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ABSTRACT

HANS URS VON BALTHASAR: JESUS CHRIST THE CONCRETE FOUNDATION OF
FAITH
Robert Emmett Burns
University of Dayton, 199^
Advisor: Rev. Johann G. Roten, S.M., S.T.D.
This thesis examines Hans Urs von Balthasar's theology of

the act of divine faith in Jesus Christ, and God in Christ. The

central question for fundamental theology as posed by Balthasar
is "How does God's revelation in Christ confront man in history?

How is it perceived?" Can one have actual knowledge of Jesus
Christ, and God in Christ, in the act of divine faith? Chapter I
examines the history of the epistemology and theology of the act
of faith during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Chapter

II analyzes Balthasar's writings concerning the manner in which
God in Christ is perceived in the act of faith. Chapter III,

considers the question of nature and grace as found in Balthas
ar's writings, particularly his use of "analogy of being."

Chapter IV is a critical analysis and conclusions about founda
tions for the act of faith and theology.
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INTRODUCTION

Christian faith presupposes

sense.

If

theology

Christology

is

faith-knowing

some

is

that we can

"faith

of

seeking

"know" Christ,

understanding,"

seeking

Christ

in
then

understanding.

Christology then must suppose that we can come to some knowledge of
Christ

which

Our

century.

is

relevant

initial

to our

as

lives

faith-knowing

of

live

we

Christ

is

them

in

this

already

an

understanding. So we need to define exactly what we mean by "faith

knowing"

and

Christ do we
deeper

"understanding."
think we

understanding

have
are

we

What

of

kind

(and can we

seeking?

faith-knowledge

have)

How

can

and what
we

come

of

kind of
to

this

knowledge?
These questions can only be asked and answered in terms of our

own

cultural

and historical

context.

Jaroslav

Pelikan,

quoting

Albert Schweitzer, says of the contextualization of christology:

"Each successive epoch," Schweitzer said, "found its own
thoughts in Jesus, which was indeed, the only way in which it
could make him live"; for, typically, one, "created him in
accordance with one’s own character."1
Each age seems to get the image of Jesus

it wants and needs.

But

the image that simple believers live by, may or may not correspond

'jaroslav Pelikan, Jesus Through the Centuries: His Place in
the History of Culture. New York: Harper & Row; Yale University
Press, 1985, pp. 2.
1

2
to that which theologians develop.1 *Given the contextualization of

christology, how is historical continuity and identity with Christ
to be maintained?

Hebrew

13:

8-9

tells

us

"Jesus

that

Christ

the

is

same

yesterday and today and forever. Do not be led away by diverse and

strange

teachings."

While

this

can be

and

given a metaphysical

theological sense, in what sense is this true in human history? The

context to which this verse speaks is that of fidelity to correct
teaching about Christ's identity and significance.

Revelation in

Christ occurred in a Jewish context of meaning to which Jesus of

Nazareth

addressed

himself

and

in

which

he

received.

was

The

context of meaning had developed over centuries as revealed in the
Old Testament.
place

Assuming

in Christ in

the

truth of

the

revelation which

that meaning context,

how can that

took

truth be

passed on in new historical and cultural contexts?3 Can historicism
and relativism be avoided? The fact of continuity and discontinuity

in Christian

tradition and

evident. Historical

in history

and

and cultural contexts

culture
are

not

generally

is

self-enclosed

systems or intergenerational and intercultural exchange would not
be

possible.

But,

particularly

with

respect

to

the

Christian

tradition of Christ, what are the criteria by which identity and

continuity

are

to

be

maintained?

What

can

be

the

basis

for

1 See Gerard S. Sloyan, The Jesus Tradition: Images of Jesus in
the West. Mystic, Conn.: 1986. Sloyan traces the images which have
been vital in the lives of great spiritual teachers and believing
people.

3I am assuming that real truth can be communicated through a
contingent historical context of meaning.

3
certitude

in

these

answering

Christ's universal

questions?

significance

How

throughout

can

history

we

understand
for

and

all

peoples? How can there be different images of Christ in different

times and cultures while,

in the historical sense, He remains the

same from age to age? What is there about Christ that can be and is
universally true for all humanity in every age?

These questions necessarily assume that

there

is

something

about humanity which is universally true in every time and place.
It assumes a Christian anthropology based on Christ’s humanity.

It

assumes that there are some fundamental, existential and universal
human conditions, and questions about human existence and destiny

which transcend historical and cultural contexts, to which Christ

is the

answer.1 He

is

the answer both

in

the

sense that

he

has

humanly lived through those fundamental conditions and questions

and revealed the truth about human reality in every age, and in the

sense that he has

lived and revealed the truth about

humanity's

transcendental questions - the truth about ultimate destiny,

and

the relationship between life now and life eternal.

*"The Gospel, and therefore evangelization, are certainly not
identical with culture, and they are independent in regard to all
cultures. Nevertheless, the Kingdom which the Gospel proclaims is
lived by men who are profoundly linked to a culture, and the
building up of the Kingdom cannot avoid borrowing the elements of
human culture or cultures. Though independent of cultures the
Gospel and evangelization are not necessarily incompatible with
them; rather they are capable of permeating them all without
becoming subject to any one of them." Pope Paul VI, On Evange1izat ion
in
the Modern World: Apostolic Exhortation Evange1i i
Nunt iandi. Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference,
1976, par.20, pp. 16-17.

It

But, he has done all that in a particular meaning context. God

has truly become flesh in the context of Judaism, and by doing so
he has permanently become part of human history in a human way, and

the revelation in Christ

is now passed on in a human historical

way, subject to its finite and contingent nature, albeit with the
aid of

the

Holy Spirit.

Does human historical

reality,

in

metaphysical, ontological and epistemological dimensions,

its

permit

the continuity and identity of truth in any objective and universal

sense? Put another way, is there an epistemology of human religious

knowledge and an ontology of human language which can provide the

philosophical grounding for such continuity and identity? How can
Revelation which took place nearly two-thousand years ago speak to

the present? How can Jesus of Nazareth, Risen Lord and Christ, be
known through faith in a way that is relevant to today?

In the dialectic between past and present, text
tion) and present faith experience,

(and tradi

the historical Jesus and the

Jesus of faith, is the only arbiter of truth the Archimedean lever

of human subjective experience, and therefore the authority of the
human subject?

Are the structures of human subjectivity the basis

for certitude in matters of Revelation? Or, if faith is based on

Cod's authority, is certitude a particular dimension of the act of
faith

itself,

which certitude

comes

from Christ,

the

immediate

object of faith? If so, how do we encounter and receive certitude

from Christ,

the

immediate

certitude with respect
know only second-hand?

object

of

faith?

How

can

we

have

to a contingent historical event that we

5

These are

some

of

the

central

questions of

our

age

which

underlie development of doctrine and inculturation issues. How one

resolves these questions of continuity,

and certitude

identity,

with respect to Christ, the object of faith, will determine one’s
theology of revelation and of the act of faith, or vice versa. A
theology of revelation and of the act of faith are correlatives.
Vhat one believes to be the elements of a theology of revelation

will determine what one believes to be the elements of the act of
faith. Further, one's theology of development of doctrine directly

depends on one's theology of revelation. For example,

if one holds

to a propositional conception of revelation and faith, one's theory

of doctrinal development will be logical, rather than transformistic or theological J Finally, one's theory of cultural correlation

will depend
doctrinal

in part

on how one

development

is

one

resolves

essential

these prior
dimension

issues,

of

as

cultural

correlation.
In this thesis my overall objective is to show how Hans Urs

von Balthasar's method,

and his theology of revelation and faith

which is the basis for his christology, provides a way to respond
to

the

question

of

how we

can

know

Christ

in

this

age.

The

objective can be summed up with the question: How does Hans Urs von
Balthasar propose we can know Christ in our age?

For each age, the life and teachings of Jesus represented an
answer (or, more often, the answer) to the most fundamental

5J.H. Valgrave. "Doctrine, Development of.” New Catholic
Encyclopedia. Vol. k. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 940-944,
at 941.

6

questions of human existence and of human destiny, and it was
to the figure of Jesus as set forth in the Gospels that those
questions were addressed?
Behind the

positions taken by

intellectual

the scholars of

each

epoch are some fundamental assumptions.
There will be some fundamental assumptions which adherents of
the variant systems within the epoch unconsciously presuppose.
Such assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know
what they are assuming because no other way of putting things
has ever occurred to them. With these assumptions a certain
limited number of types of philosophic systems are possible?

Cor relatively, "the way any particular age has depicted Jesus

is

often a key to the genius of that age."

How

should

we

in

our

age

proceed

to

know

and

understand

Christ? What do we mean by faith-knowledge of Christ? Immediately

we are faced with the question of methodology.

Where do we start

and how do we proceed? What questions must our method address to

achieve our goal of knowing and understanding Christ in a way that

is

relevant

to our

contemporary setting? Christ

challenged

the

assumptions of his age. Or, would it be more accurate to say that

he challenged some fundamental human assumptions which simply take
different cu1tural-historical forms in different times and places?

How does our method allow Christ to challenge us and our questions
and assumptions?

How can we ask the questions to which Christ is

the answer? We have
Jesus

is

to keep in mind

paradigmatic of

humanity's

that

Israel's

rejection of

rejection of

Jesus

and

the

revelation which he is of human and transcendental reality. Is our

‘Pelikan, p. 2.

’ibid., p. 2, quoting Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the
Modern World. New York: Mentor Editions, 1952, pp. 49-50.

7

epoch open

to Christ? Does

our method

put

us

in a

fundamental

posture of being taught and receiving from Christ, or does it put

us

in

the fundamental

posture of

determining and

authenticating

Christ? Is our method or our form of christology determined by the
content of the gospel, or does it shape and determine the gospel's

contents?* If Christ is the Revelation of God who is universally
in

significant

necessary

to

all

assure

times
that

and

places,

Christ's

what

kind

universal

method

is

significance

is

of

appropriately proclaimed in our age in continuity with the past?
Who or what is the source of our certitude about Christ?

We are not the first generation of Christians to be faced with
these

questions.

As

previously

indicated,

different

periods

of

Christian history have raised different questions with respect to

what is known and understood, and what the particular historical
period wants and needs to know about Christ. But, such a search in

each period must have proceeded according to some method,

uncon

*For the argument that content does indeed determine form and
therefore method see Colin E. Gunton, Yesterday & Today: A Study of
Continuities in Christology. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Pub. Co.,
1983. "The content of Christian belief, at least until the time of
the Enlightenment, was expressed in words that were for the most
part common to all times -except the very earliest- and parts of
the Christian world. The form of talk about Christ was that of the
language of Nicaea and Chalcedon, which formed a centre for the
Christology of most major Christian theologians, certainly in the
West. From the time of Schleiermacher there has been a division
between those who would express the content in a different form and
those who believe the old forms to be indispensable in certain
respects if the content is to be retained. The argument of this
book is to be that certain changes of form entail also a change in
content: and that it is very difficult to maintain a real continu
ity with earlier ages unless we can at ieast in some ways affirm
their words as our words, even though necessarily we shall not use
and understand those words precisely as they did. Ibid., p. 5.

8

scious

and

though

implicit

that

might

method

be.

Fundamental

assumptions determine method.

In the first chapter, I plan to explore the historicai context

which gave rise to the theological questions which Balthasar and
other theologians, particularly the Transcendental Thomists, were
trying to solve. Then,

in Chapter II,

I will present Balthasar's

approach to the initial act of faith in Christ. This will involve
his epistemology, and by way of comparison that of the Transcenden

tal

This

Thomists.

theology

of

"legible

form"

aesthetics.”

the

act

of

will

chapter

of

faith-knowing

or

Christ,

As we examine

theology of Balthasar,

move

then

what

the

we will

as

a

fundamental

also be

examine

his

of

the

perception

calls

he

to

on

"theological

his

assumptions

looking

the

in

indirectly and

secondarily at the assumptions of the theology of our age, partic
ularly

those of Transcendental Thomism.

In Chapter

III,

I

will

address the question how it is possible for us to participate in
God's life of knowing and

loving Himself,

which was assumed

Chapter II. This is the problem of nature and grace. Here,
examine Balthasar's use of "analogy of being"

problem of nature and grace.

Chapter IV will

in

I will

to understand

the

contain a critical

analysis and conclusions to be drawn about how Christ can be known
by faith today according to von Balthasar.
My

own

approach

to

Balthasar's

thought

is

systematic

in

method, whereas Balthasar's approach to theology is more synthetic
than systematic. In fact, I agree with Balthasar that a completely
sytematic approach to theology is impossible because God is

the

9
object of Revelation. A diversity of

the

is

Gospels,

necessitated

by

the

theologies, as evidenced by

nature

of

the

object

of

Revelation. But the question is whether all theologies are equally

true in method and content. Or, do they all equally understand the

reality contained in Revelation? That reality, God, is one. Somehow
all

unity.

diverse and

is

that

Consequently,

aspects

fundamental

approaches to God,

true of God

the

of
the

question

Revelation

in Revelation must

becomes

one

determine

object of Revelation?

of

method.

What

theological

proper

there

If

have a

are

such

fundamental aspects which determine a proper approach to Revela
tion, how can and do they lead to diverse theologies? While I can
not do

so

in

this

thesis,

one might ask what,

if

any,

are

the

similarities in method of the Gospel writers in their approach to
understanding and knowing Christ? It is my belief, that Balthasar

has

identified and conceptualized

writers.

However,

the methodology

of

the Gospel

I will not be able to document that belief

in

this thesis.
I will be drawing from only a few of Balthasar's works and

secondary sources. Consequently, my arguments and conclusions must
be tenative, though I believe the works and sources chosen fairly

represent his thought.

CHAPTER I
THE HISTORICAL THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT

The Immediate Historical Context

Theologians in each age develop their particular theological
approaches in response to theological questions to which their age

gives birth. Usually those questions have a history that can be
traced to the questions and answers of prior ages. One needs to ask
from a historical perspective what fundamental problem is Balthasar

and other theologians of his period trying to solve? The immediate
context of Balthasar's Christology is that of the 1940's and what

was called "the new theology" (nouvelle theologie).
The Church in Europe,

in the years 1930 to 1950, in the midst

of a time of crisis and change affecting every aspect of European
society,

revival,

witnessed

an

return

to the

a

enormous

intellectual

and

theological

sources of Christian Revelation.*

This

upsurge was really a wave that started at the turn of the century

and was

now

cresting and

about

to crash

onto

the

contemporary

scene. "No small part of this world-wide revival and upheaval

theology has been centered in France;

in fact,

in

since the turn of

*Marcellino D'Ambrosio. "Ressourcement Theology , Aggiornamento,
and the Hermeneutics of Tradition," Communio 18 (Winter, 1991), pp.
530-555, at 530.
10

11
the century

the French

spearheaded this

have

theological

move

ment. nllIt was this revival which gave rise to the ’’new theology."
The fundamental desire that seems to drive the "new theology" is to
rediscover the authentic Christ, to know him with the certitude of
faith, and to bring him to the modern world. But we really need to

go back to the nineteenth century context to see how the problems
of the 1940*s arose.

General Theological Background- 19th Century

During the nineteenth century Catholic theologians as a whole
had been in reaction to the rationalism of the eighteenth century.
They were united in the common aim of trying to show the errors of

those types of rationalism which either rejected religious belief

or

reduced

it

to

rational,

natural

belief.

They

were

bitterly

divided on the philosophical and theological method to be used. The
battle was between the post-Kantians and the Neo-Thomist scholas

tics.

They were

divided on

the most

fundamental

issues of

relationship between nature and grace, faith and reason,

the

natural

versus supernatural knowledge of God, innate awareness of God, and

revelation and philosophy. In essence the issues being raised were
about the metaphysical nature of finite and transcendent reality,
the

natural

and

epistemological

the

supernatural,

question

of

human

and

correspondingly,

knowledge

of

the

transcendent

reality. To put it more concretely, how did human created reality

permit Cod's transcendent reality to be revealed in Christ,
11 James M. Connolly, The
Macmillan Co., 1961, p. xi.

Voices

of

France.

New

York:

in a

The

12

contingent historical/cultural context? Secondily, how could that

revelation

in Christ

historical/cultural

be

known

context,

in

a

way

in a

new

continuity

and

cer t i tudelland
*

now with

that

had

identity with the authentic revelation in Christ? These issues were

critical to a unified approach to the act of faith, the nature of
theology, theological method, development of doctrine and apologetics.

As we will

see,

these

fundamental questions converged and

became focused on the question of the nature of the act of faith in

Christ,

and God’s revelation of

himself

in Christ.

Prior to

the

second half of the nineteenth century, Thomism was basically dor

mant.

It had declined along with scholasticism due to its corrup

tion by Cartesian rationalism during the eighteenth century. When

neo-Thomism develops in the second half of the nineteenth century,

what distinguishes it from scholasticism is precisely Neo-Thomism's

commitment to Thomi sm.13
At the beginning of

theologians

heritage,

were

in

the nineteenth century,

basically

reaction

to

out

of

touch

post-Cartesian

rationalism, and Hegelian pantheism,

they

with

since Catholic

their

scholastic

rationalism,

"attempted

to

Kantian
restore

Catholic theology by using new theological methods modeled on the

llHi stor i cal ly the quest seems to have been for objective
scientific certitude, rather than the certitude of faith. This
involves the issue of whether God's revelation of Himself can be
known other than with the certitude of faith. I will try to address
that question in the final chapter of this thesis.
nGerald A. McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth
Century: The Quest for a Unitary Method. New York: The Seabury
Press, 1977, pp. 17-19.

Ibid., pp. 27-30.

13
philosophical

method

of

post-Cartesian philosophy."1*

The

post-

Kantian theory of knowledge, anthropology, and metaphysics of the

German

idealists,

Schelling,

especially

were

the

philosophical

vehicles used. The theology of the "Catholic Tubingen School, the

metaphysical

dualism of Anton

Gunther,

and

the

"ontologism"

of

Romini and Gioberti were built upon it."*
15

differed

Post-Kantians

reality

could

be

known

by

from Kant
intuitive

in holding
reason

that

noumenal

(Vernunf t),

though

discursive reason (Verstand) was limited to objective phenomena.
The intuitive process of reasoning had two stages. First, intuitive
reason passively received metaphysical reality

discursive

reason

scientifically

reflected

(Glaube).
upon

the

Second,
intuited

metaphysical reality (Wissen). "Philosophy was understood to be a

science (ffissenschaft) of faith (Glaube). or a science of revela
tion." Christologically, Christ and Revelation in Christ could be

uIbid., pp. 2,

13.

l5Ibid., p. 13; regarding "Ontologism" see Ibid., Chapter 4
and: D. Cleary, New Cathol ic Encyclopedia. Vol. 10. New York:
McGraw-Hill,
1967-79, pp. 701-703; Albert Keller, Sacramentum
Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology. Vol. 4. New York: Herder and
Herder; London: Burns ic Oates, Ltd., 1970, pp. 290-292. Transcen
dental Thomism tries to avoid "ontologism," while retaining some of
its insights. ". . . the formulas of Ontologism are to be rejected
insofar as they affirm the perpetual presence of God to human
reason in the form of an object. Nonetheless, there is a justifi
able purpose behind this assertion, one which was native to the
Augustinian tradition and to which Christian philosophy is again
devoting its attention today. It is the effort to explain how the
non-objectivated grasp of being, which is characteristic of the
human mind, is related to the knowledge of God, 'self-subsistent
being’, and whether this does not imply a non-objectivated
experience of God prior to and at the basis of all proof of the
existence of God." Keller, pp. 291-92. As we shall see, it is
precisely here that Balthasar differs from the Transcendental
Thomists.
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known subjectively by intuitive reason and Christology would then

be

scientifically

addition,

derived

the metaphysical

that

from

intuitive

knowledge.”

In

realities available through intuitive

reason, in the fashion of Plotinus, composed "an organic universe
of interrelated forms or souls." This is the model of "faith" and
"reason" that the post-Kantians proposed. It assumed a certain con
ception

of

and

grace

nature,

and

in

its

turn

determined

"the

relation between revelation, apologetics, and positive speculative
theology.... "l? Naturally, this more subjective intuitive approach
to truth, gave the post-Kantian nonscholastics a greater "sensitiv

ity to the intelligibility of history,

tradition and community,"

and a greater "appreciation of the apologetics of immanence" than

the Neo-Thomists.”
In the second half of the nineteenth century Neo-Thomism was

revived to deal with the problems of faith and reason which the
traditionalist's fideist approach and the more correlationist post-

Kantian approach of Hermes, Gunther, the Tubingen theologians, and

the

ontologists

"reacting

had

against

failed

the

to

resolve.”

Cartesian

The

subjective

Neo-Thomists

starting

point

were

in

1(Balthasar discusses the effects of this approach on method in
Christology and the unsuccessful attempts of Schleiermacher and
others to surmount rationalism and idealism in
Theodrama,
Theological Dramatic Theory. Volume III: The Dramatis Personae: The
Person in Christ, trans. Graham Harrison. San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, 1992, pp. 59-101.
”McCool, Ninteenth Century. p.

”Ibid.
”lbid., pp.

18-19.

13.
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and

epistemology

metaphysics.”1*

took

Neo-Thomists

the

position

that there was no way to correct and adapt current philosophies as
they were all

"vitiated by the fundamental defect of

individual

istic rationalism." McCool sums up their position as follows:
In modern philosophy reason was individual reason, separated
from the Church's authoritative communication of Christian
tradition. The separation of individual reason from the
Church's authoritative communication of tradition had occurred
within theology at the time of the Protestant Reformation.
Descartes had extended it to Catholic philosophy. Rationalism
and skepticism were the inevitable results of modern philos
ophy's separation of itself from Catholic tradition. Therefore
they could never be overcome until philosophy had been
persuaded to retrace its steps, abandon the modern form which
it had assumed with Descartes, and rebuild itself anew in
vital continuity with the sound Christian philosophy of the
scholastic period.

In reacting against the Cartesian subjective starting point,

the Neo-Thomists "stressed the sensible origin of man’s conceptual

The

knowledge."

universal

things,

intentional

ideas,

that

were

derived
"the

forms

represented

subjectively

correlates

of

categorical

sensible

from

the

in

singular
forms

changeless

in

sensible things themse1ves....The intelligibility of being was not
grounded in the intelligible motion of the knowing mind" as it was

for the post-Kant ians. "Nor was it grounded in an unobjective grasp
of

the

mind's

moving

infinite Goal."

For

the

Neo-thomists

the

"intelligibility of being was grounded in the contingent intelli
gibility

of

sensible

philosophy as opposed

211 bid. , p .

11.

21 Ibid., p.

19.

Ibid., p.

11.

things
to the

themselves."12

idealism of

It

was

a

realist

the post-Kantians.

The
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Neo-Thomist theory of knowledge was that one came to know God and

the mysteries contained in revealed truth through "the indirect and

concepts of

analogous

judging

a

intellect."

and

By abstraction

analogy one could come to know more what God was not rather than
what Cod was, as St. Thomas had said.

In sum,

Abstraction and analogy rather than direct and intuitive
knowledge of God distinguished the scholastic approach to Cod
from the approach of post-Cartesian philosophy and, despite
its rapprochement with modern thought in the
twentieth
century, abstraction and analogy are still the cognitional
characteristics of Thomistic metaphysics and theology.11

The

differed

epistemologies

in

several

ways.

reality, or theoretical
intellect.

of

the

First,

Neo-Thomists

and

they differed on how noumenal

and spiritual truth,

The Neo-Thomists

reality only

post-Kantians

insisted

that

indirectly in a mediated

the

is mediated to

humans

fashion,

can know

through

such

sensible

realities. The post-Kantians said that such reality can be known

directly by intuitive reason before it is conceptualized. Secondly,
for post-Kantians

the

sensible realities,

truths of the Christian faith have,

concepts,

at most,

symbols and

an instrumental

or

occasional role in mediating such intuitive knowledge.

The debate between the

Neo-Thomists and

the

other

schools

became so emotional and difficult that the Church authority had to

intervene.11 In 1870, The First Vatican Council, a Council on Faith

and the Church, promulgated the doctrine of papal infallibility and

approved the Apostolic Constitution Dei Filius. which "clarified

23Ibid., p.
Ibid.

10.
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and reaffirmed the elements of the Church's traditional teaching on

revelation

and

faith

question

by

This was

followed

which

had

nineteenth-century

in

been

or

obscured

philosophers

1879 by Leo XIII's

called

into

theologians.”*
15 *

and

disciplinary document,

Aeterni Patris which "proclaimed the Church's official option for
the Aristotelian method of

St.

Thomas

instruction. "l<

The

combined

theological

in her

philosophical

effects

of

and

these

two

documents, and Leo XIII's efforts to implement them, particularly
Aeterni Patris. shaped the history of Catholic theology in the Neo-

Thomist form until the Second Vatican Council.17 * * * *
The structure and content of the Constitution Dei Fi1ius is a
significant reflection of the issues "which had been obscured or
called into question by

theologians. Dei

the nineteenth century philosophers and

Fi1ius starts with the metaphysical

issues.

It

clearly teaches that God is the creator from nothing of all created
reality

and

is

distinct

from

the

world

both

in

reality

and

essence.11 It thus reaffirmed Pius IX's condemnation of pantheism

in the Sy1labus of Errors promulgated
anathematize

those

specific

forms

of

in 1864.15 Specific Canons
pantheism which hold

that

15Ibid., p. 216.
15Ibid. , p. 2.
’’ibid., p. 236-240.
uHenry Denziger, Denziger: The Sources of Catholic Dogma.
trans, by Roy J. Deferrari from the Thirtieth Edition of Enchiri
dion Symboiorum. St. Louis, MO. and London: B. Herder Book Co.,
1957, 1782-1783; DS 3001-3002.

2’lbid.,

1701; DS 2901.
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the

created realities emanate from the divine substance, or that
divine essence becomes all

affirms

the

is

universal

or

In Chapter 2 the Council takes up Revelation.

indefinite being.30
It

or that God

things,

fact

of

positive

supernatural

revelation,

the

necessity of revelation given the supernatural end of humanity, the
sources of revelation in scripture and Tradition, and the necessity

of interpreting scripture in accord with the mind of the Church.31 *
Chapter 3 addresses the epistemological dimension of truth by
taking up the issue of faith. The Council first defines faith as a

supernatural virtue which requires grace to believe revelation on

God’s

authority,

tion.33

reason,

However,
and

that

rather
it

then
it

is

than on

the

that

affirms

itself

intrinsic

a

gift

truth

faith

is

of

God,

of

revela

consonant
including

with

the

preliminary faith needed for justification.33 It then declares that

30Ibid. ,

1804; DS 3024.

31Ibid.,

1785-1788; DS 3004-3007.

3l". . . faith, which is 'the beginning of salvation,’ the
Catholic Church holds to be a supernatural virtue. By it, with the
inspiration and help of God’s grace, we believe that what He has
revealed is true, not because of its intrinsic truth seen by the
light of natural reason, but because of the authority of God
revealing it, who can neither deceive nor be deceived;" (my
emphasis) Ibid., 1789; DS 3008. But the question remains as to how
we perceive God’s authority at work in persons or events. Vatican
I points to the manifestation of God’s power and knowledge in
miracles and prophecy, but these are "exterior proofs" given to
reason so that "the obedience of our faith be nevertheless in
harmony with reason." These "divine facts" are "joined to the
interior helps of the Holy Spirit" and "manifestly display the
omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God." Consequently, "they are
the most certain signs of the divine revelation, adapted to the
intelligence of all men." (DS 3009)
33Ibid.,

1789-1791 ; DS 3008-3010.
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divine and Catholic faith requires belief that revelation is to be
found "in the written word of God and in tradition, and those which

are proposed by the Church, either in a solemn pronouncement or in
her ordinary and universal teaching power...."u There is a duty to

embrace the true faith and persevere in it. God gives the Church as
an external aid and supernatural virtue as an internal aid to come
to true faith and persevere in it.55

Finally,
thorny

in

question

the

of

Chapter

fourth

the

relationship

the

Council

between

natural and supernatural knowledge of God.

addresses

faith

and

the

reason,

It affirms the two-fold

order of knowledge, distinct both in principle and in their object.
It then

teaches

penetrate

that faith

revealed

analogy of

is above

mysteries

faith, without

by

the

reason and

analogy

of

leads

being

reason

and

to
the

there being any contradiction between

what is reasonable and what is proposed by faith. In a key section

it describes the reciprocal relationship between faith and reason:
... not only can faith and reason never be at variance with
one another, but they also bring mutual help to each other,
since right reasoning demonstrates the basis of faith and,
illumined by its light, perfects the knowledge of divine
things, while faith frees and protects reason from errors and
provides it with manifold knowledge.
Scholastic theology had a strong influence in the shaping of

Dei Filius' approach to faith and reason, and its assumptions about

grace and nature. These issues were a major source of the conflict

HIbid.,

1792; DS 3011.

’’ibid.,

1793-1794, DS 3012-3014.

HIbid.,

1799; DS 3019.
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between

the

embattled

post-Kantians

over

which

and

Neo-Scholastics.

the

could

approach

best

handle

the

were

They

Catholic

teaching on these issues. Of course, the underlying presuppositions
regarding theory of knowledge, anthropology, and metaphysics had to

be clarified in the process.*
3’
The

Constitution

rejected

both

the

fideist

positions

of

traditionalists and semi-rationalist positions of some nonscholas
tic theologians. It rejected the fideist position that no knowledge
of

God

was

possible

reasonableness of

apart

from

the assent of

revelation31

faith against

and

the

defended
"blind

the

leap”

approach of the Protestant pietist tradition.33 Scholars maintain
that the post-Reformation thesis of a

"pure nature," devised

to

protect the gratuity of grace, influenced both the drafting of the
constitution and its subsequent

interpretation.

The constitution

could be read as assuming this particular theology of the relation
ship between nature and grace.

It is said to have "encouraged the

development of a nonhistorical Aristotelian scientific theology in
the post-conciliar church."33

37McCool, Nineteenth Century. p.

14.

3,"Fideism" seems to have become one of those pejorative terms
used to dismiss the viewpoint of anyone who approaches Revelation
from a faith perspective. For a historical definition see S.A.
Matczak, "Fideism." New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 5. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 908-910; and, Paul Poupard, "Fideism."
Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology. Vol. 2. New York:
Herder and Herder; London: Burns & Oates, Ltd., 1970, pp. 335-337.

’’ibid., pp. 216, 217, 220.

“ibid., p. 221.
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This scientific theology assumed two distinct ways of knowing,
based

on

the

abstract,

non-existential,

possible

between pure nature and supernature. First,

distinction

there was the natural

knowledge of God one could have through reason.

Second, was

the

supernatural knowledge one could have through grace. The result of

these

assumptions

scientific

about

how one

apologetics based

come

might

on proof

of

the

to

faith

to

led

a

divine origin and

truth of the gospel by signs and wonders and rational historical
argument.

Once

one had

come by

grace of

the Holy

Spirit

to

the

assent of faith and been justified, one was provided with the first

principles which could then be developed rationally by speculative

reasoning/1 McCool sums up the effect of scholasticism’s ascendan

cy by way of Dei Fi1ius and Pastor Aeternus as follows:
Therefore the definitive victory of the neo-Thomists over
their post-Kantians rivals in the closing quarter of the
nineteenth century resulted in a tension between Roman
Thomistic theology and subjective, historical modern thought
that led to the painful confrontation of the modernist crisis,
and which Maritain endeavored to resolve through his brilliant
development of the Thomism of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas
before it broke out again in the controversy over the New
Theology a decade before the opening of the Second Vatican
Counc i1 .“
The crucial question is how one comes to make the act of judging as

true, that which is present in the object of faith, God in Christ.

Does

the certitude

of

faith

precede,

come with,

or

follow

the

judgment of faith which comes from God's authority? Precisely how
does God's authority become the motive of faith? This is not clear.

“ibid., p. 223.
“ibid., p.

13.
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Scholastic theology held that the formal object of faith is

God Himself or First Truth/3

In the actual economy of salvation in which man is elevated to
the supernatural order, the first thing that he knows supernaturally is God Himself, the First Truth in essendo, that is,
His divinity, His innermost life .... Although First Truth
and the Deity as It is in Itself are abstract theological
expressions of a kind that theologians often prefer to
concrete ones because of their exactitude, they nevertheless
mean God in the concrete, subsisting in three Divine Persons,
as these, together with the sum of all divine perfections,
have been revealed to man. Consequently God, the First Truth
ontologically, is not only the First Truth believed . . . but
also the formal object of faith in all the truths and myster
ies that have been revealed. For, as St. Thomas Aquinas
pointed out, "nothing comes under faith except in relation to
God" .... This is the commnon and constant doctrine of the
Church. The first article of faith, with which in one form or
another all the symbols begin and on which all the other
articles are based, is: I believe in God, One and Triune."
In the act of recognition of God that is central to the act of
faith and the motive for it,

both the

intellect and the will are

involved, but the intellect submits to God’s se1f-disclosure by an

act

of

the will.

In other words,

because

of

the

nature

of

the

object (God), the intellect is incapable on its own of making the

act of judgment of God's credibilty which intrinisically satisfies
it. God as object will always be greater than the

intellect can

know or comprehend sufficiently to intrinsically satisfy

it.

The

human finite intellect has an infinite capacity which allows it to

know God but can make a judgment of credibility which intrinsically
satisfies

it,

only

by evidence which it

sees

with respect

to

a* 5

>3This discussion is based primarily on the article by T.
Urdanoz, "Faith. 3. Theology of." New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol.
5. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 798-799.
Ibid., p. 798-99.
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created

The

reality.

expressing

their

in

intellect

person

in

who

judging

Jesus'

is

life-form,

judging a "who" and not a "what." Who is Jesus,

ontological nature of God's being is
judgment

(who)

is

Catholic theology
(fides

qua),

being

made

recognizes

concept

"[i]ts

looking more to who and what

of

all

of

not what

the

is

ontological

While

object.

the subjective dimensions of
faith

is

faith

objective,

primarily

is believed.God Himself,

faith,

ultimate inner motive of

first

is

the question. A functional

an

of

who

is

it

as the

"is to be understood as distinct

from the objective evidence on which natural, and even religious,
knowledge of truth may be based.

The Scholastic view was that the mind conformed itself by the
power of

the will

to

the reality

God's authority present

of

in

Christ through the weight of the divine objective evidence as seen

in the light of grace.

Faith knowing of Christ

through

sensible

reality was upheld, but based on a supernatural faith-knowing which
was graced assent to propositions about Christ on the authority of

God,

as

nature

perceived

in

and origin.

approach

the

As we

"supernatural

evidence God
will

see

gave

later,

rationalism."

of

Christ's

Balthasar

There

was

divine

calls

no

this

adequate

theological and philosophical explanation available to explain how
a personal faith-experience of Christ's personal reality could be

mediated by the Word and the Spirit, through historical Revelation

‘’ibid., p. 798.
“ibid., p. 799.
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as borne through history by the Church to the present.

Important

theologians of the twentieth century, to which we now turn, attempt
to resolve this issue primarily through the approach of Transcen

dental Thomism.
General Theological Background- 20th Century

According to Gerald McCool

the history of twentieth century

scholasticism can be divided into

period from the turn of

four stages. The first

I

and

II.

The third

the

I. Second is

the century up to World War

the period between World War

is

is the period

between World War II and Vatican II. The final period is that after

Vatican 11 ?’

At the turn of the century, prior to McCool’s first stage, the

Neo-Thomist

direction

Scholastic

of

Catholic

revival

had

theology.

taken
In

its

a

on

the

during

the

strong hold

conflicts

nineteenth century it had been forced to clarify its epistemology,
metaphysics, anthropology, and methodology in a way that gave it a

greater systematic coherence and unity.

But there was more to be

done: "scholasticism and the philosophical theology of St. Thomas

had yet to be clearly distinguished from each other." In addition,
they had not yet seen that the approaches of Thomas and Bonaventure

were not compatible,
and

metaphysics

were

nor had they seen that Thomas*
essentially

different

from

epistemology

that

of

his

uIbid., pp. 241-242, and Gerald A. McCool, S.J. "TwentiethCentury Scholasticism." The Journal of Religion (1978), pp. S198S221, at S198-199.
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commentators, Cajetan and John of St. Thomas?* Basically, the NeoThomists had not done their historical homework.
would

radically affect

the terms of

This deficiency

the future controversy

over

"the new theology." McCool sums up what was missing as follows:
The radical uniqueness of Thomas' metaphysics of existence was
largely ignored. As a result, the distinctive character of
Thomas' philosophy of man and God was also missed. The special
role which abstraction and the judgment play in Thomas'
epistemology was not appreciated. Neither was the distinction
between ratio and intellectus in Thomas' metaphysics of
knowledge.... Furthermore, the intelligible connection which
links Thomas' metaphysics of God to his personal religious
experience was not observed, much less exploited. In this
misleading presentation Thomism could not fail to give the
impression of being a highly rationalistic system....
... The writing and teaching of scholastic philosophers
and theologians displayed a markedly negative attitude toward
anything like a philosophy of intuition. Yet philosophies of
intuition were the spearhead of the philosophical revolt
against positivistic scientism in the early 1900s?*

Any hope for some rapprochement between Neo-Thomism and modern
philosophy was dashed with the

advent of Modernism in the

first

period before World War I. In their attempts to find a way to bring

the knowledge of Christ through Revelation to the modern world, the
modernists denied

that

scholasticism

was

capable

of

expressing

revelation in the way which the modern world needed. This posture
"struck

at

the

heart

educational, and social

of

Leo

XIII's

program

for

theological,

reform."*
5* The Church reacted strongly to

the new approach to exegesis, theology and doctrine. The Biblical
Commission rendered severe decrees to restrict the use of scientif

**McCool, Nineteenth Century. pp. 20, 243.

•’ibid., p. 244.

5* I b i d . , p. 247.
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ic methods. Modernism was condemned by the encyciicai Pascendi and

the decree Lamentabi 1 i. The Magisterium saw two dangerous errors at

the heart of Modernism. "First was the metaphysics of "becoming.*
The modernists had abandoned the metaphysics of being .... They
had

replaced it with

the evolutionary

"they had given up

Bergson." Secondly,

temporality of Hegel

and

the scholastic notion of

truth." The scholastic view was that truth was arrived at by the
judgement of the mind conforming itself to reality. "The judgement

of the mind unites a stable universal to a changing singular by the
"is* of the objective affirmation. The scholastic epistemology of
the conceptual

judgement... also

efficient and exemplary cause of
approach

was

conforming

it

that

itself

to

could

reality

shows that being, esse.
truth?1

explain

only

the
in

a

is the

The problem with

judgment

of

the

propositional,

rationalistic manner. At the most fundamental

level,

this
mind

highly

the crucial

question was how the reality of Christ, and God in Christ, could be

present

to

the mind

in each age with God's

authority

so as

to

permit the act of faith. Modernism sought to apply the idealist and
romantic subjective solution.
After Modernism, Thomism was viewed as the bulwark to defend

the Church against modern errors in epistemology and metaphysics.
Thomism now defined itself against "positivism, German Idealism,

and Bergsonian philosophy." At issue were the "metaphysics of being
and the epistemology of the concept." The epistemology, metaphysics

Ibid., p. 248.
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and theology of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas became the prevail

ing basis of seminary education.

Cardinal
Patris

Mercier

he

(1851-1926)

a

established

impetus from

in France took its initial

The Thomist revival

of

higher

Shortly

Belgium.

Philosophical

after

Institute

Aeterni

at

the

University of Louvain. But Thomism in France really flourished in
the

second Scholastic

period between

WW

I

(1914-18)

and WW

II

(1939-45), due to the work of Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson and

Pdre Antonin-Gilbert Serti1langes.n
The Neo-Thomist school produced theologians of great ability.
Such names

as Cardinal

Billot, de

Gardeil,

Lebreton,

Grandmaison,

profound

influence

the

French

la Taille,

and

Garrigou-Lagrange,

Marin-Sola

Neo-Thomists

had

testify
on

the

the

to

Church.

Ambroise Gardeil (1859-1931) focused his interest on the theory of
knowledge.

His "aim was

to defend,

and repr istinate,

Thomism

in

relation, first and foremost to Kant's critiques, but also with an
eye

to

the

voluntarist and pragmatist

philosophy of the day.*
53

representative

of

those

tendencies of

the

latest

Of course Blondel was the most important

with

Gardeil called Neo-Scotist.

the

voluntarist

tendencies

In opposition to the Modernists

whom
like

Loisy and Tyrrell, Gardeil developed his theory of the development
of dogma. His theory was, of course, based on his epistemology and
consequent theology of the act of faith and theology of revelation.

53Ibid., pp. 20-22; McCool, Nineteenth Century. pp. 251-255.
53Aidan Nichols, O.P. From Newman to Congar: The Idea of
Doctrinal Development from the Victorians to the Second Vatican
Counci 1. Edinburgh: T. it T. Clark, 1990, p. 156.
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Basically, it depended on the Neo-Thomist view that truth

is the

conformity of the mind to reality, the ability of the mind to make

"absolute affirmations."5*

In opposition to the post-Kantians and

Modernists he acknowledges the reality of intuition but holds that
"our intuitive powers are only actualized through being receptive
to a reality other than themselves."*
55 In other words, he does not

admit direct intuition of metaphysical realities, only a mediated

intuition through sensible realities. The experience of revelation

by the Apostles then has to have an objective cognitive content.
Despite the fact of interior inspiration, their experience is truly

revelation because it has its "guaranteed normative bearing." God's
revelation "must come to light above all in our faculty for making

absolute,

leaves

universally

them

in

valid,

possession

indefinitely transmissible."55

affirmations
of

"a

about

determinate

the

real."

It

truth

which

is

The key point, for our purposes,

to notice the way in which his Neo-Thomistic epistemology,

is

while

retaining the necessary connection with reality and importance of
propositional truth,

sought a via media to recognize the role of

the intuition and subjective religious experience of God in Christ.

The religious experience of the Apostles provided them with first

order or second order truths such as one finds in the Creeds. Later
reflection moves

to different kinds

of

concepts

to

explain and

formulate the first and second order affirmations. Marin-Sola also
5*Ibid., pp.

161-162.

55Ibid., pp.

162-163.

551 bid. , p .

164.

29
acknowledged that there must be an "affective way" as well as

a

logical way for dogma to develop.*
5’ The strict Neo-Thomists, called

the "Logicists," operated on a "concepts only" theory of knowledge,
and held that dogma not only must have a logical connection with
early dogma and revelation but that it could only develop logically
also.5* The Logicists were opposed both by Gardeil and his contem

porary,

de

Leonce

Grandmaison.

Both

these

Neo-Thomist's

were

willing to recognize the role of intuition in some limited form.55

Unfortunately, they were unable to ground the role of the intuition
in anything other than cognition of first principles. This is the

problem that I believe Balthasar's approach solves.
Despite the fact that after Modernism the Thomism of Cajetan
Thomas became the prevailing theology taught

and John of St.

in

seminaries, there were those who were still unconverted. Prior to
the

condemnation

Modernism

of

Bergson had become a

"evolutionary

and

dominant

in

1907,

figure on

vitalistic theories

from

the

about
French

1890

Henri

scene.”

influenced a host

of

His

his

contemporaries, and he prepared the way for the ... popularity of

Existential ism. "(>

In this first period before WW I,

in France,

Blondel published in 1896 his Letter on Apologetics which explained

the methodology used in his thesis,
”lbid., p.

183.

’’ibid.
’’ibid., pp.

186-187.

5*Connolly, p. 25.

51 Ibid.

L'Act ion.

"Blondel's apolog
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etics

immanence

of

presented

Christian

revelation

as

the

only

meaning-giving answer to the dynamic exigencies of the human will.

Thus it provided a point of contact with a philosophical community
whom the

Church’s traditional

apologetics could

not even

inter-

In 1908 Pierre Rousselot published L’ Intellectualisme de S.

Thomas which showed that St. Thomas'
function of the mind.

intellectus. was an intuitive

It was an "essential element in St. Thomas'

own epistemology and metaphysics. Far from being the highest object
of

human

intellect,

knowledge,

the

in St. Thomas'

substitute for

a missing

concept

of

the

the

ratio,

opinion was no more that
intuition.'43 Rousselot

discursive

the deficient

believed that

a

(lIbid., p. 250.
<3"Thus the 'three acts of the mind' are (1) understanding a
quiddity, form, essence, nature, or 'whatness'. . . by 'simple
apprehension' (which is not yet either true or false);
(2)
judgment, composing or dividing two such concepts (judgments alone
are either true or false); and (3) reasoning, proceeding from one
judgment as premise to another as conclusion. Acts of reasoning are
not either true or false;
they are logically valid (if the
conclusion necessarily follows from the premises) or invalid (if it
does not)." Summa of the Summa. edited and annotated by Peter
Kreeft. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990, p. 328. Intellectus or
understanding is the simple apprehension by abstraction of the
universal form from the sensory phantasm according to St. Thomas.
But the simple fact of existence or "esse" seems to be an intuitive
act of judgment that is direct and immediate without abstraction.
It is a judgment of an act not a form. I can judge that something
"is" without knowing what it is. In fact, the act of abstraction
depends on such a prior judgment, as the act of being gives reality
to a form. If we move to the level of persons, what is the nature
of the understanding and judgment by which I know another through
their conscious and unconscious self-expression? Here another type
of "form" which expresses the essence of their personhood, while
concealing it from direct and immediate perception, appears. But it
would seem that an intuitive ability of the intellect is operating
in our judging the meaning and significance of another's person
hood. Since, each person is unique by definition, intuition by
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clear understanding of St. Thomas’ view of the intuitive mind could

resolve

the

apparent conflict

between an

objective,

scientific

apologetics, and the dogma that the whole act of faith, both the

initial assent, conversion, and

justification depended on grace.

Rousselot’s

found

proposed

solution,

in

Les

Yeux

de

la

foi.

maintains that the intellectus. the intuitive mind, can be modified
freely by the will before one makes a judgment on the level of the
rat io. This is a description of the process by which rationaliza

tion or denial might take

place and would profoundly effect

the

ability of the mind to "allow an intelligibility to appear to it on

the level of the judgment." A related concept that was important to
the act of faith, the theology of revelation, and the development
of dogma was Rousselot's concept of loving knowing or sympathetic

knowledge.*
4*

This

is

"a

movement

of

the

intel lectus ♦ . . ♦

The

influence of connaturality and the attitude of sympathetic love" in

the

process

of

faith,

"can

account

for

the

reasonableness

and

freedom of the supernatural act of faith."45 If he were right,then
the gap between Thomistic theology and those based on philosophies

smaller than Thomists

were willing to acknowl

edge.44 Rousselot's thought will surface

in Henri de Lubac's work

of

intuition was

abstraction of a universal seems self-contradictory. I believe this
has important implications for the act of faith, the act by which
we recognize the formal object of faith, God in Christ.

4*Nichols, From Newman to Congar. p.

198.

45Gerald A. McCool, S.J., From Unity to Plural ism: The Internal
Evolution of Thomism. New York: Fordham University Press, 1989, p.
77.

Ibid., pp. 250-251.
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which contributed to the New Theology controversy after WWII, and
also in Balthasar's thought.

Rousselot

died

tragically

in

WW

I.

But

the

influence

of

Rousselot and Blondel "remained a powerful force among the French

Jesuits."*
ably

by

In his thought Rousselot had been influenced consider
another

scholasticism between WW
Thomism emerged;

Joseph

Jesuit,

those of

I

an

WW

Marechal?1

II

three

Jacques Maritain,

the

period

of

distinct

streams

of

In

Etienne Gilson

and

Joseph Marechal.

Jacques Maritain brilliantly developed traditional Thomistic

metaphysics in his "Creative Intuition which was an in-depth study
of the

imagination in a Thomistic theory of

role of the

knowl

edge.While Maritain maintained the epistemology of the concept,

he also respected

the nonconceptual knowledge of the artist

and

mystic. "No other Thomist ... realized more completely Leo XIII's
hopes for scholasticism as a unifier of human exper ience.
Etienne Gilson was fascinated by medieval philosophy. His many

years of research led him to the conclusion that a common scholas
tic philosophy had never existed in the Middle Ages. The epistemol

ogy and metaphysics of Bonaventure, Thomas and Duns Scotus were so
opposed as to require distinct theologies. Gilson himself preferred

Thomas. Gilson discovered

that

in Thomas'

thought the notion of

^McCool, Nineteenth Century. p. 251.
uMcCool, Unity to Pluralism, pp. 61-63.
^McCool, Nineteenth Century. p. 253.
,#Ibid., p. 253.
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being is acquired through a double operation of the

judgment and

could not be grasped through an intuition of the imagination as
Maritain thought.71 The first judgment in Thomas'
something

is.

It

a

is

something has esse.

judgment

of

has being. This

existence,

is

that

judgment

that

thought

a

judgment that something has

being is the judgment of an act, for being is not a form. Rather it
is the act which confers reality upon form. This insight led him to

the

conclusion

Aristotelianism.

that

Thomas'

philosophy

is

not

a

Christianized

It is "an integral part of a theology which must

begin with the Christian God and descend to his universe following

the theological order."71 The Thomism of Gilson was fundamentally
at odds with the Thomism of Maritain. But it was even more opposed
to Blondel*s phenomenology of the human spirit.

Blondel was trying to show that the dynamic exigence of the
human spirit must lead a philosopher to affirm God's exis
tence.... Should he deny it, his very denial would entail a
lived contradiction between his verbal denial and the vital
drive of the human spirit. Gilson denied that any such lived
contradiction could be proved.73
Influenced by Blondel and Rousselot, Marechal constructed a
five

volume

between St.

dialogue

(Le

Point

Thomas and Kant.

de

depart

His thesis was

de

la

m£taphysique )

that had Kant

been

consistent in his own method, and remembered that the mind's act of

knowledge was not static, but was instead a dynamic operation with
a tendency toward an end, he would have ended up with a metaphysics

71Ibid. , pp. 253-254
7IIbid. , P- 255.

73Ibid. , P- 256.
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identical with that of St. Thomas. For, according to Marechal,
end of the movement of the mind in knowing,

the

is the existence of

Unlimited Being, as its a priori condition of possibility. Thus he
would have come to the starting point of a realistic metaphysics.
It would have been identical with that of Thomas Aquinas

...for the a priori condition of possibility for every
speculative judgment is the existence of the Infinite Pure Act
of Esse as the term of the mind's dynamism. . . . The extramental
correlate of the objective judgment must be matter, form, and
existence... But matter, form, and existence are the metaphys
ical constituents of the sensible singular in the philosophy
of Saint Thomas.’*
So,

in the

period between the wars three distinct

Thomisms

emerge. Each differed from the other about the role of the judgment
in

epistemology,

the

abstraction

of

being,

and

the

nature

of

Thomas’ philosophical theology.’5

"The New Theology"

In

1943

Pope Pius

XII

issued

"monumental encyclicals

direction and encouragement

contributed force,

movement in France:

the

to

the

that

religious

theological Mystici Corporis Christi and

the scriptural Divino Afflante Spiritu. The French received these

as

encouragement

and

a

"breath

of

fresh

air."’*

The

different

streams of French thought, the theological renewal, existentialism,
post-Hegelianism,

the influence of Marxism and Socialism, and the

post war conditions of the time were combining to create a mandate

’*Ibid., pp. 256-257.
’’ibid., p. 257.

’^Connolly, p.

175.
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for the Church to open to the world. Connolly describes the situa

tion as follows:

The best description of the French Church after the war would
be to state that she was seized by the missionary spirit. As
the onus of the occupation was lifted, the French Church stood
marked by certain qualities: a theological movement rooted in
the sources of theology, and preoccupied with those notes
sounded by the Magisterium; a dynamic Catholic Action move
ment, many of whose members had shared the wartime horrors
with non-Catholics; some extremely capable and enlightened
members of the Episcopate, Lienart of Lille, Gerlier of Lyon,
Weber of Strasbourg and Suhard of Paris; men in authority of
a fairly liberal turn of mind; and, finally, thinkers and
writers of great intellectual caliber, open to the intellectu
al currents of the modern world.”
The

"new

Already,

controversy

theology"

in

February

1942,

the

out

emerged
term

of

"nouvelle

this

context.

theologie"

had

appeared in an article by Mgr. Parente in the Osservatore Romano in
relation to two Dominican writers.
In

1941

the

Jesuits

at

"a series

series Sources Chretiennes.

with

the

original

introduction."”

texts,

In

the

year

of

with

printed

same

near

Fourvidre,

they

Lyons,

Patristic

notes
also

and

started,

started

the

translations
an

extended

Theologie:

Etudes publiees sous la direction de la faculte de theologie S.J.
de Lyon-Fourvifere.

"a series of monographs covering a variety of

subjects from the patristic studies of Danielou and Mondesert

the

historical

perspectives

of

de

Lubac

and

the

to

speculative

analyses of Fessard and Mouroux."” This effort was building on the

’’ibid., p.

177.

’’Robert F. Harvanek, "Philosophical Pluralism and Catholic
Orthodoxy." Thought 25 (March 1950)96: 21-51, at 23.
’’ibid., p. 24.
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liturgical and biblical revival which had been in progress since
It had been provoked by the profound awareness of the

the 1890's.
need to

Danielou and
between

to relate Christianity

find a way
the

others

involved saw a profound

theology

patristic

to the modern world.

and

modern

"pivotal

history, human solidarity, and personal

correspondence

categories

as

subjectivity" which they

saw as forming "the warp and woof of patristic thought.

While France was the center of this theological activity, the
"new theology" was not limited to France. It included such Belgian

and

thinkers

German

Guardini, Karl Adam,
primarily

by

as

Dorn

and Dorn Anselm Stolz.

Jesuits

the

Mersch,

Emile

at

Lyons

and

Odo

Casel,

In France

the

Romano

it was

Dominicans

of

led
Le

Saulchoir. It included Henri de Lubac, Jean Dani€lou, Hans Urs von
Balthasar, Yves Congar, Marie-Dominique Chenu, and Louis Bouyer.11

Those

involved differed

in many

respects and did

not

share

one

theological system.
What united this diverse group were the convictions that I)
theology had to speak to the Church's present situation and
that 2) the key to theology's relevance to the present lay in
the creative recovery of its past. In other words, they all
saw clearly that the first step to what later came to be known
as aggiornamento had to be ressourcement-- a rediscovery of
the riches of the Church's two-thousand year treasury, a
return to the headwaters of the Christian tradition.11

For

them

return

to

the

sources

was

a

creative

hermeneutical

exercise in which the burning questions of the present were asked

“d'Ambrosio, pp. 539-540.
“ibid., p. 531.
“ibid., p. 532.
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of

the

This

past.*5

ressourcement

was

not

theological

simply

historical scholarship, but an attempt to return to the sources of

the Church's vitality, to the "fountain-head of dynamic spiritual
life which never runs dry."’* Their goal was the revitalization of
the life of the Church and "a recentering in the person of Christ

and in his Paschal mystery." They wanted to establish "a spiritual
and

intellectual

moments as

communion with

transmitted to

which would nourish,

Catholicism."*5

Here,

us

Christianity

in its

classic

in

its most

texts,

vital

a communion

invigorate, and rejuvenate twentieth-century

we

see

clearly

the

search

for

a

way

to

rediscover the faith-knowing of Christ evidenced in the patristic
sources, and the search for a way to explain that faith-knowing in

contemporary terms.
The return to the sources did not mean that these theologians
rejected or despised St. Thomas or the medieval period. Indeed many
were committed Thomists, but not committed in the same way the neo
scholastics were. Several of the Lyons Jesuits were committed to a

critical re-investigation of the Scholastic tradition. They stood
on the shoulders of their predecessors like Rousselot and Mardchal.

The debate initiated by these theologians had been carried forward

by J.F. Bonnefoy, R. Draguet, and L. Chariier. What they found was
that the rigid, non-historical and rationalistic character of much

131 bid.

’* I b i d. , p. 537.
’’ibid., p. 538.
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neo-Scholastic thinking and "conclusion" theology did not genuinely

reflect St. Thomas. Thomas emerges as one who was "in substantial
continuity

with

Scholastism,

positive

the

on the other hand,

theology

of

the

had modified St.

Fathers."”

Thomas

Neo-

through

commentators like Cajetan, and John of St. Thomas. His thought had
been further corrupted by Neo-Thomism which had added "heavy doses
of Suarezianism and Baftezianism (not to mention [Christian] Wolff

and Descartes)."17

not

a

What

restoration or

the

ressourcement theologians

repristination of

St.

Thomas

or

sought was
patristic

theology, but a capturing of their spirit and methodology.”
What Thomas and the Fathers had done was to distill the
essence of the tradition for their respective generations. In
their organic conception of the unity of theology and life as
well as in their hermeneutical effort to rearticulate tradi
tional doctrine in the language of their contemporaries, these
classical theologians offer today's Church a paradigm of
authentic theological method.”
The

debate

with

the

Neo-Thomists

which

eventually

led

to

Humani Generis began in earnest in 1946, with Danielou's publica
tion of a provocative article:

"Les Orientations Presentes de la

Pensee Religieuse." In this article Danielou attempted to describe

the current theological situation and the kind of
the times demanded.

theology which

It reflects the discontent which many French

theologians felt in the 1940's. He indicts scholasticism for being

“ibid. , PP . 542-543.
”lbid. , P. 543. quoting Gilson. Letters, 33 n. 6.

”lbid. , P- 545.
”I bid. , P- 547.
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disengaged from the currents of contemporary thought. In fact, they
were mired in Greek philosophical categories which were incapable

the modern world.

of engaging

while

sense,

history

Scholastism

from Hegel

historical

lacked any

has

to Bergson

been a

central

category of modern thought. "In an existentialist world, it remains

essentialist

resolutely

and

objectivist,

oblivious

to

human

subjectivity.... [It] is cut off from the daily life of the people
of God....and

is

thus

incapable of

offering

them spiritual

and

doctrinal nourishment."

This article stimulated a vigorous attack by the Neo-Thomists
in the Revue Thomiste in Paris and the Angelicum in Rome. It became

clear that the "real point at issue was the nature of the develop
ment of doctrine, philosophical and theological, and the position

of

Thomas within

St.

that development."’1

The

rebuttal

articles

sought to defend the identity of the modern Thomist theology of the

Garriqou-Lagrange and Maritain school, with that of St. Thomas him

self. What the Neo-Thomists feared was that the "new theology" was

headed toward theological relativism.’2 What the crux of the debate

revolved around were issues of nature and grace which involved St.
It had become

Thomas' metaphysics, anthropology and epistemology.

evident

that

Thomists,

the pure nature,

foundational

to

supernature

their

two-order

concepts
theory

of

of

the

Neo-

knowledge,

theology of the act of faith, logicist doctrinal development, and
MIbid., pp. 534-535.

^Harvanek, p. 25.
Ibid.
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apologetics,

scientific

were

not

to

found

be

in

medieval

the

Doctors or the Fathers.’3
Two important works became the focus of the debate.

Bouillard had published a remarkable

Henri

theology

of

justification,

Conversion

et

study on St.
grace

chez

S.

In

1944

Thomas'

Thomas

d'Aquin.” And, in 1946, the same year as Danielou's article, Henri

de

Lubac

published

Surnature1.”

Bouillard’s

study

was

purely

historical, but in investigating St. Thomas' views on justification
Bouillard included

some reflections on the

historical nature

of

theology. In comparing St. Thomas' view on justification with those
of the

Fathers, Bouillard noticed the Aristotelian character

of

Thomas' thought which was absent in the Fathers. He concluded that

the "history of theological notions shows...that the constant and
invariable affirmation of a truth...is found expressed in different

notions

and

schemes

in different

times

and

places."

There

is,

however, in the evolution of theology "an absolute of affirmation,
an absolute which determines and modifies new notions to fit

its

meaning." These affirmations include scripture and Tradition, and

the principles and truth necessary for dogma.

De Lubac*s work is a marshalling of the evidence that "none of
the Fathers or medieval Doctors ever proposed the possibility of a

’JMcCool, Unity to Plural ism, pp. 200-203.
wHenri Bouillard. Conversion et grace chez S. Thomas d'Aquin.
Paris: Aubier, 1944.

’’McCool, Unity to Plural ism. p. 203.

’‘ibid., pp. 26-27.
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'state of pure nature.'" Patristic or medieval theology contains no

idea of a theoretical double finality for human nature, one purely

natural and the other supernatural. The

image of God as found

in

the Fathers and medieval Doctors means the actual image of God in

which

we

were

created,

not

a

image

possible

of

pure

nature.

Likeness to God meant human nature as deified by grace and having

an existential desire for the Beatific vision. But de Lubac also
points out that the gratuity of that grace

is insisted on by the

Fathers and Doctors. Humans have a desire for the Beatific vision
because that is the end for which they are created, but the actual

gift

of

that

grace

is

still

a

gift

and

not

something

received

because one is entitled to it.

De Lubac' s claim that for St.

Thomas the only actual end of

humans is a supernatural one was verified by other Thomists,

and

Bouillard's claims were not all that radical. But these books were

provocative and disturbing to conservative Neo-Thomists.

ard's study,

while historical,

suggested

that

changing

Bouill-

concepts

preserved immutable truth. Thus, he "proposed an epistemology and

metaphysics that

introduced history and evolution

into the

very

structure of theology itself." It was one thing for Gilson to show

historical development and pluralism in the Middle Ages, but it was
another for Bouillard to claim such development was necessary as a
matter of principle.”

,?McCool, Uni ty to Pluralism, pp. 203-204.

Ibid., pp. 210-211.

42

De Lubac was accused of Baianism and denying the gratuity of

grace and the supernatural order. Jean Marie Le Blond had reminded
the

Neo-Thomists

that

even

on

their

own

assumptions

regarding

analogy of being and matter and form, theological pluralism should
be

possible.

The

Neo-Thomists

denied

that

St.

thought

Thomas’

contained any distinction between signification and representation
in the

judgment that could provide the basis for pluralism.

For

them only one conceptual framework was possible.
The debate raged back and forth between the "new

theology"

theologians and the Neo-Thomists. The principal adversaries were M.
Michel Labourdette,
Lagrange

in

the editor

the Angelicum.

of

the Revue Thomiste.

and Guerard des

Lauriers

Garrigouin

L'Ann6e

Theologique However, the Neo-Thomists were influential in Rome.
In 1946, Pope Pius XII, mentioned the "new theology" in an address

to the General Congregation of the Society of Jesus. Likewise,

in

an address to the General Chapter of the Dominicans, it was brought

up again.*
10
The "new theology" debate came to a swift end.
XII

issued his Encyclical, Humani Generis.

In 1950, Pius

It warned

theologians

against the dangers of historicism and relativism. The Dominican
and Jesuit

superiors

silenced their

theologians

and

transferred

some to other places. The effect was temporary, however. De Lubac

and Congar were very influential at Vatican II, Chenu "remained an

^Harvanek, p.27.

1OH. Rondet.
"Nouvelle Theologie." Sacramentum Mundi: An
Encylopedia of Theology. vol. 4. New York: Herder and Herder;
London: Burns & Oates, Ltd., 1970, pp. 234-235, at 234.
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historian

internationally

respected

Bouillard had

"distinguished

a

medieval

or

teaching

career

at

theology,
the

and

Institut

Catholique in Paris." Danielou and de Lubac eventually were made

Cardinals in recognition of their contributions to theology.
McCool sums up the situation after Vatican II:
During and after the Second Vatican Council, the "new theolo
gians" were counted among the leading theologians in the
Church and their disciples became the leaders of the genera
tion of theologians who succeeded them. Hans Urs von Balthasar
was a student of de Lubac' s. Karl Rahner emerged from the
tradition of Marechal, and Bernard Lonergan, who claimed to
have learned Marechaliansm "by osmosis," carried on the
tradition of Rousselot's intellectualism by grounding his new
method in theology on the act of understanding, the immediate
act of insight which Rousselot claimed was St. Thomas' ideal
act of intellectual knowledge. As the history of theology
after Vatican II was to show, the future lay with the "new
theologians," and the form of Thomism which Le Blond used to
vindicate the place of history and pluralism in theology is
the form of Thomism which survived the demise of the NeoThomist movement in the theologies of Rahner and Lonergan.
The "new theology debate" was the culmination of the
development within Thomism itself which gradually led to its
decrease as a single organized movement. The emergence of
pluralism in its epistemology and metaphysics challenged its
internal coherence as a unitary speculative system.181

Conclusions
The central problem since Vatican

I has been the problem of

the role of faith and reason in the act of faith in Christ, and in

God in Christ. Of course, this involved on the foundational level
the nature of the relationship between God and created reality. How
could human beings receive and perceive revelation in Christ? By

faith or by reason, or by both? If both, what were the respective
roles

of

faith

and

reason?

What

was

the

1,lMcCool, Uni ty to Plural ism, p. 225.

nature

of

the

faith
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perception? Was

it

simply subjective

mediated in some way by historicai

or

intuitive,

and

it

was

reality? What established the

authority of God which was the motive for faith? Did one have any
knowledge of God in and through the act of faith, or did one just
have

to

to

surrender

God's

evidence

if

one

were

act

to

in

a

rational and prudent manner? Did intuition or religious experience
have any role to play in the act of faith? As we have seen, these

issues

in

converged

the

"new

theology"

controversy

especially

around the question of the relationship of nature and grace.
Theologians struggled to found faith in Christ and Revelation
on

some

kind

rationalist,

of

intuitive knowledge,

fideist

or

positivist

as

so

avoid

to

approach

which

a

purely

made

God

extrinsic to creation. These attempts culminated in the development
of

Transcendental

Bernard

Lonergan.

subjective

maintaining

knowing
the

Thomism
They

to

especially

tried

avoid

the structures of

importance of

bringing knowledge

to

through

the

Rahner

Karl

immanentism

the

role of

to consciousness. On the

human

by

and

tieing

spirit while

objective

reality

subjective side

in
the

dangers were idealism and ontologism. On the objective historical

side, the danger was historical relativism or making the historical
simply the occasion or instrument of faith-knowing.

I believe Hans Urs von Balthasar's approach to these issues
provides a more adequate solution. I want to continue now with the

manner in which he approached these same problems.

CHAPTER II
HOW CAN WE KNOW GOD IN CHRIST?

Balthasar's Epistemology

Balthasar's Starting Point

Balthasar has said that his starting point philosophically
is the concrete contingent finitude which human beings experience
as a real phenomenon. "I am, but I could not be."1’2 This is the

fundamental enigma of humanity, finite beings open to infinite
Being. Attempts to leave behind St. Thomas'

"real distinction"

between 'esse' and 'existence', between the infinite and the

finite lead to the conclusion that all being is infinite and
immutable (Parmenides) or that all is movement, becoming (Heracl

itus).1,3 The first is "the solution of Buddhist mysticism," the

second "contradicts itself: pure becoming in pure finitude can

only conceive of itself in identifying contraries...." Conse
quently, "it is necessary to commence from an inescapable duali

ty: the finite is not the infinite.... The question is then
inevitable: Whence comes the division? Why are we not God? Two

attempted solutions lead to pantheism. One posits a fall, a

l42Hans Urs von Balthasar. "A Resume of My Thought." Hans Urs
von Balthasar: His Life and Work. ed. David Schindler.
San
Francisco: San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991, p. 1.
103

Ibid., p. 2.
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decline. Salvation is a return "of the sensible finite into the
intelligible infinite." The other reasons that the infinite God
needed the finite world to perfect himself, to actualize all of

his possibilities, or to have an object to love. But if God has

no need of the world... Why does the world exist?"100
"No philosophy could give a satisfactory response to that
question.... But, in fact, the true response to philosophy
could only be given by Being himself, revealing himself from
himself. Will man be capable of understanding this revela
tion? The affirmative response will be given only by the God
of the Bible.... And this posits a counterpart: to be able
to hear and understand the auto-revelation of God man must
in himself be a search for God, a question posed to him.
Thus there is no biblical theology without a religious
philosophy. Human reason must be open to the infinite.*
105
God's Revelation requires that human beings be able to

perceive and respond to God's se1f-discIosure, and therefore a

philosophy and a theology of man, an anthropology,

is necessary.

Thomistic metaphysics approached the question of "being"

in

Aristotelian fashion, analyzing the nature of the cosmos, of

which man was a part. Balthasar draws from St. Thomas but ap
proaches the question of "being" from a more personalist, dialog
ical perspective.

Instead of looking to nature or being in the

abstract to find how the concept of being reflects the doctrine
of Creation and Trinity, he looks to personal and concrete being

as the locus of reflection.
l0‘lbid.
IO5Ibid; as we will see, Balthasar bases the philosophical
distinction between the finite and infinite ultimately on the
distinction of persons within the Trinity, and the reason for
creation on the Trinitarian self-emptying love revealed in Christ.
Now we are exploring how he finds philosophically the phenomenolog
ical evidence in creation of these revealed realities.
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How do we first apprehend the idea or concept of being?

How

do we perceive and know reality? This question is fundamental to

the manner in which we know all created reality and therefore how
we can know the revelation of God's love in Christ. More precise

ly, how can the love of the Trinity revealed in Christ be known
through reality in the act of faith, both by the Apostles and us?

I want to show how Balthasar answers these questions by setting
off his approach against that of the transcendental Thomists.

The Transcendental Thomist Approach
The transcendental Thomists like Karl Rahner and Bernard

Lonergan,

though in different ways, posit some type of a priori

unmediated pre-apprehension of "Being" by the human spirit which

is the basis for all other acts of knowing. As previously dis
cussed in Chapter I,

in reaction to Kantianism and rationalistic

scholasticism, neo-scholastics such as Cardinal Mercier, Maurice
Blondel, Joseph Marechal, Pierre Rousselot, Karl Rahner, Bernard

Lonergan and others sought a way to ground the certitude and
objectivity of truth or knowledge in the intrinsic nature of the
intellect itself'.1** Influenced by Edmund Husserl and Martin
Heidegger these thinkers sought a via media between idealism and

moderate realism by way of a phenomenology of human conscious
ness.

In this philosophy Being is definitely finite and histori

cal, and lights up the human consciousness, but the question is

'**W.J. Hill. "Thomism, Transcendental." New Catholic Encyclo
pedia. Vol. 16. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 449-454.
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in what manner? W.J. Hill summarizes the manner in which Rahner

and Lonergan have utilized this phenomenological approach.

From Rahner and Lonergan has come a new metaphysics in which
the being investigated is that which occurs within con
sciousness. They tend to view being as more phenomenal in
kind and closely assimilated to meaning and knowledge.
Coreth writes of "an immediate unity of being and knowing in
the very act of knowing" .... From this being there is
extrapolated the being of the cosmos. Lonergan, e.g., looks
upon being as "whatever is to be known by intelligent grasp
and reasonable affirmation" . . . , and progresses from the
structures of consciousness as sensation, concept, and
judgment to the structures of extra-mental being as matter,
form, and existence .... Phenomenology had effected the
decisive turn to subjectivity (better expressed in Heideg
ger's term 'subjectness," Subjektitat, precluding individu
alism), making man a 'co-constitutor of his world of mean
ing'. . . . This occasioned a subtle transformation of
metaphysics into philosophical anthropology, which when the
Christian implications of Marechal's thought are brought to
bear upon it can be made to function as a fundamental theolThus,

it is the finality of human consciousness, as "co-

constitutor," which "affirms,""confirms," or "performs" being in

its concrete reality. The historical and finite existence of
persons and things are the occasions of the manifestation of
being through and in human consciousness. There is real corre
spondence between being's manifestation in human consciousness

and reality, but that correspondence comes about because of the

structures of human consciousness, not because being informs

consciousness. This differs from Thomism in which the intellect
takes into itself the reality of being and "discovers" being--

being informs the intellect. The intellect is a blank tablet

107

Ibid., p. 451.
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until "being" presents itself through the senses. All knowing is

a posteriori.
Rahner explains the transcendental view by his notion of the

Vorgriff, which is a "prehension or anticipation by the soul of
being which, while unconscious, is preconceptual, nonobjective,

and unthematic in kind; all a posteriori knowledge is an object

ification and thematization of this.

..." Lonergan explains the

transcendental view differently but also posits "prior to every

content, it [being] is the notion of the to-be-known through that
content .

.

.

.

Ontologism is avoided by identifying Absolute

Being with the unconditioned horizon of finite being which only

points to God. Both Rahner and Lonergan, though again in differ

ent ways, argue for an a priori transcendental knowledge of God

through the a priori knowledge of Being.

There would seem to

be some concession here to idealism and a refined ontologism.

Transcendental Thomists posit a priori knowledge of Being by

a reductive analysis which asks what the a priori conditions for
the possibility of objective and certain knowledge are. This is
where they move from moderate realism to critical realism. How

can the perception of reality take place? What can explain a

human spirit which is a quest in search of absolute and infinite

knowledge of Being? This phenomenon of the human spirit's quest

“‘ibid., p. 452.
Ibid., p. 452-53.
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cannot be explained unless one posits an a priori consciousness
of what it is that the human spirit is seeking.11’

I think it is precisely here that Balthasar differs from the

transcendental Thomists. As we will see, he believes that the
Creator/creature dissimilarity, the dialogical and interpersonal

nature of Revelation, and an adequate explanation of the phenome
non of the interpersonal and dialogic nature of human relation

ships requires that human existence be pure receptivity. The

initial awareness of Being can be, and is discovered a posteriori
through the phenomenon of the interpersonal, not "co-constituted"
or performed by means of an a priori consciousness. Consciousness
of being and self is awakened through the phenomenon of the

interpersonal and love. Balthasar's epistemology requires that
Cod's revelation in Christ be received and inform the human
consciousness through human historical reality illumined by
grace. The act of faith-knowing of Christ, and God in Christ,

is

a participation by grace in God's knowledge of himself in Christ.
I believe Balthasar would also take the position that the funda
mental quest of the human spirit, though reason must be open to

the Infinite,

is not, first of all, knowledge of Being, and an

autonomy based on knowing. Rather,

it is primarily the quest to

receive and give love infinitely, and the freedom from egoism or

nt Ibid.
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self-autonomy necessary to do so.111 *Now,

I want to turn to Balth

asar's approach to the psychogenesis of Being.

Meta-Anthropology: The Interpersonal Revelation of Being

I

and

Thou

Thomistic metaphysics,

like Greek and Aristotelian thought,

sees humnaity as part of the cosmos, and metaphysics and episte

mology is developed in the context of the whole of nature of
which humanity is a part. Balthasar describes his philosophical
approach in the contemporary context:

For us the cosmos perfects itself in man, who at the same
time sums up the world and surpasses it. Thus our philosophy
will be essentially a meta-anthropology, presupposing not
only the cosmological sciences, but also the anthropological
sciences, and surpassing them towards the question of the
being and essence of man.111

Balthasar's philosophy, like that of Rahner and Lonergan will be
a meta-anthropology, but his methodology will maintain the

analogy of being113 and follow the theological order, approaching

the question of Being concretely through the interpersonal. That
is, he will start from an "analogy not of abstract Being, but of

lllcf. Medard Kehl, S.J. "Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Portrait."
The Von Balthasar Reader ed. Medard Kehl, S.J. and Werner Loser,
S.J., trans. Robert J. Daly, S.J. and Fred Lawrence. New York:
Crossroad, 1982, p. 1-54, at p.33.
luIbid., p. 3.
UJ"Analogy of being," for Balthasar, expresses the doctrine of
the Fourth Lateran Council, that however great the similarity
between created reality and God's reality, the dissimilarity is
ever greater. This concept will be explored in more detail later.
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Being as it is encountered concretely in its attributes (not

categorical, but transcendental)."111
Balthasar's starting point is that
man exists only in dialogue with his neighbor. The infant is
brought to consciousness of himself only by love, by the
smile of his mother. In that encounter the horizon of all
unlimited being opens itself for him, revealing four things
to him: (1) that he is one in love with the mother, even in
being other than his mother, therefore all being is one;
(2)that love is good, therefore all being is good; (3) that
love is true, therefore all being is true; and (4) that love
evokes joy, therefore all being in beautiful.*
115
This is a highly compressed statement which implicitly

contains a number of conclusions. First,

"being" is first a

concrete experience before it is a concept.

It is a primal

phenomenon, which comes about when one experiences a "thou" for
the first time. Part of the primal experience of "being" is the
experience of the "thou" and in that experience of the "thou" is
contained simultaneously the experience of the "I," the distinct

ness of my "being" from the "being" of the "thou." But,

in that

same experience, of "thou" and "I" is the experience of the

oneness or unity of "being." "Being" is shared with others.

Notice that Balthasar, consistent with his view that being and
love are co-extensive11*, puts the experience of "being" in the

context of the experience of the love of the "thou." Being,
the concrete of the "I"-"thou" experience,

in

is not experienced

1HIbid., p. 3.

115Bal thasar, "Resume of My Thought," p. 3.
ll<The idea that being
explained in detail later.

and

love

are

co-extensive

will

be
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abstractly in the infant's thought but in the infant's experience
of the transcendental attributes of concrete "being" which are

present to the infant in the "thou." These transcendental attrib
utes of the "being" of the "thou" are the manner in which the
"thou" is concretely present to the infant, as love which is

good, true, and beautiful. So in sum, one could say that the

transcendental attributes of personal being which express that
"being" are love, goodness, truth, and beauty?17

Another point that Balthasar makes is that the infant

experiences not just a pure appearance but the reality of the
mother herself. The mother's essence is experienced indirectly
and mediately through the form of her appearance, which communi

cates her being by the "grammar" of her/its transcendental
attributes.
Consistent with the analogy of being, God is the fullness of

the One (love), the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, even
though the dissimilarity between the finite transcendentals and
the infinite is ever greater than any similarity?1* It is by

virtue of the experience of the "thou" that space and the world

tl70n the transcendentals in general see J.B. Lotz. "Transcend
ental s." New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 14. New York: McGraw-Hill,
1967-79, p. 238-241; for an excellent article analyzing the
transcendentals in relation to "esse" in itself and in relation to
others, see Mark D. Jordan. "The Grammar of Esse: Re-Reading Thomas
on the Transcendentals." Thomist 44 (Jan. 1980): 1-26; finally, for
an excellent article with respect to the interpersonal as the
starting point of metaphysics, see W. Norris Clarke, S.J. "The 'We
Are' of Interpersonal Dialogue as the Starting Point of Metaphys
ics." Modern Schoolman 69 (1992): 357-68.
tit

Balthasar, "A Resume of My Thought," p. 3.

5k

exist, not by virtue of the "I.” For it is in the response of the
child to the mother that the child experiences itself as "I give

mysel f.

The primal value of my "being," initially experienced as
being given the gift of myself, can become lost in a positivistic

culture which simply takes "being" for granted, as material for
our domination. But,

in the primal encounter with the "thou," who

is an exemplar of Cod,

is included a primal encounter with God

who shines forth in the "wonder of being. "tl* Here we might say,
in contrast to the transcendentalist approach, that the infant

has "something like an experience of God" but it is mediated
through the concrete being of the "thou."in However,

this unthem-

atic experience is governed by analogy of being so that however
similar the exemplary "thou" is in "being" to God,

the dissimi

larity is ever greater. But the reality remains, that the tran
scendental attributes of created being do reflect and reveal in

ll,Martin Bieler. "Meta-anthroplogy and Christology: On the
Philosophy of Hans Urs von Balthasar." Communio 20 (Spring 1993):
129-146, at 137.
ll,Bieler, p. 138; and see Hans Urs von Balthasar. Theo-Drama:
Theological Dramatic Theory I I : Dramat i s Personae: Man in God,
trans. Graham Harrison. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990, p.
286.

>nBalthasar extends this to all subsequent acts of knowing: "at
the most fundamental level, the dawn of self-awareness in freedom
is not the realization that we are simply "there": it is rooted in
the fact that we are 'gift' and 'gifted', which presupposes a
'giving' reality. In this sense 'all knowers know God implicitly in
every mental act', insofar as 'being itself . . . is a likeness of
the divine goodness'; thus all men naturally tend toward God'
(Thomas)." Balthasar, TD I 1. p. 391.
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and through themselves, God, who is the fullness of the reality
which they reflect. Balthasar states it this way:
"This day I have begotten you", says the Father to the Son.
This day I have created you, says eternal freedom to finite
freedom. The fact that no human "I" can awaken to itself
unless it is called "thou" by some other "I" is only the
prelude, within the parameters of the world, to what is
meant here. For in and through the human "I" there is mani
fested an Absolute "I", who has from eternity generated an
equally Absolute "Thou" and, in the Holy Spirit, is One God
with him. It is precisely this process of generation, this
giving and receiving of self, and this oneness of both in
the Holy Spirit that causes the absolute preciousness--we
call it holiness--of Absolute Being to shine forth in its
limitless self-affirmation and freedom."1”
It is only on the basis of this "miracle" of the eternal

generation of the Son by the Father, that the creature in its
finite freedom, gifted with the gift of self, can "be addressed

as a 'thou' and so designate itself an "I" vis-a-vis the Giver."
Further, a finite "I" can only dare to call God "'Thou'
doing so,

it is answering to a 'thou'

if,

in

that comes addressed to

itself from the inner nature of the Absolute--from the divine
Trinity."

Finally,

. . . I only appreciate fully that God is my "highest good"
when I learn (in the Son) that I am a "good" to him, af
firmed by him; this is what guarantees my being and my
freedom. And it is only when I learn that I represent a
"good" and a "thou" to God that I can fully trust in the
imparted gift of being and freedom and so, affirmed from and
by eternity, really affirm myself too.1”* 123

l”lbid., pp. 286-87; and see pp. 209-10, where Balthasar says
"communicated being is not oniy in generai an 'image of God' . . .
but it is actually an image of the three-personal God, in whom the
imcommunicabi 1 i ty of the hypostases is one with the unity of
'essence' in each of them."
123

Ibid., p.

287 .
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Again and again, through analogy of being, Balthasar finds

the Trinity, the fullness of Being, reflected in creation and

particularly in the phenomenon of human interpersonal interac
tion.

It is the Trinity's action in creation, revealed fully in

Christ, that can be the basis for elimination of the fear and
anxiety generated in finite creatures by the abyss between the
Creator and creature. This abyss, without the Trinitarian revela

tion in Christ,

leads to pantheistic mysticism and formalistic

ri tualism.

The creature's metaphysical and theological locus is the
diastasis of the divine "Persons" in the unity of the divine
nature. Here the real difference between the creature and
God no longer needs to occasion any anxiety in the former,
because ultimately it is grounded in the real difference
between the divine hypostases, in virtue of which God can be
the Most Worthy and Most Holy One. ... In the mystery of
the Trinity, the creature can affirm itself as an act of
thanksgiving to God.

Balthasar's explanation of the psychogenesis of being is the
foundation of an epistemology of receptivity in which the being

of the "Thou," through the being of the "thou," informs the "I."

This the foundation for his theology of revelation in Christ.

How Can We Know Christ Today?

Jesus: The Figure of Faith

In his short, popular work, Does Jesus Know Us? Do We Know
Him?115, Hans Urs von Balthasar addresses the contemporary con
trast

between the phenomenon of popular Jesus piety and the
iaIbid., p. 288.

us San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1983.
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efforts of scientific exegesis to find and describe the reai
Jesus hidden behind the language and concepts of the New Testa
ment. As Balthasar puts it:

. . . to a degree, people take no notice of the barriers or
simply break through them, in the doubtlessly sound instinct
that no Scribe can diminish the uniqueness and the day-today significance of the figure of Jesus. "I must get to
him," the simple man (am-ha-arez) says, "for he belongs to
__ . ”•»*
me
What Balthasar is pointing to here is the common instinct that a

reliable "figure" of Jesus can be attained from the pages of the
New Testament, which figure is the object of and motive for the

act of faith, for a life based on that faith, and for theology.
In other words, a perception of the object of faith, the desir

ability or goodness of the object of faith, and the intelligibil

ity of that object (A Theological Aesthetics. a Theodrammatik.
and a Theologic).

Scripture and Christology

Central to Balthasar's Christology is the
. . . conviction that only the Scriptures of the New Cove
nant, taken as witnesses of faith and in their entirety, can
produce a tangible and credible portrait of Jesus Christ,
whereas every critical attempt to approach him from a posi
tion other than that of the faith witnessed to in the Scrip
tures can only result in a pallid, distorted picture unwor
thy of belief (and hence devoid of interest).
It is a fact: only the person who is convinced that
Jesus knows him personally gains access to knowledge of him.
And only the person who is confident of knowing him as he
is, can know that he is also known by him.127

Ibid., preface.

tl7Bal thasar, Does Jesus Know Us?. preface.
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These strong statements would appear to be a rejection of
scientific exegesis, but in fact, Balthasar does not reject
scientific exegesis. He subordinates it and its methodology to

the "figure" of Christ which can be found in the New Testament as

a whole despite its diversity of approaches to the "figure." His

Christology guides his interpretation of and methodological
approach to scripture.

"All scriptural problems must be ap

proached through christology: the letter is related to the Spirit
as the flesh of Christ (we know what that means: his human

nature) to his divine nature and Person."111 As we shall see,
Balthasar's whole theological synthesis and methodology, with
respect to all the central theological questions of Cod and man,

Creator and creature, nature and grace,

revelation and faith,

faith and reason, theology and philosophy are structured around
and resolved through reflection on the relationship between

Christ's divine and human natures, and Christ's divine and human
freedom. For Balthasar, Christ is both the revelation of the

inner triune life of Cod and the life of true human freedom. For
him, a complete Christian anthropology is possible only "within

the context of an overall Christology."

ll,Hans Urs von Balthasar. "The Place of Theology." Explorations
in Theology. I: The Word Made Flesh. San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
1989, pp. 149-160, at 149.
ll,Bal thasar, TD III. p.

13.
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Christocentric Theology

Balthasar's theological synthesis is Christocentric and
theocentric at the same time, for Christ reveals the inner life
of the Trinity through his human words and deeds. The immanent

life of the Trinity is lived out and manifested economically in
Christ's human life.134 Balthasar's Christocentric perspective
was shaped in dialogue with Karl Barth and in his study of

Barth's theology.*
131 *His integration of the theology of the Trin
ity and Christology keeps together the theologia (theology of

God) and oikonomia (order of salvation), which became separated
after the New Testament and early patristic period. Early and
classical scholastic theologies followed the basic historical

sequence Trinity-creation-fall -incarnation.133

Balthasar's theological starting point is
the very center of Christian revelation--the Word of God
become flesh, Jesus Christ, God and man--and so we are led
unreservedly to affirm that here we have a true form placed
before the sight of man. . . . --the fundamental thing is

l3tDonald MacKinnon. "Some Reflections on Hans Urs von Baltha
sar's Christology With Special Reference to Theodramatik 11/2 and
III." The Analogy of Beauty: The Theology of Hans Urs von Baltha
sar . ed. John Riches. Edinburgh: T. 4c T. Clark Ltd., 1986, pp. 17579.
l3lHans Urs von Balthasar. The Theology of Karl Barth. trans.
John Drury. New York: Holt, Rinehart 4c Winston, 1971. See espe
cially "Christ at the Center," pp. 247-270.
13lAlois Grillmeier. "III. Christology." Sacramentum Mundi: An
Encyclopedia of Theology^. Vol. 3 ♦ New York: Herder and Herder:
London: Burns & Oates. Ltd.. 1970, pp. 186-192, at 186-87.
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that here we have before us a genuine, 'legible ’
not merely a sign or an assemblage of signs.135
33 *

form, and

Christ's Figure as Legible "Form"
Behind Balthasar's emphasis on Christ as 'legible'

form lie

the twentieth century controversies over the nature of the act of
faith, and the relationship between nature and grace.11* The
basic question is how is God revealed and perceived in Christ?

How is the object of faith revealed and perceived in the act of
faith? Balthasar puts it this way:

The central question of so-called 'apologetics' or 'funda
mental theology' is, thus, the question of perceiving the
form--an aesthetic problem. To have ignored this fact has
stunted the growth of this branch of theology over the past
hundred years. For fundamental theology, the heart of the
matter should be the question : 'How does God's revelation
confront man in history? How is it perceived?' But under the
influence of a modern rationalistic concept of science, the
question shifted ever more from its proper centre to the
margin, to be re-stated in this manner: 'Here we encounter a
man who claims to be God, and who, on the basis of this
claim, demands that we should believe many truths he utters
which cannot be verified by reason. What basis acceptable to
reason can we give to his authoritative claims?'135
More precisely, the question is how does God use the human nature
of Christ, his historical context and salvation history, to

reveal Himself? And, what kind of process of knowing or perceiv
ing this revelation is the act of faith in Christ? What kind of

l33Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological
Aesthetics, I: Seeing the Form. San Francisco: Ignatius Press: New
York: Crossroad, 1989, p. 153; referred to hereafter as Glory J_.

luJohn Riches. "Balthasar and the Analysis of Faith." The
Analogy of Beauty: The Theology of Hans Urs von Ba 1thasar. ed. John
Riches. Edinburgh: T. &. T. Clark Ltd., 1986, pp. 35-59.
l35Bal thasar, Glory J_, p.

173.
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knowledge of Christ or cognitive content is foundational for this

act of faith, for the life of faith, and therefore for theology?
Balthasar's Christology is founded on an examination of the
nature of a reciprocal interplay between revelation in Christ

(the objective reality of the divine presence, divine action, and
divine cognitive content) and faith (the subjective perception of

that presence, the living of faith's content, and the articula
tion of content). Theology mediates between these poles in its
search for deeper understanding. He refers to this reciprocal
interplay between these two poles as a "closed ellipse with two

centers." Balthasar incorporates philosophy and literature into

the ellipse as pre-theology ,l3<
The foundational examination of the nature or "form" of
revelation in the figure of Christ and its faith perception is

the subject of the first leg of Balthasar's trilogy, The Glory of

the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics.137 However, since the percep

tion of Christ, the object of faith, in the act of faith draws
one out of oneself into a life in Christ, one thereby becomes
part of the divine drama of infinite and finite freedom which is

the essence of Christ's human life. Without leaving behind the

perception of the object of faith with the "eyes of faith," one
moves on to a new way of knowing God in Christ by a life con

13tBal thasar, Does Jesus Know Us?. p. 61; TD III, p. 59, 63.
tJ7The seven volumes of the first leg of the trilogy are: I :
Seeing the Form. 11 : Clerical Styles. Ill: Lay Styles. IV: The
Realm of Metaphysics in Antiquity. V: The Realm of Metaphysics in
the Modern Age. VI: The Old Covenant. VI I: The New Covenant.

62

formed to Christ. This is another dimension of the reciprocal
interaction between revelation and faith. This dimension of life
in Christ is the subject of Theodrama: Theological Dramatic

Theory.n> The third dimension of the reciprocal interaction

between revelation and faith is that of God's theology and ours.
Balthasar describes it thus:
How can God come to make himself understood to man, how can
an infinite Word express itself in a finite word without
losing its sense? That will be the problem of the two na
tures of Jesus Christ. And how can the limited spirit of man
come to grasp the unlimited sense of the Word of God? That
139
will be the problem of the Holy Spirit.

This is treated in the third leg of the trilogy, Theo log i c. and

an appendix, Epi logue .1>0
These three legs of the trilogy correspond to three tran

scendental attributes which all being including personal being
have through existence and activity. These three attributes of

being: beauty (self-manifestation), goodness (self-gift), and
truth (self-expression or intelligibility) are present in Chr
ist's personal being, actions and words and are the fundamental
ground of the human perception of the meaning and significance of

l3,This leg of the trilogy contains five volumes only three of
which have been published in English to date. I: Prolegomena; 1 I:
Dramati s Personae:Man I n God ; 111: Dramat i s Personae: Persons in
Christ; IV: The Action (Die Handlung) ; V: The Last Act (Das
Endspiel).

t3,Bal thasar.

"A Resume of My Thought," p. 4.

ul>Theologic contains three volumes which have not yet been
published in English: 1: The Truth of the World (Warhe i t der Welt);
I I: The Truth of God (Warhei t Go 11 e s); III: The Spirit of Truth
(Per Geist der Warhe i t). Epilogue (Epilog) has been published in
English by Ignatius Press, 1992.
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Christ, and ultimately of the Triune God in Christ. Obviously,

they are not accidents of personal being but are attributes of
the substance of personal being itself, which in the case of
personal being find their unity in that of personhood. Each

being, but particularly the highest form of finite being, the
person,

is as a being, someone perceptible, desirable or good,

and intelligible. This will be explored in more depth later.
In Theodrama III, Dramat i s Personae: Persons in Chr ist.
Balthasar outlines his methodological approach to his Chris
tology. His first task is "to gain access to the figure of

Christ, which is only possible through pondering the specific

character and structure of the New Testament sources,

the Gospels

in particular." His next task will be to use the figure of Christ
obtained from the sources to "ask--by way of confirmation--how is
it possible for such a figure to be represented; and this will

explain the condition in which we find the sources themselves."

Then he will proceed to "a speculative Christology and raise the
question of the meaning and limitations of the 'Chalcedonian

model.'" Finally, he will consider the "issue of the inclusion of

the theodramatic characters in Christ .

.

.

." With respect to

all of these steps he raises the fundamental question whether the

concept of theological "form" which was analyzed in The Glory of

the Lord can "stand up to the attacks of the historico-critical
method? At this point the struggle for the foundations of dogmat
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ics, and of all Christian faith, becomes acute and--dramat ic. "lU

Balthasar’s theology of Christ’s theological

'form' as contained

in the act of faith and its relation to the historico-critical

method is foundational to Balthasar’s approach to Christology and

the act of faith in Christ.
Christology is, after all, "faith in Christ seeking under
standing." But the first question is what does Balthasar mean by
"faith in Christ."

Since revelation and faith are correlatives,

what he means by revelation in Christ will determine what he

means by faith in Christ, and this will determine his methodolo-

gy.

Issues of nature and grace, and metaphysics and epistemology

underlie questions about the nature of revelation and faith. Most

fundamental in resolving these underlying questions is the
question of how one approaches their resolution. This is the

question of methodology and the proper relationship between
theology and philosophy, and grace and nature,

reality as it really is,

in coming to know

in both its natural and supernatural

dimensions. Even if one were to deny the relevance of metaphysics
to theology, that would be a metaphysical position, so the

question of metaphysics is unavoidable. The crux of the matter
for Balthasar's Christology is whether Christ's self-expressive

historical "life-form" can be in continuity with the faith life-

form of Christ contained in the New Testament and that passed on

by the Church. First, I will explore Balthasar’s theology of the
perception of Christ's "life-form" in the act of faith, and then,
Ul

TD Hi, p. 55-56.
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in Chapter III, move on to the nature and grace issues which are
involved in knowing Christ.

"The Nature of the Act of Faith:Seeing the Form"
What is the Nature of the Act of Faith?
The available evidence (New Testament, Early Doxologies,
Hymns, and Pagan Perceptions of Christianity) all point to

worship of Christ along with adherence to Jewish monotheism in

the earliest Palestinian Jewish ChristianityHow did Jesus'

contemporaries in the process of interpretation move from simple
encounter with him or reports about him to a faith which wor

shipped him and made him Kyrios? In this kind of a judgment the
question becomes the nature of the intrapersonal dynamics of the
act of faith. Especially the relationship between certitude
arrived at by the intrinsic power of reasoning through knowledge

and judgment; and certitude given as a gift of God to which the

intellect and will freely chose to submit in reliance on God. As
we saw earlier, Vatican I made the most important and complete

doctrinal statement on the nature faith and the role of reason.
It intended to respond to the errors of semi rationalism and

fideism.

luRichard Bauckham, "The Worship of Jesus," The Anchor Bible
Dictionary. Vol. 3 (H-J), ed. David Noel Freedman. New York:
Doubleday, 1992, pp. 812-819. See generally, Larry W. Hurtado, One
God. One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and Ancient
Jewish
Monotheism. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988; Paul A. Rainbow,
"Jewish Monotheism As the Matrix For New Testament Chistology: A
Review Article," on One God, One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and
Ancient Jewish Monothei sm. Novum Testamentum 32 (1991)1: 78-91.
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". . . faith, which is 'the beginning of salvation,' the
Catholic Church holds to be a supernatural virtue. By it,
with the inspiration and help of God's grace, we believe
that what He has revealed is true, not because of its in
trinsic truth seen by the light of natural reason, but
because of the authority of God revealing it, who can nei
ther deceive nor be deceived' (Denz 3008)." **3

In this definition, the key phrase which needed further
clarification was "because of the authority of God revealing it,

who can neither deceive nor be deceived." How was God's authority

revealed in and through the life-form of Jesus to the Apostles

and disciples? What is the substantive content being judged about
Jesus'

life-form in such an act of faith, and how does such a

judgment take place?

Does the Act of Faith Include Knowledge of God?

As discussed previously, Scholastic theology also held that

the formal object of faith is God Himself or First Truth. But,
the question was what kind of knowledge of God,

the formal object

of faith, could one have through and in the act of faith? If God
himself, by his authority, was the motive and basis for faith and
its formal object, in what way was he known? Or, did faith

include knowledge of God at all?
The Vatican I definition of faith was arrived at in a

context in which the understanding of nature and grace was
founded on the idea of "pure nature." As we have seen, the idea

mA.R. Jonsen, "Faith, 2. Patristic Tradition and Teaching of
the Church." New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 5. New York: McGrawHill, 1967-79, pp. 796-798, at p. 797.
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of two kinds of knowledge, one natural and the other supernatu

ral, was derived from this concept.
Thus the mainstream of post-Vatican I Catholic theology has
attempted to define, often with great precision, the extent
to which the will's assent to God's authority is directed or
prepared by rational considerations. It has also considered
the extent to which in such an act of faith the truth of
what is revealed is in fact perceived.*
1**
The question crucial to the act of faith was whether the First

Truth, the formal object of faith, was in fact perceived or known

in any way in the act of faith. What Balthasar calls "supernatu
ral rationalism" was an understandable reaction to the Romanti

cist,

Idealist, and Modernist currents of thought which were part

of the neo-Kantian efforts in the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries.1*5 "Supernatural rationalists" wanted to avoid any
hint of intuition, religious feeling, or immediate perception

which tended to naturalize religious knowing. The efforts of
Blondel, Rousselot, Marechal, and later the "new theology" were

all attempts to overcome these fears, and the sterility of
"supernatural rationalism." The act of faith had been reduced to
assent or faith in God based on the rationality of the proofs

(signs, wonders, prophecy, Resurrection) which demonstrated God's
presence and authority, seen of course, by the gift of the light
of faith. This was backed up by the external authority of the

Church. Faith and actual knowing had been separated.

***Riches, "Analysis of Faith," pp. 35-36.
l*5Bal thasar, Glory J_, p.

139.
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Faith Gnosis of Cod's Glory in Christ
Balthasar perceived that it was vital to apologetics to
reintegrate the element of "pistis" and "gnosis" in the theology
of the act of faith. Faith could not be content to define itself

as propositions accepted on authority.

It had to "bring man to an

understanding of what God is in truth."
. . . the content of this se1f-revelation of God's bears the
name of doxa . . . the analogy suggests itself between
aesthetic and theological revealed reality and its recep
tion. This, then, already means that the element of authori
ty, on which theological faith is based as its ultimate
motive and formal object, must possess a wholly peculiar
colouring attributable to God alone, and this quality clear
ly distinguishes the divine authority even from the ecclesial authority which proclaims and enacts it. The divine
authority belongs to the divine doxa as it manifests itself;
indeed, authority and doxa are but one in so far as in both
of them God's divinity approaches the believer.1*4
God's glory or doxa is of course,

the majesty of the Triune

kenotic love revealed in the person, action, and words of Christ,
particularly in the mysterium paschale.

It is the revelation to

the "eyes of faith" of this love in Christ, which is the authori

ty of God to which the human heart submits.
The majesty of this absolute love--the central phenomenon of
revelation--is the source of every form of authority pos
sessed by the mediators between man and God. The primal
authority is possessed neither by the Bible . . . , nor by
the kerygma . . . , nor in ecclesiastical office . . . the
primal authority is the Son interpreting the Father through
the Holy Spirit as divine love. For it is only at the source
of revelation that authority (or majesty) and love coincide.
All an authoritative call to submissive faith in revelation

iti Ibid., p.

140.
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can do is to prepare men to see the love of God made mani
fest, and help them to value that love fittingly.*
1*7 * * * *

The Relation Between God and Being in the Act of Faith
Balthasar's explanation of how that doxa or love of God in

Christ is perceived, first by the Apostles, and now by us,
depends on his metaphysics of personal "being." As we saw,

personal being in its transcendental attributes is manifested in

interpersonal relations. As with all being, by analogy there is a
natural revelation of God in the natural transcendental attrib

utes of personal being. But,

in the union of divine nature with

human nature in Christ, we have much more than this natural
manifestation. Absolute Personal Being, who is pure act of being
in the person of the Word, has now united himself to created

contingent personal being.
. . . the formal object of theology (and, therefore, also of
the act of faith) lies at the very heart of the formal
object of philosophy (along with the mythology which belongs
to it). Out of those mysterious depths the formal object of
theology breaks forth as the se1f-revelation of the mystery
of Being itself; such a revelation cannot be deduced from
what the creaturely understanding of itself can read of the
mystery of Being, nor, even in the manifestness of the
mystery of God, can such revelation be grasped by this
intellect without the divine illumination of grace. . . .
But it is no less a Word from God, an intelligence concern
ing Being itself and thus, at the same time philosophy.1*1

**7Hans Urs von Balthasar.
Herder, 1969, p. 47.

Love Alone.

New York:

Herder

and

l**Balthasar, Glory J_, p. 145; notice that Balthasar does not
equate or identify in any way the theological and philosophical
formal objects. Instead, the theological shines through Being but
is not closely identified with Being as in the transcendental
approach.
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God, the ground and fullness of all being, who is the fullness of

the transcendental attributes of beauty, goodness, and truth in
the unity of love, "reveals himself once and for all in a posi

tive-historical, spatio-temporal form.

.

.

. The mystery of I-

Thou within the Godhead must find its epiphany in an I-Thou
mystery between God and man;

.

.

.

The "Form" of Gnosis in the Act of Faith

What Balthasar means by "form" with respect to personal
being is related to the manner in which the mysterious unity and
uniqueness of the "whole" or "Gestalt" of a person's being is

sel f-expressed.15(1 It is the self-expressive "form," not the
ontological form which esse needs to exist. The very nature of

the transcendental attributes of a "being" is that they are not
accidents, not categorical attributes, but subsist in the very

unity of the person's "esse" or act of being. Unity is a tran

scendental attribute of any "esse" that has a form. Unity is what
the form gives an existing being. Or, put another way form is

what reveals the unity of an existing being. But,

the ontological

unity or form permits the transcendental attributes to appear to
others in their se1f-expressive "form." The self-expressive form

reveals the beauty, goodness and truth of the existing being. And

as we will see,

it is beauty that constitutes the appearance or

the perception of the phenomenon of the truth and goodness of

u’lbid., p.

147.

l5tThe following discussion is based on Glory JL, pp.23-34.
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another's being. Because of the unity of being, the transcenden

tal attributes co-inhere each other. However, the element of
human freedom in a human being who is also sinful determines
whether its transcendental qualities of beauty, goodness and

truth will be expressed. It is the spirit of a person, incarnated

in their body, which expresses through the body that form (spir
it-body) which has its origin in God, the pure act of Being.

It

is precisely God's power and most characteristic prerogative to

confer personal "esse" in its unique individual spirit-body form.

"Esse" and form need each other as neither can exist without the
other.

This God-given personal form (spirit-body)

is destined to

pour itself out in a chosen life-form that is consistent with its
personal form which is "image and likeness" of Cod. To the extent
it does so, it has personal integrity and congruence with the

reality of its unique personhood.

In a sense it manifests and

becomes what God always intended it to be.

It expresses its tran

scendental attributes of beauty, goodness and truth in the unity

of personal love. But, it must do this freely, by a choice which
assumes it knows or perceives, however dimly,

its unique identity

in Christ. Balthasar sees personal "form" as that which we

perceive nediately when we perceive in another's life-form, their
self-expression of their personal meaning and significance.

With St. Bonaventure he agrees that the essence of form lies
not in its being a potential object of sense perception, but
rather in its intrinsic power to express—whatever mode of
appearance the expression may take. In the Incarnation God
essentially express himself in a manner that allows us to
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speak of a divine form, even though the expressing God
remains hidden within the expressive form.

Here, "whole" or Gestalt cannot mean either that all of God
has been expressed, or that God's expression of himself has been
exhausted.

It can mean that the fullest expression of God in this

creation has taken place in Christ.151 What God has revealed
about himself in Christ is itself, through the medium of human
reality,

formally structured. As Christ's body is a created body,

so God's "life-form" in this world is created, but is a true

self-expression of God. The divine form of self-expression in
Christ is that of the kenotic love of the Triune God. The full

ness of Being and the transcendental attributes are united with

contingent being. The mysterium paschale, with the Cross as its
center piece,

is the climax of that self-expression and self-

disclosure .
But, not only God is disclosed and expressed. Christ is the
archetype who reveals that personal integrity and congruence with

l5lLouis Dupre. "The Glory of the Lord: Hans Urs von Balthasar's
Theological Aesthetic." Communio 16 (Fall, 1989), pp. 384-412, p.
388.

‘^Balthasar carefully explains what is meant by the fullness
of the Godhead dwelling in Christ: "Instead of speaking of the
'form of revelation' we could also, with the same qualifications,
speak of the 'revelation-body' in view of the fact that, on the one
hand, 'the whole pleroma of the Godhead dwells corporeally in
Christ' (somatikos), that is to say, in the way that a spirit
inhabits a body or that God's Spirit of glory dwells in the old
temple .... And none of this can be understood in a purely
figurative sense, since Christ's corporeal body is and remains the
point of union (Eph. 2.16) while all other 'religion' compared with
his corporeality remains at best a 'shadow'(Col 2.17)." Balthasar,
Glory £, p. 433.
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oneself is found only in the "image's" integrity and congruence
with God. Here, another dimension of the fulfillment of human

freedom in divine infinite freedom is revealed.
But the Christian form is structurally a part of the miracle
that transfigures and ennobles the whole sphere of being and
which in itself guarantees that a spiritual form will thrive
as the greatest of beauties. The image of existence is here
illuminated by the archetype of Christ, and set to work by
the free might of the Creator Spirit with all the sovereign
ty of one who need not destroy the natural in order to
achieve his supernatural goal. For this reason, however, it
is clear that in any age--and most especially our own--the
Christian will realize his mission if he truly becomes this
form which has been willed and instituted by Christ.

The Objective Nature of Christ's "Form"

As the Archetype, Jesus is the Word, the Image, the Exegesis
of God. He is God's theology in the flesh.

"He is what he ex-

presses--nameiy, God--but he is not whom he expresses-name1y,

the

Father. This incomparable paradox stands as the fountainhead of

the Christian aesthetic, and therefore of all aesthetics!"*
15*

Balthasar gives three reasons why God's revelation must pos
sess an objective form.

In the first part of Glory J_ Balthasar

has established that the subjective experience of the act of

faith does indeed contain a "gnosis" or an experience of reli
gious knowing of God in Christ. This subjective experience "finds

the reason and justification for its existence in an experienceable object" and "without this object that experiential ability
can by no means be demonstrated in its totality nor indeed be

l53Ibid., p. 28.

l5‘lbid., p. 29.
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made comprehensible."1*5 In giving the reasons he first explains
that our faith object, that is, what is revealed in Christ "can

be correctly understood only when it has been made visible in it
self."154 He makes it clear that our object is not "God in Him
self." Then proceeding on the faith assumption that there is a
radical difference between God and humanity,

the infinite and the

finite he says:
If God is the infinitely free agent who, in his freedom,
invents a world and, also in his freedom, creates that
world; and, if on top of this, he is the triune God who in
Jesus Christ becomes man, then there are three interconnect
ed reasons why God's revelation must possess an objective
form.l5?

First, since God is infinitely free, God's infinite subjec

tivity "can in no sense be identical with the human religious

subject." And, "a revelation of God may occur ever so interiorly
in the subject and, nonetheless, God will remain interior i nt imo

meo♦" God in His transcendence remains someone who must be

believed and someone to whom one must surrender unconditionally.

"Even the most intimate self-disclosure of Cod in the soul has a
'form', even if it is spiritual:

the form of experiences, sensa

tions, illuminations, which as such are not the self-disclosing

God himself."15*

l55Ibid., P- 429
l5<Ibid., P. 429

l”lbid.
l5*Ibid. , P. 430
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Second, "If God has first of all revealed himself as a
Creator, and if this creation is necessarily ... a manifestation
of God,

it follows that this manifestation takes its form from

the form of the world itself."

He then develops the argument

that God's divinity is made visible through creation but only in

an analogous way. The Glory of God which is manifested through

the creation is not to be identified with the glory or splendor
of creation itself.

It is the difference between the form and

what the form expresses by its form. What is the relationship
between the natural revelation of Creation and the revelation in
Christ?

The revelation of the triune God in Christ is not simply, to
be sure, the prolongation or the intensification of the
revelation in the creation; but, in their essence, they are
so far from contradicting one another that, considered from
the standpoint of God's ultimate plan, the revelation in the
creation is seen to have occurred for the sake of the reve
lation in Christ, serving as the preparation that made it
possible ,lM
Finally, he develops the arguments to show that the appear

ance of the revelation of the Triune God requires an objective
form, a "super-form," especially since God's appearance is not an

independent image of God, but a unique hypostatic union of the

Word (the Archetype) and the image (Jesus). The analogy of being,
which will be discussed in connection with nature and grace, has

to be maintained here also. However similar the transcendental
attributes of beauty, goodness, and truth may be to those attrib-

l”lbid.

id Ibid., p. 431.
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utes in God's being, God's Transcendental Attributes are infi
nitely dissimilar. God's Being, as the pure act of kenotic love,
appears as doxa or "glory," in Christ. This is God's splendor,

beauty, majesty, the appearance of His Being,

in a human-divine

1 i f e-f orm.111

Beauty and "Form" in the Act of Faith

God's divine form, expressed in Christ, paradoxically
climaxes in its greatest splendor, beauty, and majesty,

in the

ugliness and tragedy of the Cross. God in the flesh is crucified

by His creatures precisely because of His love. There could be no
greater ugliness, tragedy or evil. How can this be beauty? It is
precisely here that we find God’s revelation renewing the minds
of his creatures in their understanding of the truth about

reality, and revealing what the Resurrection unveils. That is,

that all human reality, even the worst of sin, can be and is

transfigured and transformed by the love of God in Christ.
There can be no greater example of the descending nature of

“‘ibid., p. 432-433.

“l". . . the glory of Christ unites splendor and radiance with
solid reality, as we see pre-eminently in the Resurrection and its
anticipation through faith in Christian life.
As Karl Barth has rightly seen, this law extends to the
inclusion in Christian beauty of even the Cross and everything else
which a worldly aesthetics . . . discards as no longer bearable. .
. . it embraces the most abysmal ugliness of sin and hell by virtue
of the condescension of divine love, which has brought even sin and
hell into that divine art for which there is no human analogue."
Ibid., p. 124.
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Revelation which calls upon creation to view itself in the light

of Cod's understanding.
Von Balthasar's theology of form plunges its roots more
deeply in the New Testament than in a philosophical aesthet
ic. The suffering and death of Christ, far from being the
exception they would be in a worldly aesthetic, here become
the model. . . . The entire volume on the New Testament
(111/2/2) presents the divine glory as essentially consist
ing in the kenosis of Cod's Word. . . . Cross and damnation
thereby come to belong to the very essence of divine form. A
theological aesthetic describes how Cod's perfection becomes
actually manifest, and Scripture reveals it to consist in
the "correspondence between obedience and love, between
self-annihilation in hiddenness and the ascent toward mani
festation" (III/2/2, p. 2<»2).“3

It is precisely here that Balthasar's distinction between
his theological aesthetics of perceiving the form, as distin

guished from an aesthetic theology, is most clearly seen.

I have

deferred discussing the relation between "beauty" and "form"
because of the common difficulty of understanding Balthasar's use

of it in terms of philosophical or contemporary ideas of it. The

analogia of the Cross (analogia crucis) reveals clearly the
limits of the analogy of being,

in terms of using natural "beau

ty" to understand God's beauty, or for that matter, any of the
other transcendental attributes of personal being. More general

ly, this is the problem between natural forms as a vehicle for

supernatural revelation which will be discussed in the section on
nature and grace. As developed there, nature is taken up into

grace, and put at the service of grace; human love participates

in the intratrinitarian love for the world. Balthasar

inDupre, p. 389.
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. . . does not deny the relative autonomy of the natural
form, but he assumes this natural aesthetic into an aesthet
ic of grace which, while fully respecting the autonomy of
nature, nevertheless in the light of the Christian mysteries
aesthetically transforms the natural. Revelation itself
radiates the light in which we see its form. In lumine tuo
videbimus lumen. "The light of faith stems from the object
which revealing itself to the subject, draws it out beyond
itself--into the sphere of the object" (I, 181). God's
revelation establishes both its content and the believer's
ability to comprehend it. Christ reveals as the God who ex
presses, and stands revealed as that which he expresses.IW

Beauty and the Light of Faith

What this implies is that the "glory" of God shining on the
face of Christ cannot be seen unless our faces are unveiled by
the light of Christ Himself. For,
all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord
as though reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into
the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this
comes from the Lord, the Spirit." (2 Cor. 3.18)
Analogy of being finds itself at the very heart of the act of

faith. One cannot "see" the beauty of the Triune love in Christ
simply in or through the natural transcendental attributes of His
human "being." One cannot encounter God's Being and "glory" in

Him unless one's face is "unveiled" and one is given the light of
faith with which to "see." "[But] when one turns to the Lord,

the

veil is removed." (2 Cor. 3.16) The light of faith is a partici

pation in the knowledge and love of God in which God sees Himself
in Christ, and we in that light of God, see God and ourselves in

Christ.

in Dupre, p. 401.
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It is not that we demand grace by virtue of our peculiar
dynamism; it is grace which both claims and expropriates us.
The ascendancy of grace in us is what compels us, and it is
also what bestows absolute authority on God in us. Consid
ered in this first aspect, fundamental to all others, the
auctoritas Dei revelantis is revelation as it witnesses to
itself in us. We never could or should believe an historical
existent on the basis of divine testimony if we did not
believe it by virtue of the witness of God's being to itself
which shines out for us in the interior light of grace. The
Son of God, who in history witnesses to God and is witnessed
to by God, convinces us only because we have God's witness
16 5
in ourselves . . . .

As we see epitomized in the life of Christ,

it is in Chris

t's self-expression in His life-form, which is identical with His

consciousness of mission, that the truth and goodness of His
"form" (being) are manifest as "beauty." Beauty is what makes the
truth and goodness of Christ's being attractive and love-wor

thy.It is the value and worth of the truth and goodness of
Christ's being as it shines forth in His life-form.

"We are

confronted simultaneously with both the figure and that which

liJBal thasar, Glory J_, p.

162.

lJ<"The form as it appears to us is beautiful only because the
delight it arouses in us is founded upon the fact that, in it, the
truth and goodness of the depths of reality itself are manifested
and bestowed, . . . The appearance of the form, as a revelation of
the depths, is an indissoluble union of two things. It is the real
presence of the depths, of the whole of reality, and it is a real
pointing beyond itself to these depths. . . . both aspects are
inseparable from one another, and together they constitute the
fundamental configuration of Being."
"When it comes to confronting this structure . . . with the
contents of Christian theology, it should be clear from the outset
that there can be no univocal transposition and application of
categories. This must be so because the living God is neither an
'existent'
(subordinate to Being) nor 'Being" itself, as it
manifests and reveals itself essentially in everything that makes
its appearance in form." Balthasar, Glory i, p. 119.
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shines forth from the figure, making it into a worthy, a lovewor

thy thing."*
1*7 * * *

Here the unity of the transcendentals is emphasized.
Christ, and in us,

In

"esse" is constituted and expressed in the

unity of love. Love and being are coextensive111, and the truth
and goodness of our love/being are manifested as beauty. There

fore, Balthasar can say that "beauty" is the primal phenomenon-that which appears to our consciousness as the reality of another's being.

It is the splendor of the goodness and truth of

their love/being shining forth in the deeds and words that are
their self-expressive life-form. Since their "form"

(love/being)

is a unity, their life-form, to the extent it expresses that Godgiven "form" manifested in Christ, the archetype and measure of

all forms,
"beauty."

is a unity. The unity of the form shines forth as
In the act of faith, beauty,

the light of faith, and

God's love are different ways of referring to the same reality.
That means that the only way it can be perceived is as a unity,

through a synthetic act of the intellect, such as is attributed
to the intellectus.

In what I have read of Balthasar, he does not

explicitly tie faith perception to this aspect of Thomistic
psychology. But in his discussion of "The Spiritual Senses,"17’

lt7Bal thasar, Glory J_, p. 20.

l**The idea that love and beauty are co-extensive is unusual and
will be developed in detail in a separate section.
1$,Bal thasar, Glory J_, p. 20.

l7tBal thasar , Glory £, pp. 365-425.
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some type of synthetic operation of the intellect which grasps
the "whole” intuitively (in an immediate perception), but sensu

ally, seems to be what he has in mind. He discusses the "Spiritu
al Senses" as part of the experience of faith. Experience of

faith is crucial to Balthasar's aesthetics.

later in more depth. But,

I will explore this

I point it out here because theological

aesthetic perception is more than simple intellectus while that
may also be a constituent dimension of it. Also,

in this dis

cussion Balthasar is very careful to avoid any systematization
that would seem to suggest that a definitive psychological
description of how Cod gives the light of faith to the human

spirit could be given. But he is insistent that it is mediated
through the senses even in mystical experiences.

Unity of Content and "Form" in the Act of Faith
Since this primal "form" can only be seen in its unity,

it

cannot be broken up critically into its constituent parts nor can

it be gotten behind and transcended Platonical ly.171 Balthasar

stresses the necessity to maintain in the hypostatic union, the

unity between the life-form (Christ's human life) and the content

(God's se1f-disciosure). This is essential to "the subjective
unity of faith and vision in the Christian life" which would be

"incomprehensible if it could not be elucidated in terms of a
unity in the objective revelation which demands and conditions

m Ibid., pp. 20-21,
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it."in In other words, God's self-expression and disclosure in

Christ's human form is true to God's essence, without itself
being that essence.

It is a revelation of God's glory without

being identical to God's glory.

The beauty and glory which are proper to God may be inferred
and 'read' off from God's epiphany and its incomprehensible
glory which is worthy of God himself. But in trying to
perceive God's own beauty and glory from the beauty of his
manner of appearing, we must neither simply equate the two-since we are to be transported per hunc (Deum visibilem) in
invisiblium amorem--nor ought we to attempt to discover
God's beauty by a mere casual inference from the beauty of
God's epiphany, for such an inference would leave this
epiphany behind. We must, rather, make good our excessus to
God himself with a theologia negativa which never detaches
itself from its basis in a theologia positva: DUM visibi1i ter cognosc imus.173
Here, the analogy to human personal self-expression and
disclosure helps us to understand. When one honestly self-dis-

closes there is an integrity or fittingness between the chosen
form of self-expression and the person who is being expressed in

the self-expression. What is intended here also is reflected in
natural aesthetic form, wherein there is a fittingness or integ
rity between the form and what the artist is expressing. Personal
being,

in its self-possession, possesses the truth of its self in

complete freedom of choice of self-expression. But, a true selfexpression truly reveals the person in that self-expression.

However, when we apply this to Christ, the person of the Logos

inIbid., p. 435.
*”lbid., p.

124.
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revealed in Him, is ever greater in dissimilarity than any
similarity we can perceive in His life-form.
Balthasar is concerned that this integrity between the form

and its content be preserved so that Christ not become a mere
symbol or sign Platonically pointing beyond himself to some

greater insight or spiritual reality.

And so it is fitting to remember in this context what we
said earlier when we discussed the question of subjective
evidence: in relation to the central phenomenon of revela
tion we can by no means speak of 'signs’ which according to
their nature, point beyond themselves to something 'signif
ied'. Jesus the Man, in his visibleness, is not a sign
pointing beyond himself to an invisible 'Christ of faith’-whether this view is nuanced more in a Platonizing Catholic
sense or in a criticistic Protestant manner. The image and
expression of God, according to the Biblical assertion, is
the indivisible God-man . . . .
If Christ is perceived more in terms of final causes he will no

longer be seen as God’s self-expression, but as the instrument or

occasion through which one seeks something deeper. Similarly,

if

in a Platonizing manner, the created human reality through and in
which God has revealed is seen as concealing the spiritual or

heavenly, Christ again becomes a means to enlightenment.

For now everything corporeal about Christ is simply regarded
as an image that still conceals, and which stimulates us to
seek and understand the spiritual element in him, and both
things together become an occasion and a springboard from
which we soar to the divine. Not only everything sacramental
and institutional about the Church, but Christ's whole
humanity thus becomes all too clearly something for those
'simple' Christians who need material crutches, while the
advanced and the perfect can dispense with the symbol, whose
spiritual core they have been able to reach 1/5

lMIbid., p. 1*37.

l”lbid., p. 437-38.
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Unity of Content and "Form" in Theology

Theology then, because its formal object is the "divine

form" self-expressed by God in the Word made flesh,

is "indissol

ubly united to this visible form," and has therefore a necessary
aesthetic quality. But, "aesthetic" must have the theological
objective meaning and ontological grounding Balthasar has expli

cated, rather than the purely subjective meaning current in the
culture since the eighteenth century.174 However,

the reality to

the contrary is that theology has moved toward a

rational interpretation of Scripture (exegesis), of nature
and history (fundamental theology), and of the ecclesiasti
cal tradition (dogmatic theology). By thus neglecting the
form of the Incarnation it has failed to do justice to
revelation itself as Christians have concretely received it.
The form thereby becomes reduced to a mere sign pointing
toward a mystery that lies entirely beyond it.*
177

Balthasar seeks to "reintegrate grace and nature, thought
and feeling, body and mind, culture and theology within a syn

thetic, comprehensive, theological reflection on form."171 But,
form is simply the way, through one's life-form, we perceive the

unity of the transcendental attributes of a personal "being,"
under the appearance of "beauty," if they have lived with true

integrity. More germane to our subject,

it is the way that God's

presence in Christ is perceived. The mystery of Being is revealed

in Christ, so philosophy is a necessary part of theology. Thus,

l74Dupre, p. 385-387.
l77Ibid., p. 385-86.

171 Ibid., p. 386.
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there is the necessity of rediscovering the necessary connection
between metaphysics (meta-anthroplogy) and theology,

if we are to

truly perceive and understand Christ. But, this is difficult in a

milieu still colored by the skepticism of the Enlightenment.
It is more difficult because our eyes lose their acumen for
form and we become accustomed to read things by starting
from the bottom and working our way up, rather than by
working from the whole to the parts. Our multi-faceted
glance is, indeed, suited to the fragmentary and the quanti
tative: we are the world's and the soul's analysts and no
longer have the vision for wholeness. For this reason,
psychology (in the contemporary sense of that term) has
taken the place of philosophy. For this reason, too, we no
longer credit man with the ability to achieve form, whether
metaphysically or ethical ly ,in

Two Essential Dimensions of a Theological Aesthetics
It is the primal form in Christ that is the formal object of

the act of faith and as we saw earlier, the source of the author
ity of God which is the motive of faith.

If perception of the

primal form in Christ through his life-form is the object of
faith,

it is also the object of theology. But the kind of percep

tion of Christ which takes place in seeing this primal form, or
the object of faith,

is not a detached observation. God in Christ

encounters the believer, and vice versa. One cannot encounter God

in a detached manner.

In our judgment about God's presence in

Christ, we judge ourselves in the light of God's Word, as the
Gospel of John carefully points out.

In the act of faith, and

therefore in a theological aesthetics, there are two essential

dimensions. One is the seeing of the real,

in Balthasar, Glory J_, p. 25.

the objective presence
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of God in Christ. ".

God as 'mediated*

.

.[A]n object which is actually 'God* but

(per) by the 'sacramental form of the mystery*
J

(mysterium) of the 'enfleshed Word*'* This first perception is
meant in the sense of taking into oneself, allowing to become

part of oneself "of something true .

.

. which is offering .

itself." The object itself provides through its splendor the
light in which we see light, and therefore in our seeing we allow

it to become part of us.111 Ve are not offered something which we
are "compelled to accept obediently in blind and naked faith

something hidden" from us. Rather, "something is 'offered*
by God,

to man

indeed offered in such a way that man can see it, under

stand it, make it his own, and live from it in keeping with his
human nature." This light of faith is God's invisible love; "the
lux tuae claritatis, is the appearance of God's amor invisibi1is."
The second dimension builds on the first. Our perception of

God's amor (eros), or God's going out of Himself in Christ,

is a

function of the goodness and truth of God perceived as beauty or

glory. God's eros stimulates a like eros in us, causing us in
response to freely go out of ourselves to God. This needs to be

understood in a strictly theological sense,

the theological sense

of enthusiasm.1*1 "The enthusiasm which is inherent to the Chris

tian faith is not merely idealistic; it is, rather, an enthusiasm

“’ibid., p.
“‘ibid., pp.

120.
121-22.
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which derives from and is appropriate to actual,

realistic Be-

These two dimensions or phases Balthasar calls the theory of

vision and the theory of rapture. The first he equates with
fundamental theology and its central question as he defined it:

How is God's revelation in Christ perceived? The second he
equates with dogmatic theology. That is,

"'aesthetics' as a

theory about the incarnation of God's glory and the consequent
elevation of man to participate in that glory.”
For the object with which we are concerned is man's partici
pation in God which, from God's perspective, is actualized
as 'revelation' (culminating in Christ's Godmanhood) and
which, from man's perspective, is actualized as 'faith'
(culminating in participation in Christ's Godmanhood). This
double and reciprocal ekstasis--God’s 'venturing forth’ to
man and man's to God--constitutes the very content of dogma
tics, which may thus rightly be presented as a theory of
rapture: the admirable commercium et conubi um between God
111
and man in Christ as Head and Body.

As Balthasar points out the methodological implication is

that fundamental theology and dogmatics are as inseparable as the

two dimensions of faith from which they flow. Those on the road

to faith are already moving in the dawn of the light of faith and
are being drawn by the light of the object of faith as Balthasar
has defined it.

In dogmatics faith continues to grow as a tides

quarens intellectum.
But this continued growth is not to be thought of as a leap
from the preambula fidei of fundamental theology and the
evidence it provides . . . --a leap to pure fiducial faith.

“lIbid., p.
“’ibid., pp.

123.

125-26.
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Rather, the facts of revelation are perceived initially in
the light of grace, and faith grows in such a way that it
allows the se1f-evidence of these facts--an evidence that
itself was 'enrapturing' from the outset--to continue to
unfold according to its own laws and principles. . . . Paul,
in the locus classicus of his theological aesthetics, never
theless speaks of a 'vision of the Lord's splendor with un
veiled face', through which 'we are transformed into the
same image' (2 Cor 3.18). Paul thus unites vision and rap
ture as a single process.lM

The Place of Theological Aesthetics in Theology

As we have seen Balthasar is insisting against "supernatural
rationalism" that Cod, the formal object of faith,

is actually

encountered and known in Christ's life-form. Despite the abyss of
dissimilarity between God in Himself and created being, God can

manifest Himself through created being by means of the hypostatic
union of the divine and human natures in Christ. The act of faith

includes both pistis and gnosis. The trusting self-surrender of

pistis is to a truly perceived objective vision of God in Christ

(gnosis), which is a perception of God's kenotic love in Christ.

The light of faith is God's love to which the only response can

be love--the love of God for Himself in us through the Holy

Spirit ("God's love has been poured into our hearts through the
Holy Spirit that has been given to us" (Rom. 5.5)). At the same
time he is answering the Protestant extreme that requires faith
to be a blind leap. For Balthasar is insisting that there is an

analogy of being which makes faith possible through created
being. The Protestant view of faith has its Kierkegaardian

th Ibid., pp.

126-27.
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subjective, existential school and its Hegelian idealistic
school. Against all these views Balthasar is insisting on the
unity of theology and philosophy, that Being must be allowed to

reveal God. Or, better, that God must be allowed to reveal

Himself through and in Being, while retaining his ever greater
dissimilarity from created Being.115

Balthasar distinguishes theological aesthetics from two
other ways of reading revelation, the rationalist and the tran

scendental-personal ist . He describes the rationalist approach
first.

According to the first of these, we may see in it historical
signs and the manifestations of an acting God. These signs
are witnesses of the highest personal urgency which of
themselves prove themselves to be signs of God, and which
mean to be read and understood as such .... Whoever
distrusts their demonstration of the divine authority speak
ing through them would be acting contrary to the laws of
human discernment, both of theoretical reason (which has
here received evidence of credibility) and of practical
reason (which orders that one should entrust oneself to a
trustworthy witness). Thus understood, the rationality of
faith rests totally on the persuasive character of the
revelatory signs, their power to convince man's reason . . .
. This is an anthropological theory of faith which dispenses
with the philosophical dimension, the faith-theory of posi
tive theology as developed primarily by the Baroque scholas
ticism and Neo-Scholasticism of the Jesuits.lM
Theology in this theory of faith proceeds from first principles
and rationally constructs its system. The object of faith is not

encountered in Christ, that vision must await the beatific
vision. There is no continuity between faith's vision now and the
beatific vision.

1<5Balthasar discusses these issues in Glory J., pp.

th Ibid., p. 147-148.

131-147.
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The second way of reading revelation, the transcendental-

personalist, does from the beginning focus attention on the
formal object of faith: "God's eternal truth as he is in himself

and as he witnesses to himself in revelation." But the eternal

truth of who God is in himself is identified with the depths or
inwardness of absolute Being. The mystery of God's inner life and

love is manifested in the depths of philosophy's formal object.

Consequently, this theory of faith "tends to build on the founda
tion,

first, of the spiritual subject's cognitive dynamism and,

second, on the luminous and illuminating character proper to
absolute Being." This theory is a form of Alexandrian or Augus

tinian i 11 umini sm.1,7 The Logos who is the light of Being, shines
directly into the human spirit in a way that the intellect
receives the Word "as a kind of grace and revelation .

.

.

."

What is specifically Christian in revelation is raised above the

valid object of philosophy. Historical facts simply become part

of the "final dynamism of cognition." The transition of faith to
theology from philosophy is made by translating "the general

philosophical theory of knowledge into the Christian Trinitarian
mode.

.

.

." Christ is seen "as the redeeming illuminator of the

mind and revealer of the Father.”lM Faith then is an inchoate

l,7For a good discussion of St. Augustine and iiluminism, see
Frederick Copleston, S.J. A History of Philosophy, Vol 2. Mediaeval
Philosophy. Part I. Augustine to Bonaventure. Garden City, NY:
Image Books, 1962, Chapter IV.

l,,Bal thasar, Glory _I_, p.

1^8.
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beatific vision. Balthasar includes Blondel, Scheuer, Marechal,
and Rousselot with those who

in a moderate way take their departure from the subjective
dynamism of cognition and act, and who then argue to the
interior appropriateness and reasonableness of the transcen
dent faith act, made possible by the light of grace, from
the 'restless heart' of man, from its need and emptiness
(Masure), and from unlimited expectat ions .l,)
The advantages of this approach are that extrinicism and

heteronomy are removed; both the natural and supernatural aspects
of the act of faith are preserved and grounded objectively upon
Revelation, and subjectively and existentially on the human

spirit's dynamic orientation to its formal object. But, whether
the objective grounding in Revelation is adequate is in question.
Also, there is the question whether philosophy by the internal
standards or structures of the human spirit becomes the measure

of Revelation.

Faith tends to move toward immediate mystical

and interior experience "which half enjoys the light of the
eschatological visio beats.”

Balthasar sees each of these approaches as attaining only

"one side of Christian faith, and the insight and vision which
belongs to it." Both need to be purified from the common defi
ciency of referring to the historical events of revelation as
"signs." The rationalist approach treats the signs as pointers to

God which themselves do not "stand within the light of divine
Being. The transcendental-personalist approach, by emphasizing

l”lbid., p.

149.

t« Ibid., p. 149.
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the interior immediacy of revelation, makes the signs "so trans
parent .

.

. that in the sign only the signified is of interest,

and in the historical only that which is valid for eternity."1’1

The dualism of "ostensive sign and signified interior light .
. can be abolished only by introducing .

.

.

.

. the thought- forms

and categories of the beautiful." The light of the form as it

appears in the phenomenon of its beauty does not come from
outside the form but shines out from its interior.

Visible form not only 'points’ to an invisible, unfathomable
mystery; form is the apparition of this mystery, and reveals
it while, naturally, at the same time protecting and veiling
it. . . . The content (Gehalt) does not lie behind the form
(Gestalt), but within it. Whoever is not capable of seeing
and 'reading' the form will, by the same token, fail to
perceive the content. Whoever is not illumined by the form
will see no light in the content either.1,1
For Balthasar the perception of the beauty of God's love in

Christ is crucial to a proper understanding of the truth and

goodness in Christ's love. Theoretical reason, with truth per se

as its object, without seeing the splendor of the truth, "remains
pragmatic and formalistic." Its "only concern .

.

.will then

merely be the verification of correct facts and laws .

.

.

."

Without seeing the beauty of the good, practical reason "remains

utilitarian and hedonistic." How it satisfies my good or my needs
will be the focus. Only the value of the being-for-me will be

seen, not the desirability of the being-in-itself. For the faithperceiver to go out of himself to God, aesthetic reason must be

di

Ibid., p.

in Ibid

• 1 p.

150.
151.
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allowed to be part of the act of faith and the doing of theol-

In the luminous form of the beautiful the being of the
existent becomes perceivable as nowhere else, and this is
why an aesthetic element must be associated with all spiri
tual perception as with all spiritual striving. The quality
of 'being-in-itself' which belongs to the beautiful, the
demand the beautiful makes to be allowed to be what it is,
the demand, therefore, that we renounce our attempts to
control and manipulate it, in order truly to be able to be
happy by enjoying it: all of this is, in the natural realm,
the foundation and foreshadowing of what in the realm of
revelation and grace will be the attitude of faith.1’*

Revelation and Experience: The Experience of Fai th

Experience Must Be Part of the Act of Faith
The act of faith contains the two related dimensions of a

perceivable object and a response that is part of the perception

of the object. The response is part of the perception because the
light of God's love for Himself is that in which the believer
participates in order to "see."

The eye with which the believer sees God, as Eckhart force
fully expressed it, is the eye with which God sees himself.
In modern language, the conditions for the possibility of
'theological knowledge' are the very conditions that consti
tute the 'theological' object, with this important restric
tion that the object itself provides the conditions for its
knowledge.

193

Ibid., p. 152; Balthasar points out here that aesthetic
perception is a "fact beyond reasonable doubt." He says: "Nor is it
now our concern to ask in what (epistemological) manner form is
perceived--what, for instance, the significance of 'intuition' is
for human perception. It is enough to accept that the aesthetic
'seeing the form' is a fact beyond reasonable doubt." Ibid.
lHIbid., p.
1)5

153.

Dupre, p. 402.
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The unity of faith and experience are critical to the theological
standing of Balthasar's theological aesthetics.1’* * If
* *the
* *act of
faith in the perception of the form of God's love in Christ does
not include in its essence a true mediated experience of God,

then any claim that there is a true "gnosis” is empty. The "form"
becomes a mere aesthetic form detached from its content.

A study of theological form then, turns into a branch of
natural aesthetics . . . wherein the form functions only as
the appearance of a totally different, supernatural reality.
For von Balthasar, the gnosis of theology grows entirely out
of the experience of faith and belongs to the same order.1’7
Balthasar's theology of the experience which is part of the

act of faith is built on the nature of human existence as recep

tivity and the nature of the grace of the light of faith. To

perceive God's love in Christ is to see that the essence of
Christ's love response to the Father is humble and grateful

obedience. To put one's faith in Christ is to enter into Christ's
experience.

It involves a going out of oneself, a surrender of

"one's self and knowledge as the norm of experience."1”

l’*For commentary on Balthasar's approach to experience, see in
addition to Dupre's comments: Christophe Potworowski, "Christian
Experience in Hans Urs von Balthasar." Communio 20 (Spring, 1993)1:
107-117; Peter Casarella, "Experience as a Theological Category:
"Hans Urs von Balthasar on the Christian Encounter With God's
Image." Communio 20 (Spring, 1993)1:
118-128. Potworowski and
Casarella read these articles at the second meeting of the
Balthasar Society, held in conjunction with the 1992 Convention of
the Catholic Theological Society of America. One place Balthasar
treats the topic at length is in Glory. £, pp. 219-425.

*’7Ibid.
Hl Potworowski, p.

113.
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As an attitude, faith is the surrender of one's own experi
ence to the experience of Christ, and Christ's experience is
one of kenotic humiliation and self-renunciation, a reality
which . . . rests on the foundation of Christ's hypostatic
consciousness as Redeemer. For this reason, in 'mysticism'
[and analogously in Christians everywhere] every deeper
experience of . . . God will be a deeper entering into . . .
the 'non-experience' of faith, into the loving renunciation
of experience, all the way into the depths of the 'Dark
Nights' of John of the Cross, which constitutes the real
mystical training for the ultimate renunciation.1”

This paradox of faith as an experience of letting go of
experience as the norm of our knowing of God and His ways, while

it is a painful surrender of an illusory autonomy,

is an entry

into and growth of the infinite freedom and love of the Trinity.
That love is an obedience to goodness and truth which have their

inexhaustible origin in God, and can only be received in Christ,

through the power of the Holy Spirit. Such faith is a true entry

into and growth in participation in the life and "missions" of
the Trinity, an entry into the obedience of God to His own
essence and reality, which is kenotic love. Christ is the Trini-

tarian obedience incarnated.

He is the immanent life of the

Trinity lived economically in human flesh. Given the infinite
reciprocal self-renunciation which grounds the infinite recipro

cal self-gift of the life of the Trinity, this participation can
only be a gift that is received though the gift of the Holy

l”Bal thasar, Glory J., p. 412-13.

!”"Thus, he must already be obedient even as God, and his human
obedience unto death must be the epiphany of a divine--that is,
tr ini tar ian--obedience. In the Son of Man there appears not God
alone; necessarily, there also appears the inner-trintarian event
of his procession; there appears the triune God, who, as God, can
command absolutely and obey absolutely and, as the Spririt of love,
can be the unity of both." Ibid., p. 479.
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Spirit. Christ's obedience, and ours, are the obedience of
Trinitarian love.
The kingship of God, who reveals himself as love, is shown
to us in the humble obedience of the Son to the Father, and
so we are shown that this obedience is essentially love. It
is certainly the model for human love before the majesty of
God, but more than that, it is the supreme image of divine
love itself appearing. For it is precisely in the Kenosis of
Christ (and nowhere else) that the inner majesty of God's
love appears, of God who 'is love' (1 John 4.8) and there
fore a trinity. The Trinity, though to our reason an unap
proachable light, is the one hypothesis which clarifies the
phenomenon of Christ as he is present in Scripture, the
Church and history, because it is phenomenologically ade
quate, and does not do violence to the facts. 1
The Christian life-form, in whatever particular vocation it

may be expressed,

is thus a participation in a Trinitarian Theo-

drammatic, a drama of God's love for His creation, and God’s

action in it to redeem it for participation in the Trinitarian

life. Human ontological receptivity is then the natural ground
for the receptivity of the Trinitarian life, which is in the

economic order the life of Christian faith. Christians are called

to enter by faith into the

"begottenness" and the "mission" of

the Son to the world, receiving fully the Father's kenotic life,
and in that reception to live it fully in the Son in the world,

in the power of the Holy Spirit.
This attitude is the loving assumption of the will of the
loved Father, and in the identical act the Father loves the
Son and the world, and allows the Son to bring back the
world to the Father in his self-giving even to the point of
death. Thus the willingness of the disciple who has been
called to allow himself to be disposed of is taken up di
rectly into the universal saving will of God. It is, in
Jesus' call, the permission to offer one's existence to this

nt Balthasar. Love Alone

. 71-72.
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saving will to be disposed of by it. Everything rests on the
triune iove of the Father: the one who offers himseif turns
to it as the origin of ali love. And in the free obedience
of the Son whom the disciple follows, this love of the
Father appears to him concretely .in
Experience as the ground of gnosis in the act of faith is,

I

believe, the link which binds fundamental theology to dogmatic

theology in Balthasar's thought. How we know Christ cannot be
separated from knowing Christ, except in a theoretical way. The

knowledge or experience which is at the heart of the act of faith
is the fountainhead of that knowledge of Christ, and Cod in

Christ, which is the object of theology. But, there is an addi
tional dimension of knowing which is anticipated and grounded in

the act of faith, which is vital to theology and logically

conditions it. That is the subject of Theo-Drama. the second leg

of Balthasar’s trilogy.

It is there that Balthasar treats at

length the question of how infinite freedom and finite freedom as

receptivity can be compatible without dissolving finite autonomy
into the infinite. As one might suspect from the foregoing, only

love can provide the answer.

I cannot, within the confines of

this thesis, explore that topic further.

I only want to highlight

the fact that a theological aesthetics as a theology of percep
tion cannot be separated from the Theo-dramatic life in Christ;

that is, from the living of the divine life of faith which one
enters into and continues to live by a perception which is

,lPotworowski , p. 115, fn. 2k, quoting Balthasar, "The Three
Evangelical Counsels," in Elucidations. translated by John Riches.
London: SPCK, 1975, 142. Emphasis by Potworowski.
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deepened in that very act of living in it. Balthasar situates his
Theo-drama between his aesthetics and his logic because it is in

fact at the heart of theology.2,3 The three phases, which cannot
be totally separated from each other, are explained by Balthasar

as the following:
Theo-phany = Aesthetics
Theo-praxy = Dramatic theory
Theo-logy = Logic

Now we will turn to the nature and grace issues implicit in the
foregoing discussion, and examine the idea of analogy of being in
more depth. Briefly put,

the question is how in Christ we can

participate in God's knowledge of himself by grace.

2,3Balthasar explains his plan and its basis in "Dramatic Theory
Between Aesthetics and Logic," in Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic
Theory I : Prologomena. trans. Graham Harrison. San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 1988, pp. 15-23.

CHAPTER I I I

THEO-DRAMATICS: LIFE IN CHRIST
The Unity of Reali ty
The Nature of the Problem

Balthasar's views on nature and grace and the unity of

reality are intrinsically connected to his concept of "the

analogy of being," which runs like a seam throughout his Christ
ology and theology. The "new theology" controversy raised again

in new form the challenge which the Enlightenment had raised with
respect to the possibility of objective revelation by God in
human historical forms through which human beings could know with

certainty the cognitive content of that revelation. The thrust of
Enlightenment thought denied such a possibility. Christians

affirmed it but struggled to articulate theologically and philo

sophically the nature of the relationship between God and the
world which made it possible. The problem was how to maintain the
unity of reality with respect to God and creation, nature and
grace.

The neo-Platonic Augustinian synthesis which maintained the
unity of reality had been called into question by the Aristote-

1ian-Thomistic synthesis which also maintained the unity of

reality, but with a tension between the realms of faith knowledge
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and that of reason.

In the Thomistic synthesis which emphasized

the independence of reason in the realm of nature, philosophy if
misused could take over theology. As Balthasar says:

The most characteristic feature of Thomism is probably its
strong emphasis on philosophy as something to be employed
before and within theology. The indivisibility of this
before and within probably testifies to the historical
position of Thomas Aquinas better than anything else could.
Behind him lay the world of the Church Fathers--the one,
concrete supernatural order where philosophy stood within
theology. Ahead of him lay the twofold order (natural versus
supernatural) of modern times, which found its ultimate
formulation in Vatican I (DZ 1799).

Balthasar sees St. Thomas as a transition figure pointing

forward to the separation and autonomy of the natural and philoJAf
sophical sciences from theology.
He points out that though the
three central "tractati" of theology, the Trinity, Christ, and

the Church," structured and dominated St. Thomas’

thinking,

do "not hold a central structuring place in his theology.

.

they
.

."

In fact,

Thomistic thought operated emphatically from below up. From
the world of sense perception and concrete experience it
moves, through abstraction, to universal concepts and a
demonstration of the principles contained therein. Here
again we have a methodology that is predominantly philosoph
ical; its use in theology is limited. Theology concentrates
on God, the supreme concrete reality, in whom nothing can be
abstracted, and insofar as theology examines the Revelation
of this God in the world, its object is historical, con
crete, and particular. Aquinas readily admitted this, but he
went on to point out that particular realities "non perti
nent ad per feet ionem intel 1 igibi 1 ium."lii

l,>Bal thasar, The Theology of Kar 1 Barth. p. 213.

H5Ibid., pp. 213-15.
”‘lbid., p. 215.
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In his book on Karl Barth, Balthasar is contrasting St.
Thomas' method from below with that of Karl Barth which is

exclusively theological. He points out that Barth’s real concern
is to ground theology in "concrete singulars and the absolute
Concrete, where happening and doctrine are embodied in the person

and activity of Christ." Balthasar agrees that this focus on the
concrete historical events of Christ's life and on his person

could "contribute a great deal to .

.

.

renewal in Catholic

theology, even if his conclusions were not adopted.'4’7 Thus
methodologically, the historical and concrete Christ should be
the focus of how the unity of divine and human nature could be

understood. But, the question remains as to how to approach the
union of the divine and the human in Christ.

Balthasar's Approach: Existence as Receptivity

Theological or Philosophical Anthropology
Here we have a basic question about the essential nature of
personal being and autonomy, and whether the essence and being of

the human spirit can in the first place be determined by philo
sophical anthropology, or whether it must of necessity be part of
Revelation. Does philosophical anthropology or theological

anthropology have priority? What is the proper method of ap

proaching this question, from above or below? Concisely put, what

does Christ's obedience and freedom teach us about the essential

nature of personal being, knowing and loving? Is personal being

iv

Ibid., pp. 216-217.
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primarily a quest for infinite knowledge of Being or is it a

primarily a quest to enter into the infinite Triune freedom of
God to receive and give love? What is the true nature of personal
being and autonomy, and how can we know this? It is Balthasar's

position that the descending nature of God's gift of self to us

gives the initiative to God both as to the content of the gift
and the form of its reception.

Its form or content cannot be

deduced philosophically from created reality. Therefore theologi

cal method has to conform itself to the content and form of

revelation.
At every point the essential thing is this: that which is
conferred by grace can be understood as being what it is
[that is, grace], but it can never be logically reconstruct
ed in retrospect. I cannot say: this is what I have always
"really" been expecting, or what my mind and heart have
always been oriented towards, so that only the slightest
impulse from outside was required to allow my pre-understanding to crystallize into perfect insight. That which
offers itself with the basic character of free grace can
never be overtaken rationally without destroying the dis
tinctive quality of this grace.IM

The self-authenticating character of God's revelation in
Christ does not permit philosophy to dissolve the mystery into

what can be known of human nature's existential or transcendental
needs. Balthasar uses an argument from St. Anselm of Canterbury

in the following passage:

Faith must recognize the validity of the claim sufficiently
in the claim itself to allow of assent. But it would not be
faith if it were able to work out this validity in a ratio
nal system and expound it exhaustively. There must always be

4 Werner Loser. "Being Interpreted as Love: Reflections on the
Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar." Communio 16 (Fall, 1989)3:
475-490, pp. 487-88, citing "Warum ich noch ein Christ bin."Zwei
Pladoyers (Munich, 1971), 30.
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something which eludes or obstructs faith when it thinks
that it is able to see through the conditions for the possi
bility of the reality that stands before it. When Jesus
says, "I am the Truth," "I am the Resurrection," he is
saying that God is present in him. But: Si comprehend!s, non
est Deus [if you understand it, it is not God]. If God
interprets himself in Jesus Christ then Anselm's formula for
God applies to this manifestation too: "id quo majus cogitari non potest [that than which nothing greater can be
conceived]. The context makes it clear that this means
neither exhaustive knowledge--as truth--nor a dynamic-com
parative knowledge--as though the objective, utter "great
ness" of God corresponded to a subjective, ever-expanding
thought in man. It is rather that the majus [the greater] of
the one who manifests himself takes possession of the cogitatio [the thinking] in such a way that the latter, by ac
knowledging its being over-mastered, praises the perfect
victory of the inscrutable truth of God.20’

As previously noted, Balthasar agrees that "man must in

himself be a search for God, a question posed to him."211 As we

will see in this discussion of nature and grace, against Barth
Balthasar will affirm the positivity of the human spirit, and the

necessity that human beings have some minimum similarity to God

to allow there to be a relationship.21

21,Ibid., p. 488, citing "Warum ich noch ein Christ bin," 28ff.

2l#"On the one hand, this God, Creator of the world and of man,
knows his creature. 'I who have created the eye, do I not see? I
who have created the ear, do I not hear?' And we add 'I who have
created language, could I not speak and make myself heard?' And
this posits a counterpart: to be able to hear and understand the
auto-revelation of God man must in himself be a search for God, a
question posed to him. Thus there is no biblical theology without
a religious philosophy. Human reason must be open to the infinite."
Balthasar, Resume of My Thought. p. 2.
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Infinite and finite freedom

Any discussion of the human and divine in Christ, and the
relation of nature and grace, must face the question of the
relation between infinite and finite freedom.

In all acts of knowledge, including the primal phenomenon
previously discussed in the section on "I" and "thou," the "I" in

the consciousness of its presence to itself is aware of its selfpossession of its own finite freedom. Balthasar points out the

need to keep in mind the difference between the Thomistic view of

one's self-awareness and that of the Augustinian school, particu
larly St. Bonaventure. For St. Thomas the soul's habitual knowl

edge of its own existence, which precedes any abstraction,

is

"only actualized indirectly, through its powers, which are

distinct from the soul's essence and are referred to objects."
Whereas the Augustinian school holds that "the reflex character
of all intellectual knowledge involves the knower possessing him
self, especially since Bonaventure makes no real distinction

between the soul and its powers."211 I cannot enter in depth to

Balthasar's extensive discussion of the nature of finite freedom,
I can only set out here his position on the relationship between

the two.212 The primal experience of this freedom as part of the
primal phenomenon of "being" includes of necessity the awareness

of infinite freedom on which it is dependent for its own freedom.

21lTD li, p. 207-208, fn. 2.

212See Ibid., pp. 207-242 for Balthasar's position.
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The awareness of the gift of "being" is also an awareness that
one has not been given a subsisting "thing,"
but rather, the core of freedom, because in giving being,
God gives himself. In the gift, God himself is present,
however much he remains hidden, distancing himself from the
gift in the interest of human freedom .... Thus, the
'character of existence as gift’ turns out to be the 'nucl
eus' of ontological difference .... What it means to us
to be the recipients of this gift is revealed in the encoun
ter with another human who turns to us. Therefore the saying
is especially valid today: "The metaphysical question is
about Thou. As over against the cosmos it seems to be bur
ied, . . . but it is always about to burst forth" . . . ?13

Balthasar's statement of the Christian task summarizes the

solution to the relationship between finite and infinite freedom:
The Christian task, in the face of the Stoic and Plotinian
enterprise, is to heighten the formal model into a relation
ship between freedoms according to which finite freedom can
only arise out of, and persist within, primal freedom . . .
; it is precisely because it has its origin in freedom that
it is really free.
I. The Christian answer to the Neoplatonic paradox . .
. is the New Testament doctrine of the Holy Spirit, who, as
the love of God poured into the hearts of believers, brings
about two things at the same time: he liberates finite
freedom so that it may embrace its own, ultimate freedom;
and he does so by initiating it into a participation in
infinite freedom.31*
The revelation of the full meaning of finite human freedom

and the necessity of its dependence on infinite freedom for
fulfillment is found only in Christ.
of his human freedom,

It is in Christ's exercise

in the context of the hypostatic union

between divine and human natures in one person,
of human and divine freedom is revealed.

llJBieler, p.

It is in Christ that we* ll

141-42, citations omitted.

ll*Bal thasar, TD _I_I_, p. 230.

that the meaning
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see both the epitome of human freedom and obedience, which is at
the same time a manifestation of the Son's relationship with the

Father lived out in the economic order. How can Christ have human

freedom given the oneness of His person in the Word?
ultimate problem of the analogia entis.

This is the

I cannot develop here the

manner in which Balthasar demonstrates how this can be worked out
on the level of Christ’s human consciousness.115 But the fact
that Christ does have complete human freedom reveals the onto

logical reality that human freedom can be dependent on infinite
freedom without being destroyed--rather that dependence assures

its fulfillment if it is accepted. Existence for Balthasar,

in

its ontological, epistemological and interpersonal dimensions,

is

receptivity. We turn now to how this receptivity allows reality

divine and human, uncreated and created, to be in unity.

The Problem of "Nature"

Another aspect of St. Thomas' transitional character is
illustrated by his view of "nature," which is much in dispute in
the "new theology." St. Thomas "attributes only one end, a
supernatural one,

to the created spirit. Like the Church Fathers

he sees only one indivisible world order in which nature and
grace form one unity."2lt While he recognizes a natural end for

the created spirit it cannot be separated, even hypothetically,

H5Balthasar works out this ultimate problem of "analogia entis"
in the consciousness of Christ based on his consciousness of
mission. See TD III, pp. 220ff.
n$Balthasar, The Theology of Kar1 Barth. pp. 217-218.
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from the supernatural end. The Reformers, followed later by Baius

and Jansen, tried to make the synthesis of nature and grace

present in Augustine's thought, a matter of right. Baius insisted
that God could not deny grace to man without destroying his very

personhood, for grace was necessary for man to be man. This posi
tion forced the Church to insist on the separation of the natural

and supernatural orders so as to defend the gratuity of grace and

God's freedom. In turn gratuity and God's freedom defend the
distinction between God and creatures. But this defense led to
the development of a "natural theology" which had as its object

"nature in the pure state (natura pura)."717

The concept of "nature," Balthasar points out, has been used
ambiguously in philosophy and theology. The Church in her reac
tion to Baius was refining the concept of nature so as to protect

the gratuity of grace. As Chalcedon clarified the patristic
debate over natures and person in Christ, the period from Trent
to Vatican I developed the clarification of the whole order of
grace.

In the definition of a twofold order at Vatican I, the

process started by Baius reached its consummation. 711 Balthasar

sees that the only way to avoid the extremes of a pantheistic
metaphysics which cannot distinguish between philosophy and

theology, and a "radically Protestant dialectics" which splits
the concept of nature, is to use the concept of nature analogous
ly.

7l7Ibid., pp. 218, 219-221.
7“lbid., pp. 220-221.
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But Balthasar insists that the starting point cannot be a

philosophical analysis of what human nature is apart from Cod.
Such an analysis cannot achieve insight into the nature of God o
how God relates to human nature. Revelation and faith give the
realization that our vocation to the beatific vision can "in no

way be regarded as deducible from the essence or being of a
creature."

Only God through revelation can give a positive

definition of grace.

The positive definition of grace can oniy be given through
grace itself. God himself must reveal what he is within
himself. The creature cannot delimit himself clearly over
against this unknown quantity nor can he know exactly what
distinguishes grace from himself. Only Revelation can clari
fy the distinction for us.!!i

The de facto real world God created is one in which human beings
are in fact ordered to a supernatural vocation. But it is "the
union of two distinguishable and distinct orders that are not
separable in reality. ”“l The philosopher cannot know by reason

alone the nature of the relationship between the two orders. But

"(a]s tides quarens intellectum, faith can distinguish between

the two realms and probe the structure of this complex reality."

But faith cannot do this by simply taking over the philo

sophical definition of "nature;" it can do so only by redefining
the terms used in light of the theological reality. This is

similar to the process which took place in the definition of the

“’ibid., PP

223- 4.

“‘ibid., PP

224- 5.

“‘ibid., P- 225.
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terms "nature" and "person" used to resolve the christological
issues in the Councils leading up to Chalcedon. The element of

mystery in the nature of the relationship between God and humani
ty must remain, for faith to be faith. Consequently, the concrete

analogy of being and the conceptual and abstract analogy of

"nature," "do not neatly coincide with one another."

As one man has no rightful claim to the full self-disclosure
of another man, so analogously creatures have no right to
God's self-disclosure in Revelation. Here we have a real
analogy, because a real analogy exists between the divine
and human subject. It is only an analogy, however, because
the divine subject is both nearer to, and farther from, the
III
human subject than any other human thou is.
Analogy of Being: Nature and Supernature

Theoretically, it would seem that the way to proceed to
achieve a definition of "nature" would be to deduce it by sub

traction from all that is supernatural in human nature. But
Balthasar argues that "the content of the concept of pure nature

cannot be given exact elucidation." The proper approach is to

focus only on the real world, "which is the only legitimate
object of theological thought."113 Balthasar carefully delineates

the nature-grace relationship as reflecting the fundamental

reality of the dissimilarity between God and creatures, without

’“ibid., pp. 226-227.

“3Ibid., p. 228; By now Balthasar's basic phenomenological
approach to theological reality should be clear. His method has
been called a "theological phenomenology.” Medard Kehl, S.J. "Hans
Urs von Balthasar: A Portrait," pp. 34-35. But it is a realist
phenomenology, not limited to the phenomenon of the appearance in
consciousness.
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denying the similarity. At the same time he emphasizes that

theology must recognize the "servant status surrounding creat
ion's relationship to God." Nature is a formal concept which

represents that minimum which is the condition which makes

possible any situation
. . . where God might choose to reveal himself to creation;
that minimum can be called the analogy of being. If there is
to be Revelation, it must move from God to a creation, to a
creation that does not include the notion of Revelation in
and of itself. The nature which is presupposed by grace is
createdness as such.11*
God's freedom is protected in that the decision to create

such a creation to which God will give a participation in the
Triune inner life,

is a free one. But,

this decision must take the form of the analogy of being,
which is grounded in the essence of God himself. Created
being as such must be nondivine, relative, and dependent,
but it cannot be wholly dissimilar to its creator. If it is
a spiritual-inte1lectual being, both its ontic and its
noetic structures must bear some relation to its creator.
Its thinking process must be affected somehow by the fact
that it was thought up by the creator?1’

This minimum condition of possibility, which Balthasar calls
"analogy of being" and on which the "theological contingency"

depends,

is not something into which the theological contingency

can ultimately be dissolved. "Theology is not a superstructure

built atop philosophy." With respect to the analogy of being
referred to here, Balthasar is careful to point out that the
philosophical does not blend smoothly into the theological. The

“‘ibid., p. 228.

H5Ibid., p. 229.
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difference between God and creature is qualitative and not simply
a matter of degree. One cannot move from philosophy to theology
(from below to above) or from theology to philosophy (from above

to below), and combine them to form an integrated total. "The two

movements point towards each other, but they can never meet in a
total, unifying embrace. This very fact is proof of the differ

ence between them."114
Again and again, Balthasar stresses in agreement with Barth

"that being God and being creature are totally dissimilar as
such." However, this dissimilarity is stressed when we talk about
nature as the basis of the difference between God and man. On the

other hand, grace stresses the similarity and communion between
God and man. But what grace does is allow man to know God by the
Logos taking on "a creaturely shape ('the servant of Yahweh') and

even in the forma peccati, which is radically dissimilar to
God.

The theological analogy does not complete or abolish the

philosophical, rather it "sheds definitive light on what the
philosophical analogy is as such:

it shows us what the similarity

can mean (i.e., participation and sonship) and how far the

dissimilarity can go (i.e., God's abandonment of himself)."

JJ1

Balthasar establishes the possibility of distance between
God and the creature "in the infinite distance between the divine

n‘lbid., pp. 229-230.
111 Ibid. , p. 230 .

n‘lbid., pp. 230-231.
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persons within the Trinity itself."

Moreover,

the distance

contained in the formal concept of nature is based on Jesus

Christ Himself.
All creation is grounded in the Logos, more precisely, in
Jesus Christ. The possibility of creation being distant from
God derives ultimately from the Son's readiness to empty
himself, to stand over against his father in a relationship
of obedience and service. The relationship between the
necessity of nature's presence and the contingent fact of
Revelation becomes plain when we realize that the distance
of formal nature is a real presupposition for the descent of
the Logos to humanity; that, at the same time, on a higher
plane, the formal concept of nature presupposes the Son's
willingness to make this descent.231
Union of Nature and Supernature in Christ

Balthasar's views on nature and grace, his stress on the

dissimilarity between God and creature while affirming the
similarity,

the relationship between the theological analogy and

the philosophical, flow directly from a theological analysis of

the hypostatic union of natures in Christ,

the Word made flesh.

Along with de Lubac, and in conformity with the patristic tradi

tion, he seeks to reunite nature and grace by enfolding nature

within grace, but maintaining its distinctness. The key to this

w Ibid., pp. 230, 236. "Let us repeat once again. The distance
between the two sub j ects here is not created by grace. It is a
distance that belongs to nature itself, but it has its deepest
roots in the distance that prevails between the divine persons in
the Trinity, and it is grace which makes this interdivine distance
visible to us and makes possible a fruitful interchange between
Word and faith in the distance that separates God and creature.
Since participation in the Trinitarian persons is the purpose for
which creaturely personhood and subjectness was provided, it is
also the thing that grounds and makes possible this natural sub
strate
236.
Ibid.

no Ibid., p. 231.
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is the concrete reality of the hypostatic union. How can God

become man without dissolving Christ's humanity into His divinity
as in monophysitism? Or, without losing His divinity in His

humanity, as in Nestorianism? Balthasar's christocentric perspec

tive on nature and grace is clear from this passage:
It is in Christ that human nature and its mental faculties
are located in their true center; it is in him that they
attain their final truth in the manner in which God, the
creator of nature, wanted nature to exist from eternity. In
order to investigate the relation between supernature and
nature, man does not need to step outside faith; he does not
need to make himself the mediator between God and the world,
between revelation and reason; he does not need to cast
himself in the excessive role of judge over the relation
between the natural and the supernatural world. All that he
needs is to understand and believe in "the single mediator
between God and man, the man Jesus Christ" (1 Tim. 2:5) "in
whom all things in heaven and earth were created . . . all
through him and for him" (Col. 1:16). Just as Christ did not
leave the Father when he became man to bring creation in all
its spheres to fulfillment, so also the Christian does not
need to step outside the center, Christ, to mediate Christ
to the world, to understand his relation to the world, to
build the bridge between revelation and nature, between
231
philosophy and theology.

To understand the theological positions Balthasar adopts on
analogy of being we need to explore his understanding of Christ
as the center of Creation and Revelation, and the self-expression
of God in a truly human medium.

niHans Urs von Balthasar, "Theology and Sanctity." Explorations
in Theology I: The Word Made Flesh. San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
1989, pp. 181-209 at p. 195; retranslation by Angelo Scola, "Nature
and Grace in Hans Urs von Balthasar." Communio 18 (Summer 1991)2:
207-26, at 207-8.
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Creation in Christ
It is apparent from the above passage that a key insight

into the centrality of Christ in creation is the fact that
everything in creation was made "through Christ and for him."

This includes humanity, and makes the Logos the archetype for
Christ,

the God-man, and therefore for "humanness." Balthasar

emphasizes the theme of creation in Christ in "the proper,

absolute, and objective sense."132 Another way of saying this is

that "humanness" was created precisely for the archetype itself,

the Son,

that he might become the image without ceasing to be the

archetype. Thus, "the humanity of Christ shows itself to be the

singular humanity of the Son of God. For this reason it is the
complete form of the human."232
233

An important consequence of Balthasar's emphasis on the

theme of creation in and for Christ is the primacy he give« to

God
who always acts first, setting himself in (creational)
relationship over against all human movements of ascent and
transcendence. These are by no means devalued, but they
receive their deepest meaning only from the prior relation
ship of the creator to humankind. 3*

It also means that human beings must have some minimal similarity
to God (formal nature, analogy of being) which permits the hypo

static union without confusion or mingling of natures. This
232 Scola, "Nature and Grace in Hans Urs von Balthasar," p. 211.
233 Ibid., p. 213.

23*Kehl, "A Portrait," p. 21; Kehl notes: "It is precisely this
primacy that he sees as not wholly preserved in the transcendental
theology of Marechal and Rahner." Ibid., fn. 55.

115
similarity permits Revelation of God through and in creation by a
"genuine self-representation on his part, a genuine unfolding of

himself in the worldly stuff of nature, man and history--an event
which in a supereminent sense may be called an 'appearance' or
*

• »
»
epiphany
.

"235

Why did God create something he did not need? Balthasar says
that the answer to this question

can come only from Revelation.

The Christian response is contained in these two fundamental
dogmas: that of the Trinity and that of the Incarnation. In
the Trinitarian dogma God is one, good, true, and beautiful
because he is essentially Love, and Love supposes the one,
the other, and their unity. And if it is necessary to sup
pose the Other, the Word, the Son, in God, then the other
ness of the creation is not a fall, a disgrace, but an image
of God, even as it is not God.
And as the Son in God is the eternal icon of the Fa
ther, he can without contradiction assume in himself the
image that is the creation, purify it, and make it enter
into the communion of the divine life without dissolving it
. . . . It is here that one must distinguish nature and
grace. „U(
Christ the Concrete "Analogia Ent i s"

The tension between dissimilarity/similarity finds its basis
and its zenith in the hypostatic union of the two natures in

Christ. "Between the divine and the created natures there is an

essential abyss.

It cannot be circumvented."

717

"Analogia entis"

is an all embracing law that

. . . according to the Fourth Lateran Council (against
Joachim of Fiore), . . . must have universal application,
that is, it must extend to the creatures supernatural eleva-

n5Bal thasar, Glory _I_, p.

*3<Bal thasar,

119.

"A Resume of My Thought," PP. /»-5.

n?Bal thasar, TD III. p. 220.
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tion, through grace, to divine sonship; so too, we can
conclude, it must apply to that highest union between divine
and created being, in the God-man himself.231
As the ultimate union between divine and created being, "it must

constitute the final proportion .

.

. between the two and hence

must be the 'concrete analogia entis'

itself."

It is crucial that

it not be misinterpreted in the direction of identity of natures.

It is only the unity in the person of the Logos that allows

attribution of qualities of one nature to the other (communicatio
idiomatum). While the natures are undivided,

the unity of natures

is in the person, and "however close the union,

used',

they are 'unconf

'the properties of each remain unimpaired [sozomenesj’

(DS

302) . "2”
Diastas i s in the Trinity: Bas i s for Analogy of Being

The dissimilarity between God and creatures must be able to
be maintained within the union,

just as, anlagously,

the distance

or dissimilarity of persons within the Trinity is maintained in

unity of nature.

In fact,

it is the Trinitarian distinction of

persons which grounds both the possibility of a creation and that

creation's distinctness from its creator.1*1 Why is this? Be
cause,

the difference in persons in the Trinity is a real dis-* 23

23,Ibid., p. 221.
23’lbid., p. 222.

2uIn this Balthasar is following Bonaventure who "affirms that
a God who is not Trinitarian would not be able to create."
Bonaventue also says: "God would never have been able to generate
the creature by his will, if he had not generated the Son by
nature." Scola, p. 212.
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tinction, not simply a formal or modalistic distinction. Each
person of the Trinity has a metaphysical personal reality, and as

seen in the life of Christ, personal freedom. Our human catego
ries of person and individual are inadequate to fully grasp the

nature of the real distinction within a unity of one nature, so

we have to surrender to the mystery. But the reality of real
distinction in God makes the real distinction between esse and

essence, creator and creature possible.

If there can be no real

distinction in God, how can there be any in creation? If there is

distinction of persons in God then will not creation reflect in

an analogous way such distinction? Can or would God create
anything that does not in some way reflect His essence? As

pointed out earlier, God's essence is the basis for analogy of

being. And the concept of analogy of being encompasses and sums

up the double tension between the dissimilarity/similarity
reflected in the real distinction between esse and essence,
Creator and creature. The similarity is that both Creator and

creature have being in a union between being and nature, esse and

essence. The dissimilarity is that only God can and must "be"
even without us; we need not "be." Only in God are being and

essence identical.at The similarity grounds the ability to know

God through creation and God's Revelation by analogy, but the

211

Kehl, "A Portrait," p. 20.
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dissimilarity in the analogy grounds God's incomprehensibility

even in Revelation itself.*
2*2
Revelation in Christ
The self-disclosure of the Trinity which takes place in
Christ2*5 takes place in a totally human way and form, even while

all Christ's actions are those of the Logos. The modality of

Revelation in Christ's humanity is and remains itself the Revela
tion.

It is not a sign, or a Platonic symbol of deeper spiritual

reality or Revelation,

says:

it is the Revelation.1^ As Balthasar

"God, who with divine freedom, but also with divine consis

tency, has fashioned for himself in his creation a body through

which to reveal his glory."2*5

If the distance and dissimilarity between God and creature
is to be maintained, the Revelation of God in Christ's humanity

2*2There is the danger that these two dimensions of analogy will
not both be maintained. The apophatic will swallow the cataphatic.
This is the danger in the contemporary feminist disputes over Godlanguage. When the apophatic swallows the cataphatic,
human
subjectivity projects itself onto God. The historical events of
Revelation become merely symbolic and instrumental, and the true
sacramental nature of reality is in jeopardy. For in depth analysis
see, Francis Martin. "Feminist Theology: A Proposal." Communio 20
(Summer 1993)2: 334-376.

2*3"For
*
the surest thing that can be said of man is that he is
not God. Thus, he must already be obedient even as God, and his
human obedience unto death must be the epiphany of a divine--that
is, a trini tarian--obedience. In the Son of Man there appears not
God alone; necessarily, there also appears the inner-trini tarian
event of his procession; there appears the triune God, who, as God,
can command absolutely and obey absolutely and, as the Spirit of
love, can be the unity of both." Balthasar, Glory 1, p. 479.
2*‘lbid., pp. 437-441.

Ibid., p. 441.
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cannot be identical with God in Himself. Rather,

it must be a

personal self-disclosure which conceals the mystery of God's

essence both on the level of person and nature. There is a clear
analogy here to the phenomenal experience of human self-disclo
sure to others, but there is also an infinitely greater differ
ence of nature and personhood. The mystery and otherness of God
are concealed in Christ's humanity. God's greatest possible

manifestation of Himself in Christ remains an ineffable and
mysterious concealment.

It is manifestness because here God is explained to man by
no means other than himself ... by his own being and his
own life. What is most familiar to man is suddenly turned
for him into a word and a teaching about God: how could he
not understand! But it is concealment because the transla
tion of God's absolutely unique, absolute, and infinite
Being into the ever more dissimilar, almost arbitrary and
hopelessly relativised reality of one individual man in the
crowd from the outset appears to be an undertaking condemned
to failure.l“
Of course, since man has become the language of God's self-

disclosure, "man is disclosed along with God." A key point here
is that God (grace) does not use humanness (nature) in an ex

trinsic way, but a totally immanent way.

In a way which does not

destroy nature or human freedom, but brings it to perfection by
elevating it to a participation in divine life which it had no
right to and could not achieve on its own. God is able to dis

close both Himself and man simultaneously while maintaining the

integrity of each, precisely because God is the fullness of that

Z*C Ibid., p. 457 .
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Being, of which man is an existent.1’7 Human nature and human
freedom are enfolded within God's gift of Himself in grace and
within God's infinite freedom without being absorbed by it,

because it is precisely that grace and freedom which make human
being and freedom possible.

The reality of God's concealment in Revelation is seen by

Balthasar as the apophatic nature of revelation contained within

the cataphatic. The incomprehensible dissimilar is contained
within the knowable similar. While the "basic form of

greater dissimilarity however great the similarity'

simi1itudine major dissimi1itudo, Dz 432)

'ever-

(in tanta

is irrevocable,"7” it

does not have to mean that "God's Being remains infinitely hidden

and unfathomable over and beyond all analogous utterances about
him .

.

.

."It can mean that "God 'appears unreservedly and,

therefore, even in his ever-greater incomprehensibility really
comes into the foreground and into the form that appears." In
other words, God's incomprehensibility is a positive and integral

dimension of Revelation which takes place by the modality of a

self-emptying love within a human "existence determined by sin,

a7Ibid., p. 459.

a,Balthasar notes in TD III, p. 220, fn. 51, in reference to
E. Przywara, that this text from the Fourth Lateran Council "is
found in an altered form in the new edition of Denzinger. What he
[Pryzwara] read was this: 'Inter Creatorem et creaturam non potest
tanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimi1itudo
notanda.' The tanta on which Pryzwara laid such stress ('in tanta
similitudine maior dissimi1itudo': however great the similarity-even by supernatural agency--the dissimilarity is even greater') is
no longer there in DS 806."
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corrupted by death and alienated from God."a} In fact,

it is

precisely the quality of God's kenotic love which makes God
incomprehensible to us. Despite the real grasp of God we will be

given in the beatific vision God's incomprehensibility will
remain.
It would be ridiculous--and would run in the face of all
religious experience of God--to interpret the visio facialis
as a comprehensio (katalepsis) in the sense of worldly
science or even philosophy: the axiom si comprehendis non
est Deus is as true in heaven as on earth, only there it is
transformed from the spes to the res. To see God sicuti est
means precisely this. . . . the kenosis will emerge to view
as what it is in reality: not as God's self-alienation . . .
, but as the appearance, conditioned by the world's guilt,
of the God who in himself is incomprehensible in his love
for the world?511

Balthasar sees in the hypostatic union of divine and human
natures the concrete analogue for the relationship between nature

and grace. Nature is seen as within grace, but remaining dis
tinct. But there is no natural bridge between the human and
divine natures, or between nature and grace?51 The distance and

dissimilarity of natures and persons is maintained. God has
created the world and human beings to be a medium of the self-

expression and self-gift of his kenotic life and love (glory)
Christ even while giving that medium true freedom.

in

It is pre

cisely through the freedom given that God will express and reveal

His infinite freedom to love kenotically, and offer us the* 25

a’lbid., pp. 461-462.
15,Ibid., p. 462.
25lIbid., p. 442-443.
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opportunity to participate in God's infinite freedom so as to
bring our own freedom to a perfect fulfillment it could not

achieve by its own self-perfection. The form of God's revelation
in concealment reflects

. . . a threefold tension: (1) the inner-worldly tension
between the manifestness of the body and the hiddenness of
the spirit; (2) the tension, rooted in creation, between the
cosmos (as image and expression of a free God who in no way
is compelled to create) and God himself; and (3) the ten
sion, rooted in the order of grace and redemption, between
the sinner who has turned away from God and the God who
reveals himself as redeemer in the concealment of the
Cross .

Analogy of Being and Barth's Analogy of Faith
Balthasar's stress on dissimilarity becomes more understand

able if we realize that he is in dialogue with Barth, who after

moving beyond total opposition between God's nature and human

nature (pure dialectics), took the position that "analogy of
faith" was first of all God's action on man's being;

action taken by God in creating and redeeming us.

it was an

The only way

to describe the action taken by God is through the concept of
analogy, but it was not a similarity in being as far as Barth was

concerned. Barth's formulation of analogy was as follows:
In man's profession of faith, God's Word becomes man's
thought and man's word. The dissimilarity is total, but
there is not a total strangeness between them. The human
counterpart of the divine prototype is a real counterpart

inIbid., p. 441.
253Balthasar traces this evolution in the section of his work
on Barth entitled, "The Shift to Analogy," pp. 73-100.
2UIbid., p. 95, citing Zwischen den Zeiten 1: 254.
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Secondly, for Barth, "Creation's likeness to God is a one-way

street.

It is fashioned from above by the Word, which lays hold

of creation.

It is the action of God upon creation." Analogy of

faith is grounded not in similarity of being but in the fact that
God has acted on creation in Revelation in such a way as to

establish communion between God and man, which communion cannot

be due to some law of nature. The truth communicated about God by
God in human terms and concepts is present only because God has
sovereignly chosen to "make our truth an expression of his

truth."*55 Baltha sar, while also stressing God's dissimilarity
retains the positivity of the created order as required by the

very nature of God's creative act and the fact of the Incarna
tion. For Balthasar there must be commonality between God and

creation for sin and redemption, love and communion to be possi
ble. Balthasar agrees with Barth that in the concrete order of

salvation, where man is a sinner Barth's form of analogy is the
"final form" of the relationship intended by God from the begin

ning. But Balthasar insists "that in this relationship the

presupposed relationship of creation is permanently elevated and
brought to its perfect ion. "*5<
Analogy of Being and "Pure Nature"
Looking at the dissimilarity from the human viewpoint,

the

distance between God and creature cannot be preserved effectively
by a concept of "pure nature." This concept "is probably the

*55Ibid., pp. 95-96.

in

Kehl, "A Portrait," pp. 23-2^.
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price that had to be paid to rationalism" in its attempts to

defend the gratuity of grace and protect "the concept of nature

from Protestant subversion.The formal concept of nature

(analogy of being) reveals that "everything touched by grace
retains its natural side: grace is always in a nature and for a

nature."As a matter of actual fact human nature as created "has

only one end, a supernatural one." There is no such thing as

"pure nature" in the real world.151 Consequently,

the only thing

one can do is respect the mystery of grace given to that real
nature which actually exists and explore it reverently. The realm

of nature cannot be given precise and clear definition.

"Its

lower limit will be the formal concept of nature .... Nature

fundamentally is creation as such;

in terms of the hearer of
2c
it is the conscious, free subject."
a

Revelation .

.

.

,

In brief, Balthasar believes with de Lubac that the concept
of "pure nature" is not a useful theological concept. Balthasar

contends that a "formal concept of nature" which is the "analogy
of being" is the best way to deal with the distance or dissimi
larity of God's being from that of the creature. God's freedom is

protected in the act of creating a creature whom he desires and

intends to give a share in the life of the Trinity, but within

25?
251
25,

Ibid., p. 233.
Ibid., p. 232.

Ibid., p. 235.
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the context of a drama of infinite freedom and the finite freedom

of the human subject.
Balthasar respects the meaning of Humani Gener i s with re

spect to the necessity of a two-fold gratuity. There is a "two

fold gratuitous act of God inherent in the gift of creation.
When the word of God goes forth, the creature is given
insight into God's purpose in creation and realizes some
thing entirely new: God undertook that first communication
of this being, whereby finite, self-aware, free beings were
created, with a view to a "second" act of freedom whereby he
would initiate them into the mysteries of his own life and
freely fulfill the promise latent in the infinite act that
realizes Being. This "second" act does not need to be tempo
rally distinct from the first: the final cause, since it is
the first and all embracing cause, includes all the articu
lations of the efficient cause--that is, the world's comingto-be and God's becoming man. To that extent, any "claim"
the creature might make on God (assuming the word has any
meaning) would always come too late, in view of the total
gift alreadv made and the response expected, namely, total
grati tude.M

Extrincism or Immanentism? The Third Way of Love
From the human viewpoint, what is the positive content of
the human subject's similarity to God (image and likeness or

formal nature) which permits God to freely give us a share in the
Trinitarian life, without that positive content requiring God to

do so? Or, without God's gift of grace amounting to the self-

perfection of humanity in Christ? Here we meet directly the
problem of extrincism versus immanentism.

It is the problem faced

by essentialist or rationalistic christologies which risk extrin

cism.

It also is the problem faced by consciousness or degree

u,Scola, "Nature and Grace in Hans Urs von Balthasar," p. 210.
z<lBal thasar , TD I 1 . pp. 400-401.
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Christologies which run the risk of immanent ism. With respect to

an immanentist approach through religious philosophy or human
existence, Balthasar says:
Christianity is destroyed if it lets itself be reduced to
transcendental presuppositions of a man's self-understanding
whether in thought or in life, in knowledge or in action. So
it would seem at first that the extrinsic and historical
approach of recent apologetics must be the only other way. .
Is there then no way between the Scylla of extrincism
and the Charybdis of immanentism?1*1

Balthasar suggests that there are two approaches which do
avoid these polarities, the personalist and the aesthetic "form."

These two approaches converge into one,

to form Balthasar's

"Third Way of Love," which is the title to Chapter III of Love

Alone.

In Love Alone. Balthasar sketches the basic pattern of his

seven volume work, The Glory of the Lord.

It is, he says,

. . . a theological aesthetic in the dual sense of a study
of perception, and a study of the objective self-expression
of divine glory; it will try to demonstrate that this theo
logical approach, far from being a dispensable theological
by-road, is in fact the one possible approach to the heart
of theoiogy--the cosmic world-historical approach, and the
path of anthropological verification, being secondary as
pects, complementary to it.
Consequently 'aesthetics' has for us a purely theologi
cal sense: the perception in faith of the self-authenticat
ing glory of God's utterly free gift of love?*3

Balthasar is using 'aesthetic' in a very precise theological way.
He is not using it

. . . in the subjective sense which the new theory of beau
tiful form, characteristically called aesthetics (i.e.,
science of perception), acquired in the eighteenth centu
ry....For when that term began to be used for referring to a
luBalthasar, Love Alone. p. 43.
2(3

Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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theory of beautiful form, it shifted the meaning from the
form itself to a particular mode of perceiving: the human
subject achieves a temporary harmony with the perceived
object by endowing it with its own inferiority. i44

For Balthasar, Kenotic Love, the pure act of God's Being,

is

perceived in its appearance in Christ in the "form" of beauty or

glory. The beauty of the Trinity's kenotic love is objectively

present in the person, Cross and Resurrection of Christ, not in
our faith perception of them. Our faith perception receives what

is actually present in them. "Beauty, as a transcendental quality
belongs to Being itself and is,

indeed,

its primary manifes

tation."145 For him the ontological culminates in the theologi

cal. The transcendental properties of created being, more pre
cisely personal being, are the means the Trinity uses to reveal

itself as Kenotic Love in Christ. However,

the analogy of being

must be preserved so that the transcendental attributes which are
the medium of Revelation are not simply identified with the
fullness of Love, beauty, goodness and truth found in the Trini

ty. Beauty is the form of Love's appearing in Christ, the arche

type of human being and icon of God's personal Being.
Being itself here unveils its final countenance, which for
us receives the name of trinitarian love; only with this
final mystery does light fall at last on that other mystery:
Why there is Being at all and why it enters our horizon as
light and truth and goodness and beauty.144

l44Dupre.

"The Glory of the Lord," pp. 386-387.

245Ibid., p. 387.
Z44Glory £, p.

158.
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Balthasar views the anthropological approach to the justification
of the demands of faith as

methodologically in error: the framework of God's message to
man in Christ cannot be tied to the world in general, nor to
man in particular; God's message is theological, or better
theo-pragmatic. It is an act of God on man; an act done for
and on behalf of man--and only then to man, and in him. It
is of this act that we must say: it is credible only as
love--and here we mean God's own love, the manifestation of
which is the manifestation of the glory of God.
Christian self-understanding (and so theology) is found
neither in a wisdom superior to that of the world's reli
gions, based on divine information . . . ; nor on the defin
itive fulfillment of man as a personal and social being
through the realization of the effects of revelation and
redemption . . . ; but solely in the self-glorification of
divine love. . . . 2<?
Being as co-extensive with love
The identification of Being and Love as co-extensive i s

uncommon and requires some expli cat ion.

Balthasar 's view on nature and grace,

11 is grounded, as was

in the persons and love of

the Trinity as revealed in Christ, culminating in His Cross and
Resurrection. Personal being, human or divine,

in its self-

possession, possesses the truth of its personal being in complete
freedom of choice of self-expression. Personal being is possessed

only in relation to other persons, but in the freedom of its own

truth.

In human terms this means language is an integral part of

human being and relationships. The freely chosen self-expression
or self-gift of another in love can only be received as "wholly-

247Bal thasar, Love Alone. pp. 7-8; the immanent aspect of how
human being and speech can be a revelation of both the personal
being of God and the ultimate reality of created being as love is
explicated in "God Speaks as Man," in Explorations in Theology I:
The Word Made Flesh. pp. 80-93.
2<*Loser. "Being Interpreted as Love," pp. 475-6.
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jr
other".

.

.

a

Applied to God's love in Christ:

"A love so boundless

. undreamed of by man or the world, can only be perceived and

received as the Wholly Other."27’ That Being and Love are co
extensive is based strictly on the theological reality of the
Incarnation, Cross, and Resurrection of Christ, and the revela

tion of the Trinitarian kenotic love contained therein.271
And so it is not the ascent of religious man to the absolute
One but rather the descent of the trinitarian God of love to
man that is the departure point of the theology of von
Balthasar. The corresponding attitude in man to this event
is the (Marian) attitude of disponibi1ity, the (Ignatian)
attitude of indi f ferencia.111

The myster ium paschale is the central redemptive reality

that reveals that kenotic love is the pure act of God's intraper
sonal Being, and that therefore all being is co-extensive with

love.

In the light of this love the full reality of the nature of

all being, epitomized in personal being,

is revealed.

Individual

existents in their individual acts of esse are participations in
the pure and full act of Personal Being, who is love. The idea of

human beings as the "image and likeness"273 of God is seen in its

2t,Bal thasar ,

"God Speaks as Man," pp. 80- 85.

270Balthasar . Love Alone. P-

8.

27lLoser, "Being Interpreted as Love," PP- 483-85.

272 Ibid., p. 485.
273 Balthasar discusses in some detail the idea of
likeness" in TD 11 . pp. 316-334; this discussion is an "Excursus"
in the context of "grace" and infinite and finite freedom, pp. 31216.
In essence, finite freedom is sustained continuously by
infinite freedom and through grace is offered the only way human
finite freedom can transcend and realize itself. That is, by union
with infinite freedom in Christ.
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full ontological reality. The nature and essence of human being
and personal freedom, grounded in the infinite freedom of inter-

Trinitarian kenotic love,
's love.

finds its fullest expression in Christ

"The absolute Thou that meets man, says von Balthasar,

is not a Someone who happens to have the property of love
but rather is the One who is constituted as such by love.
The trinitarian, personal process is love. And this is true
neither as an abstraction nor as a collective but as some
thing inconceivably personal: the one God (Father) sends me
(us) his 'only Son' in order to fill me (us) with his Holy
Spirit of love. In response to such
an event the created
person can find not even a half-way or moderately credible
answer based on his own power. Even
if the person is struck
to the core ... he can offer nothing in return. The answer
can only be to let God be God in the person, to keep for God
all space which he has claimed for his love. 'Behold, I am
the handmaid of the Lord.' The answer made possible by grace
can therefore only be the greatest possible disponibi1ity .
. . . This is not something merely negative, a resigned
lassitude--because one has nothing to offer of one's own, as
if one could give God permission to take what he wants and
needs on one's own power. Rather it is something positive;
it is a generous indifference, which is indistinguishable
from the highest form of joy. It surrenders everything,
almost as if one were possessed, gladly doing whatever the
divine majesty might demand simply because that is its own
*ii n 2 7
gracious will.

"Openness" of human nature as the human basis for grace
As this passage makes clear "indifference" is one' s positive

and free identification of God's will to good with one' s own, out
of a desire to be,

in Christ, one with God's love. One' s own

freedom to love kenotically is perfected only through free but
obedient union with and surrender to God's infinite freedom. The

total dependence of human freedom's fulfillment on surrender to

2?lLoser, pp. 485-86, citing "Der Zugang zur Wirklichkeit
Gottes", in Mysterium Salutis. vol II, edited by J. Feiner and M.
Lohrer (Einsiedeln, 1967), 15-45, at 36ff.
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love could not be clearer. Jesus is the one who reveals that the
interpersonal

infinite freedom of the persons of the Trinity is

expressed in the obedience and surrender of the Son to the

Father,

in the love of the Holy Spirit. This "indifferent and

loving obedience" of the Son "is the foundational act of Jesus
Christ's whole existence."*
2” And this is precisely because he is

living out as a man, the immanent life of the Trinitarian love in
the economic order. There is a simultaneous revelation of the

nature of divine and human freedom, and their compatibility.

With respect to the personalist dimension of the appearance
of personal Being he says:

No I has the possibility or the right to master intellectu
ally the Thou who encounters him in his own freedom, nor can
he understand or deduce his attitude prior to their meeting.
For love granted to me can only be "understood" as a mira
cle; I can never account for it, either empirically or
transcendentally--not even from a knowledge of our common
human 'nature'. A Thou meets me as an Other.2”
Love and beauty
But how can the love of another even on the human level be
perceived? How can it manifest itself as a whole to us? As

previously pointed out 'aesthetics'

is a theological concept,

which, building on the philosophical idea of aesthetics as seeing

the form of objective beauty, is the "perception in faith of the

2”lbid., pp. 486-87.
2”lbid., p. 44; in fn. 1 Balthasar explains "understood": "The
moment I think that I have understood the love of another person
for me--for instance, on the basis of laws of human nature or
because of something in me--then this love is radically misused and
inadequate, and there is no possibility of a response. True love is
always incomprehensible, and only so is it gratuitous."
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self-authenticating glory of God's utterly free gift of love."

(my emphasis) How does it appear to us except as something
beautiful, wonderful and glorious?

. . . just as in love I encounter the other as the other in
all his freedom, and am confronted by something which I
cannot dominate in any sense, so in the aesthetic sphere, it
is impossible to attribute the form which presents itself to
a fiction of my imagination. In both cases the 'understand
ing' of that which reveals itself cannot be subsumed under
categories of knowledge which imply control. Neither love in
the freedom of its gratuitousness, nor beauty, since it is
disinterested, are 'products'--1 east of all of some person's
need.111

The personalist and aesthetic dimensions of Being converge
even in nature where

eros is the chosen place of beauty. The object we love . . .
always appears wonderful and glorious to us . . . The two
related poles were surpassed in Revelation where the divine
Logos descends to manifest and interpret himself as love, as
agape, and therein as the Glory.1,1

The positive content of the human, because of the free
nature of personal love and the form of its se1f-presentation ,
cannot anticipate or derive from itself by way of existential

need or self-perfection, the gift of God's love in Christ. The

positive content of the human is simply its openness to the
totally free act of God's love.*
2” Or, as developed above,

its

disponibi1ity, or Ignatian indifference. The problem of extrincism or immanent ism (or Transcendance and immanence) cannot be

solved on the purely ontological level,

2”lbid., p. 45.
2”lbid.

27,Kehl, "A Portrait," p. 22.

it must be solved on the
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interpersonal level in the way that free persons love and receive

love. The ontological difference between Cod's being and our
being must remain, but can be bridged by the similarity of both
being personal intelligent spiritual beings capable of kenotic

love. Gratuity is founded both in the dissimilarity of Creator
and creature by nature or being, and in the nature of interper

sonal love or self-gift and the manner of its presentation.
Additionally, of course,

in the case of grace, God must provide

the gift of faith by grace which enables the gift of God's love
in Christ to be perceived and received.

Potentia obedientalis
The compatibility of divine and human freedom in the person
of Christ is the foundation for the theological and philosophical

position of the created spirit as receptivity.

If human nature

receives in Christ union with the divine nature, and that re

flects the reality of Christ's eternally receiving himself from
the Father in complete distinction of person and freedom,

then an

ontology of receptivity is grounded in the Trinity itself. This
ontology of receptivity is then worked out philosophically in
terms of the phenomenon of the human "thou" awakening the "I" in

another. "Truth" is a transcendental attribute of the "being"

which is received in the infant's early encounter with its

mother. Both with respect to the "truth" which is an attribute of
created being and of Revelation which uses created being as its
medium, human beings are in a posture of openness, disponibi1ity,

or obedience. We have touched on this earlier with respect to the
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positive content of human nature to the reception of grace. This
is Balthasar's interpretation of potentia obediental i s’
.

The infinitely open and unfinished character of truth, whose
essence is to be constantly open to something greater,
clearly appears to the creature only when it accepts in its
depth its created condition, adopting without reservation
the attitude of obedience and availability (potentia obedientalis) in the face of divine truth?’11
This receptivity is not a pure passivity but "rather a

capacity whereby I allow another to dwell within me." The experi
ence of the fullness of being and freedom cannot come autonomous
ly but only in relationship to the ultimate other. This reflects

the reality that we initially receive our primal experience of
our "I" and possess our "I" in the fullness of freedom only in

relationship to a "thou." Only God can be a self-sufficient being
and experience Himself as such. Receiving into ourselves the
"being" of others is not an impoverishment but an enrichment.

However, it depends on our consent.
In other words: to a greater power of self-determination,
there corresponds a greater possibility and capacity to
allow oneself to be determined by another. The passivity
which must then be admitted depends on the deepest freedom
of the spirit which accepts, in all the freedom of love, to
be freely determined in love.”1
It is important to note that potentia obedientalis, though it is
not pure passivity,

is also not a natural power or a disposition

of the human subject to attain God or even receive God's Revela-

’’’christophe Potworowski. "Christian Experience in Hans Urs von
Balthasar." Communio 20 (Spring, 1993)1: 107-117, at 109, citing
Theologik. Vol. I. Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1985, 13.

IllIbid., p.

110, citing Theologik. Vol.

I, p.40-41.
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tion.

It is an ontological receptivity which must be empowered by

God's grace.

I will return to this later.

In contrast to the transcendental Thomist approach,

the

ontological character of receptivity moves the emphasis from the

knowing subject to the reception of being,

to being "informed"

rather than co-constituting.

Balthasar situates his position on knowing, more specifical
ly on the respective places of the subject and the object,
between naive realism and the transcendental critique of
knowledge. Human subjectivity is dependent on the world of
objects and on the world of the other, by whose revelation
it awakens to the world and to itself. Through this depen
dency on the other, human subjectivity is indissolubly tied
to the principle of intersubjectivity, which for Balthasar
is a privileged exper ience J12

The primal experience between mother and child can only be
understood as a response of love to love, a response of an "I" to

a "thou."

It cannot be reduced to the "I." This experience cannot

be satisfactorily explained

on the basis of the 'formal structure' of the human spirit,
from 'sensible impressions' which would trigger a constitu
tive process of categories, which itself would be ordained
to a dynamism affirming 'being-in-general' and an objectif
ication or thematization of beings, concretely given.m

Des ider i um naturale visionis; "freedom in quest of Freedom"
For Balthasar, "esse" is in the first place "the mystery of
the openness of finite freedom to infinite freedom."21*

In the

primal experience of being, there are four differences which are

2l2Ibid., p.

110.

mIbid., p.

111.

!llMarc Ouellet.
Communio 18 (Summer,

"Paradox and/or Supernatural
1991 )2: 259-280, at 262.

Existential."
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part of the experience which can be isolated on reflection. The

difference between "I" and "thou," the difference between an
existent "being" and the "act of being" (Being) shared in common
with other beings, the consequent difference between essence and

existence, and finally, the difference between the act of being
(esse) and the "'subsistent freedom of the absolute being (Sein),
which is God'

(H III,

1, 954-55)."l,J It is divine freedom which

explains the infinity of "esse's" participations and particularly

explains the individual finite experience of freedom.

It is the

experience of the autonomy of "esse" which points back to an

infinite freedom. One's consciousness of the "givenness," finitude, and contingency of one's "esse" grounds the desire for
"esse" as an object of the intellect and will. Balthasar sees

this consciousness as the real basis for intimacy with God.
It is precisely here that a new kind of intimacy of God in
the creature becomes clear, an intimacy which is only made
possible by the distinction between God and esse. Allowing
natures to participate in reality--God's most proper prerog
ative . . . must be seen positively as posited and deter
mined by God's omnipotent freedom and therefore are grounded
in the unique love of God. ... it is precisely when the
creature feels itself to be separate in being from God that
it knows itself to be the most immediate object of God's
love and concern; and it is precisely when its essential
finitude shows it to be something quite different from God
that it knows that, as a real being, it has had bestowed
upon it that most extravagant gift--participation in the
real being of God.u<

usBieler, p.

138-139.

Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord. A Theological
Aesthetics IV: The Realm of Metaphysics in Antiquity, trans, by
Brian McNeil, C.R.V., Andrew Louth, John Saward, Rowan Williams and
Oliver Davies. Edited by John Riches. San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, 1989, pp. 403-404.
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Balthasar interprets personal finite freedom as the desiderium naturale visionis,

"freedom in quest of Freedom." But, he

does not include a supernatural element in that desire. He points

to St. Thomas and Henri de Lubac as the formulators of "the
paradox of man."

Just as man is referred to the free openness of another man
in order to be himself, so too, we can simply say, he (he,
that is, who is directed and oriented towards the absolutes
of the True and the Good) is also referred to the free
openness of God, without being able to postulate it on his
own. This paradox precedes all discussion on the subject of
the "supernatural existential," even if and whatever may be
the truth of the fact that nature was created in view of the
Supernatural, in view of the incarnation of God; even if and
whatever may be the truth of the fact that the paradox of
nature finds its ultimate explication only owing to the
supernatural order (to which there can thus also belong
something like a "supernatural existential"). But the para
dox remains inscribed in the original fact of the conscious
ness of self, insofar as consciousness knows itself at the
same time as given, and, through this, as an image. This is
why de Lubac rightly emphasizes that in the natural desiderium visionis, in the aspiration to know God as he is in
himself, there is no need to have any supernatural element;
this can (and should) be affirmed wholly independent of the
fact that God has for all time already made something of his
intimacy known, and desires to make men capable of under
standing it.2,7
Balthasar will go no further than allowing the human spirit in

its created freedom to have a desire for Infinite Freedom, which
it has no potential to satisfy or even to receive, without grace,

from within itself.

It has no capacity to "establish a 'personal'

relation with God" and it knows from its own freedom that God who
19 9

is infinitely free mus t take the initiative.

2,70uellet, p. 264, citing Theodramat ik
Einsiedeln: Johannesverlag, 1980, p. 130.
211

Ibid., p. 265.

III:

Die

Hand 1ung.

138
Potentia obedientali s and "supernatural existential"

We have to return now to the question of the potentia
obedientai is. The human spirit in its finite freedom desires

Infinite Freedom, but does it have a "natural disposition" to
receive what it desires and has been created to have? Previously

we have seen that Balthasar viewed the potentia obedientalis as
an openness, a disponibi1ty, a readiness to receive, an "attitude

of obedience and availability." But it is quite clear that if the

term is to be used theologically it must be seen as a gift of

God's grace which elevates the natural ontological receptivity of
the human spirit. He says:

But it is precisely this potency of being called (as in the
case between human subjects) that man does not at all pos
sess in the face of the divine call. If he is in spite of
everything capable of perceiving and responding to the call
of God--a call which issues from no natural created order,
but from the depths of the eternal and the Absolute--then
this capacity must be conferred on him at the same time as
the call; only the divine word of grace confers on him the
grace of response. We can in this case speak of obediential
potency, but we must remain conscious that the transnatural
potency to which we refer in the word potentia is absolutely
not the creature's own potency . . . , but rather a potency
belonging solely to the Creator. The power of God is so
great that his creature will obey him even when it finds in
its own being neither the disposition, nor the tendency, nor
the possibility for such obedience
Here Balthasar is distinguishing himself from Rahner, whom

he sees as tending to transform obediential potency and the

natural desire for God by the supernatural existential into the

creature's natural disposition to receive God's offer of Himself.

n,Ibid., p. 266, citing Balthasar, "L'Acces a Dieu," Mys ter i um
Salutis V(French ed.), p. 48.
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Rahner has moved everything back to the act of creation,

from the

creature's side as well as God's. Balthasar speaks directly to

the issue:
Obediential potency designates in philosophy a recognized
and integral availability (relativity), ontic and noetic, of
the creature towards the principium et finis. But it does
not designate the (theological) anticipation of the (poten
tial) Word and of the (real) silence of God. The creature
does not hear a silence of God, unless it is with the "su
pernatural" ears of faith (or unbelief) before the God of
grace (or of anger). If we do not maintain this limit, the
critique of Barth on the "point of anchorage" (Ankniipfungspunkte) can be justified. 511

Balthasar is insisting that God's gift of Himself in Revelation
and the grace to receive that gift are intrinsically connected

and cannot be separated because of their nature as personal call

from an infinite God. The grace to receive Revelation is an
integral constituent of the human historical reality in which it

is imbedded.

In Christ, God truly enters human history and grace

becomes an integral part of that history in a way that it had not

been. The analogy of being allows the creature to have only the
minimum necessary for a freely chosen relation with God if God so

gives Himself. This minimum is the creature's dialogical nature
and its desire for and openness to Infinite Freedom. The only

"supernatural existential" that Balthasar will allow is on God's
side. God's freely issues a call to the human spirit which if

accepted, kindles in that open but powerless spirit, not a desire

n#Ibid., p. 267, citing Balthasar, "Analogie und Natur: Zur
Klarung der theologischen Prinzipienlehre Karl Barths," in Divus
Thomas (Fribourg 23, 1945), pp. 43-44.
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which is already there, but a capacity to listen and freely

respond to the personal invitation."

7 91

Christ the concrete measure of anthropology: reversal of perspec

five

Balthasar's Christocentric approach to the issues of nature

and grace by way of the Christological "analogy of being" make
Christ the concrete measure "between God and man, between grace

and nature, between faith and reason."

In doing so, he has

concretized an abstract problem, and reversed the perspective or

approach to it. The traditional emphasis and method was to
approach the problem from an ascending perspective of the perfec
tion or fulfillment of human nature. By considering the problem

from the viewpoint of the hypostatic union of two natures in
Christ,

there is a reversal of perspective because Balthasar

shows that it is the divine nature which takes human nature into

its service of love, but by human consent.

"Nature,

then,

is

perfected by being made the vessel and expression of the divine.
It gives itself over to become this expression."

Thus, nature

is transcended not simply by being open to its own greatest

possibilities but to the possibilities of God, who takes nature

mIbid., p. 268.

mBalthasar, "Characteristics of Christianity." The Word Mad
Flesh. pp. 161-180, at 177; the following discussion is based o
Ouellet, pp. 273-280.
in Ibid., p.

178.

141

into the service of the life of the Trinity as it is lived out
economically in the life of Christ.
His humanity is the expression and instrument of the divini
ty, and by no means is the divinity the expression and
instrument of the humanity. In every respect, the humanity
is fulfilled in that it sees itself, with ail its upward
strirrings, brought into the service of God's revelation,
into the downward movement of his grace and love.lH
The human esse in its similarity within ever greater dissim

ilarity to God,

in its desire for Infinite Freedom and its

openness or receptivity to the Infinite,

is that minimum condi

tion of the possibility of God's freely choosing to take it up
into the life of the Trinity. This inversion of perspective on

nature and grace is thus grounded in two personal freedoms, human

and divine,

rather than in ontological necessity by reason of

some compatibility of natures.
. . . the meaning of human existence receives its ultimate
and unhoped for determination from the fact that it is
absorbed and engaged in the service of God's engagement with
the world, and thus in the service of the trinitarian ex
change in Christo.1^

Summary of Balthasar's Nature and Grace Methodology

From the above exposition of Balthasar's position on nature
and grace one can see that his methodology starts from within
faith with the reality of the Creator/creature distinction,

the

hypostatic union of divine and human natures in Christ, and the
distance between the persons of the Trinity, expressed in the

mIbid., p.

162-63.

J,50uellet, p. 278.
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Logos becoming man and living a life of obedience and service to

the Father, even to the point of ultimate abandonment on the
cross. His methodology then is a descending one which follows the

theological order and a truly theological concept of creation.
Such an approach leads to a true metaphysics (meta-anthropology)
of concrete Being in its actual transcendental attributes, rather
than abstract Being.

It is concrete in that he focuses on the

human reality of Christ as the God-man, the fullness of Being
united with contingent human being. The fullness of beauty,

truth

and goodness, united with and revealed in and through the human
transcendentals . His philosophical positions are derived from the

implications of the most fundamental doctrines of faith: Cre

ation, Trinity, Incarnation, Redemption.

In reflecting philosoph

ically on these doctrines, his ordering theological principle is

that of the Fourth Lateran Council: the dissimilarity between

created and divine natures is always greater than the similarity.
Or as he puts it: "Between the divine and the created natures
there is an essential abyss. It cannot be circumvented.With

respect to the relationship between theology and philosophy, and
faith and reason, he does not first explore natural reality with

the power of reason and then bring that knowledge to theology.
Rather, he looks at natural reality to find there how it reveals

the created basis for what God has revealed through faith,

without expecting creation to demonstrate the inevitability or
necessity of Revelation. Theology encompasses philosophy without

Balthasar, TD III, p. 220.
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destroying its distinctiveness. But, as pointed out earlier,

the

two simply point towards each other rather than merging smoothly
together. His philosophical positions on the issue of nature and

grace reflect his metaphysics of infinite and finite being, or
better, a meta-anthropology.

CHAPTER IV

CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Search for Foundations for Fai th

In his work, Foundational Theology: Jesus and the Church

,

Francis Schussler Fiorenza contends that since the Reformation,
Protestant and Catholic theology has been on a quest for the

original sources of faith.

faith,

In the search for the foundations of

three basic methods emerged: the historical-theological,

the historical-critical, and the transcendental.

An Epistemology of Faith Knowing

In Chapter I,

I have tried to trace this quest in terms of

the search for an epistemology, or theological theory of how we

know Christ, and God in Christ, in the act of faith. Assuming the
historical and ontological reality of Jesus the Christ, how can

he be known by us in what we call the act of faith? In this act,
we claim to know the formal object of our faith, God in Christ.
If we are to know God in Christ, then two things are necessary.

Christ,

in his personal ontological reality, must be able to be

present to us in some way, and we must be able to encounter him
in a personal way which is a true affirmation of his reality.

i,7New York: Crossroad,

1984.
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Without this, faith is reduced to doctrines about Christ and
conceptual verification of Christ's reality through divine evi

dence illumined by grace, and becomes more akin to religious

ideology. As we have seen, Balthasar describes the attempts to
found the act of faith on rational evidence as supernatural

rationalism.

In the section entitled "The Nature of the Act of

Faith: Seeing the Form," I discussed Balthasar's approach to the
act of faith and to theology.
Faith Knowing, and Faith Concepts and Language
In our knowing and affirmation of Christ's personal reality,
and the reality of the Triune God in him,

there must be some

correspondence between the knowledge we have of Christ, and the
concepts, symbols, and language used to express that knowledge.
But what kind of correspondence? Do we receive the knowledge of

Christ's meaning and significance from Christ through the Word
and the Spirit in our experiences? Or do we,

through our subjec

tive intellectual structures, dynamically determine Christ's
meaning and significance through our experience and then express
it in thought, language and ritual? Is Christ's meaning and sig

nificance intrinsic to his personal reality and does it inform

our consciousness in our experiences? Is our knowledge of Christ
through a true encountering of Christ mediated by historical

reality and the Spirit? Or,

is Christ's meaning and significance

something we arrive at as a prudential judgment of, and insight

into,

the meaning and significance of our experiences and/or

philosophical anthropology? Is conversion a matter of encounter
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or insight? Insight is, of course, part of any personal encoun

ter, but there can also be insight without personal encounter.

Faith Knowing by Encounter

I think it is clear that for Balthasar the act of faith and

true conversion is a matter of personal encounter of Christ

through his "legible form" as presented to us by the Spirit
through the Scriptures and the Church. This encounter is the

foundation of divine faith, rather than any objective scientific

sources or transcendental correlation. More precisely,

it is

through the perception of the beauty of God's kenotic love in

Christ that one truly encounters Christ, and God in Christ.lM
St. Paul,

in his letter to the Romans puts it this way:

. . . we are justified by faith, we have peace with God
through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have obtained
access to this grace in which we stand; and we boast in our
hope of sharing the glory of God. . . . and hope does not
disappoint us, because God's love has been poured into our
hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us.
(Rom. 5:1-2, 5)
Through the Word and the Spirit Christ's personal reality is

present for acceptance or rejection,

just as truly as his person

al reality was present in Palestine. But, on some minimal level

the beauty of God's love in Christ must be encountered in the act
of divine faith,

if any true surrender to God in Christ is made

in that act. As we have seen,

it is Balthasar's view that it is

precisely in the encountering of God's love in Christ, that one
encounters the authority of God which is the basis of divine

in

Supra, p. 68 and following.
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faith as distinguished from natural faith.

299 One could,

I sup

pose, perceive the goodness and truth in the Church’s doctrine
about Christ and perhaps even assent to it based on natural
faith, without truly encountering the personal reality of God’s
love in Christ, and therefore God's author i ty.5,4 1 say personal

reality,

to distinguish it from physical presence which is a

different matter. As a Eucharistic community Catholics affirm not
only the mediated presence of Christ through Word and Spirit but

the transformed physical presence of Christ. True encounter with

Christ's personal and physical reality is what we celebrate. Just
as during his earthly existence,

those who follow Christ most

closely in discipleship know his personal reality most deeply and

surely.

Insight or understanding of Christ's personal reality is

the fruit of faith and an entering into the life of Christ. Many
who know the Scriptures and much about Christ,

like the Scribes

and Pharisees, may not know his personal reality as his disciples
do.

Certitude in Knowing Christ
This brings us to the central epistemological question of
the last three centuries. Can the human intellect know noumenal

299

Supra, p. 68 and following.

3,#See Urdanoz, p. 798: "Divine faith cannot exist as reserved
to the strictly natural order, although it is possible to assent to
divine and revealed truth for merely natural and human reasons, but
acquired and natural faith of this kind is not formally, but only
materially, divine, as would be the faith professed by a rational
ist or a formal heretic." I will return to the nature of this act
of faith shortly.
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reality with any certainty in the act of faith? As Christians, we
believe we know the personal noumenal reality of Christ with the

certitude of divine faith. That certitude is based on God's
authority encountered in God's love in Christ, and is therefore
divine faith as distinguished from a natural faith based on the
intrinsic plausibility or rationality of the evidence. The human

will moves the intellect in a genuine act of divine faith because
of trust in God who has been encountered. Nonetheless, the

affective or fiducial surrender and commitment which is based on
the trustworthiness of the One encountered, has an intellectual
dimension. The intellect, moved by the will,

is persuaded of real

truth based on the trustworthiness of God, encountered in Chr
ist’s witness of God's love. The intellectual assent is made for.
moral rather than strictly logical or intellectual reasons. The

perception of God's authority or trustworthiness is the motive of
the act of faith. Certitude flows from the judgment which recog
nizes Cod in Christ in the act of divine faith. But, that percep

tion and judgment is a consequence of encountering the overwhelm

ing kenotic love of God for us in Christ.

If God's love is not

poured out in our hearts through our encounter with Christ, how
could we know God as trustworthy? How could we have certitude? Or

as St. Paul points out by reverse implication in the passage
quoted above, how could we hope in God if God's love had not been

poured out in our hearts?
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Certitude by Faith or by Reason

In emphasizing the necessity of the subjective recognition
and judgment of God's love in Christ as the motive for faith,
personal surrender and certitude (tides qua),

there is the danger

of minimizing the objective (tides quae) dimension of what it is

that is believed.341 Of course, to recognize and judge that
Christ is God through the perception of God's kenotic love in
Christ is a subjective judgment of ontological truth. As dis

cussed in the section "The Objective Nature of Christ's 'Form',"
the subjective experience of faith contains a "gnosis" of "an

experiencable object," an objective " super - form. " 341

On the other hand,

in emphasizing the objective dimension of

what is believed there is the danger of seeking certitude about

one's faith in the intrinsic rationality of what is believed

rather than in the divine motive for faith, which is the encoun
ter with God in God's love in Christ. Where certitude for faith
is sought also can determine the starting point for one's theo

logical methodology.

If one is seeking certitude for one’s faith

in theology, one must start from below with rational evidence,
with philosophical anthropology, or with some subject-bound

34lBalthasar uses the greek term pistis to name the choice to
surrender to God, and gnosis to name the choice to perceive the
objective reality of God's love in Christ. I believe that gnosis is
still part of the tides qua. Balthasar's point is that the tides
qua is a mediated knowing of God as formal object, as well as a
personal surrender. This knowing can be formally separated from
that of the tides quae, which embraces all that God teaches on his
authority, but existentially no separation is possible.
302

Supra, p. 73 and following.
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approach.

If one is secure in one's faith,

then one could start

either from above or below and be led by faith. This is what

Balthasar says St. Thomas did with philosophy;

in using it before

and within theology he started from below.3’5* The methodological
danger of starting from below is that Revelation can become an

extrinsic norm for theology, even for one who is secure in their

faith, rather than being integrated into theology.

In fact,

according to Yves Congar, while St. Thomas held that "by grace,
faith in us is a divine knowing, a definite communication of

God's knowledge.

.

.

.

this communication is rather imperfect and

the human spirit naturally desires a fuller grasp of the objects

revealed."3” This fuller grasp could be sought by contemplation

or mysticism or by the use of reason. But it is the use of reason
alone, working from the first principles of Revelation contained
in the articles of faith or the creed, which is in fact,

the task

of theology according to St. Thomas.3GS Thus began the rational,

logical, scientific construction of doctrine from revealed first
principles. Congar sums up his conclusions:

. . .theology, as St. Thomas understood and practiced it,
appears to us as a rational and scientific consideration of
the revealed datum, striving to procure for the believing
human spirit a certain understanding of the datum. It is, if
you will, a scientifically elaborated copy of the faith.
What objects of simple adherence the faith delivers, theol
ogy develops in a line of humanly constructed knowledge,
seeking the reason for facts; in short, reconstructing and
3’3Supra, p.

100.

Yves Congar, A History of Theology, trans, and ed. by Hunter
Guthrie, S.J. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968, p. 93.
3t5For discussion see Congar, pp. 92-103.
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elaborating in the form of human science the data received
by faith from the science of Cod Who created all things.
Thus through his spirit directed by faith, man arrives at a
strictly human understanding of the mysteries, utilizing
their connection or their harmony with his world of natural
knowledge J**
Balthasar points out that in fact, this is what happened to the

mainstream of post-Vatican I Catholic theology.*
1*7

If one seeks

certitude or foundations for faith through the historical-theo

logical, historical-critical, or transcendental methodologies,
one is seeking certitude in objective rational evidence or

philosophical anthropology. Revelation becomes an extrinsic norm
for human insight and is not an integral part of theology.

Certitude is being sought through natural faith, and philosophy
tends to take over theology and shape it according to its presup
positions. Historically, this may have happened for reasons of

apologetics. But as Balthasar argues, apologetics is in methodo

logical error in seeking to bring others to faith or to defend
the faith on foundations which are not the foundation of faith.

Philosophical or other rational arguments to remove obstacles to

faith can only complement and support a proclamation or presenta
tion of the faith based on the appearance of God in God's love in

Christ. While the formal object of philosophy and theology are

the same, philosophy can only point to God as revealed in Christ,
it cannot make that Revelation necessary by an apologetics of

immanence. It cannot justify God's love and grace in Christ.

I b id . , p.

102.

1*7Supra, p. 66 and following.
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Conversion must come by encounter with that love in Christ and

not by rational insight. Hence,

the title of Balthasar's book

Love Alone. The kind of foundationalism which Balthasar has
criticized has also been severely critiqued by the hermeneutical

theologians, particularly Francis Schussler Fiorenza.
Form and Content, and Analogy of Being

In emphasizing that the certitude of the act of faith is
based on God's authority as perceived in the love of God in
Christ, Balthasar stresses the necessity to maintain in the

hypostatic union, the unity between the life-form (Christ's human

life) and the content (God's self-disclosure). God as formal

object, while differing in an ever greater way from his 'legible
form'

in Christ, was in fact present in Christ in the person of

the Word, and was expressed and experienced as such.

It is important in applying the analogy of being to the
knowledge of God disclosed in Christ, that the analogical differ

ence not be understood in a way that contradicts or empties the
similarity of its real content. This similarity is the only basis

we have for a truly historical Revelation of God in and through
the person of Christ. Without it the Incarnation becomes a
charade, an acting as if, which can only point to or be a sign of

God's reality and presence in Christ. Then Revelation must occur
directly to the human consciousness by an illumination which uses
the person of Jesus as the instrument stimulating the insight.

The via negativa must not be allowed to diminish the true knowl-
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edge of God available through the via positiva. Rather, as Balth

asar points out God's incomprehensibility is present in the very
knowledge we have of God in his love in Christ. God as knowable

is incomprehensible, and always will be even in the beatific
vision.

In other words, the difference is a positive difference

which emphasizes that whatever human perfection is the vehicle
for God's se1f-disclosure and our

in Christ,

encounter and knowledge of him

the fullness of this perfection in God is ever great

er, not simply by degrees, but by God's unlimited, uncreated
nature.
The unity of form and content is essential to "the subjec

tive unity of faith and vision in the Christian life" which would

be "incomprehensible if it could not be elucidated in terms of a
unity in the objective revelation which demands and conditions

it."311 God is truly present and encountered in Christ's lifeform, both by the Apostles and us.

I believe we can say that

God's love in Christ has an objective ontological reality which,
while distinct from God in himself, truly is God's presence and
can be perceived and therefore experienced in Christ's "super-

form." It is ontological truth (veritas in essendo),

identical

with reality, by which God, the formal object of the act of
divine faith, reveals himself to be encountered by us.

simply logical truth (veritas in cognoscendo),

It is not

identical with

intellectual knowledge, or moral truth (veritas in dicendo) which

nt

Supra, p. 81 and following
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is the conformity of proposition to known truth.We cannot
separate the reality of God as formal object of faith from God's

love in Christ, except by abstraction.

It is, of course,

subject

to the analogy of being. We do not experience God as he is in

himself, but as he expresses himself in Christ. This is why
Balthasar emphasizes that an experience of and knowing of God is

part of the act of divine faith.
As previously discussed, the transcendentalist-personalist

way of reading revelation does not adequately maintain the unity
of form and content.111 As Balthasar points out,

it builds on the

Augustinian-Neo-platonic tradition and is a form of Augustinian

illuminism. Rather than the Logos, who is the light of Being,
shining forth on the face of Christ in a way that informs and
illuminates the human consciousness he shines directly into the

human spirit in a way that the intellect receives the Word "as a
kind of grace and revelation .

.

.

." Historical facts simply

become part of the "final dynamism of cognition." The transition

of faith from philosophy to theology is made by translating "the
general philosophical theory of knowledge into the Christian

Trinitarian mode.

.

.

." Christ is seen "as the redeeming illumi

nator of the mind and revealer of the Father.*..311
3

For these distinctions see Urdanoz, p. 798.
3ltSupra, p. 90 and following.
3llSupra, fn. 188; and see pp. 98-100 for Balthasar's further
critique and the role of theological aesthetics in correcting the
perceived deficiencies.
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Knowledge of God in Christ Through Analogy

Analogy in St. Thomas Aquinas

Augustine and the Fathers, given their Neoplatonic view of
reality, had no need of an explicit doctrine of analogy, since
intellectual knowledge does not arise from the sensible world.112

Such a Neoplatonic view of created reality and our knowledge of
it, obviously supported a more subjective, mystical approach to

knowledge of Revelation.
Aquinas, on the other hand, develops and uses analogy more
than any previous theologian.111 Since the sensible world,

through abstraction and reason, did provide a basis for knowledge

of the created world, the question now is what is the relation
ship between "being" and God; and, knowledge of "being" and God

through reason, and knowledge of God and "being" through faith?

Analogy became the key to the relationship or correspondence

between these realities. Analogy as a concept speaks to the
nature of the relationship between the perfections in two or more
subjects.11* But, the debate quickly moved to whether there can

be real correspondence between created "being" and God, or put

3l2G.P. Klubertanz. "Analogy." New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol.
1. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 461-^65, at p. ^61.
lllIbid.
ll*Ibid. "Analogy, a technical, philosophical, and theological
term, commonly designates a kind of predication midway between
univocation and equivocation. Thus it denotes a perfection (the
'analogon') that, though found similar in two or more subjects
called 'analogates, ’
is neither simply the same nor
simply
different."
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differently do we have real or true knowledge of God by reason

through analogy? Or, can we know God only through faith? Or, is
analogy the basis of knowledge both by faith and by reason? If
so, what kind of knowledge do we have through analogy?

Aquinas'

view was that the relationship between created

"being" and God was neither univocal nor equivocal, and therefore

the perfections in each were "partly the same, partly different."
"A consequence of this is that there is no single clear meaning

for an analogous predicate (ST la,

13.5 ad 1)."

Where a perfec

tion is truly found in both analogates, it is intrinsic, where

imposed on one by the mind, it is extrinsic.115 Created "being"
and God are related by causality and participation. Perfections
in creatures are present by reason of God as exemplary cause and

by reason of participation in being.

After the existence of God is known and His nature as pure
act is apprehended, then His causal eminence in regard to
His creatures is seen to consist in this, that He is being,
goodness, and other similar perfections by His essence and
therefore infinitely; whereas creatures both are and are
what they are by participation (ST la, 14.6, 25.2 ad 2,
45.5, 57.2, 79.4, 93.2 ad 1 and 4; In Dion de div. nom. 1.3,
2.4). Inasmuch as the being-by-essence is simple and self
identical, the analogy of participation in being is neces
sarily an intrinsic analogy. Hence, whatever is predicated
of God according to this analogy is truly a knowledge of
God, even though it remains a knowledge of Him through His
creatures. Because God is the cause of the world through
intellect and will (ST la, 44.3), He is the exemplar of all
things; and created things are related to Him as images (ST
la, 3.3 ad 2, 35.1 ad 1, 93.1; In X Cor. 11.10, as represen
tations (ST la, 45.7), and as similar to Him (De pot. 7.7 ad
4 in contrar ium; ST la, 4.3 ad 4). At the same time, created
beings as individuals are seen to be related to each other

315

Ibid., p. 463.
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as diverse participants in the One Being that is being by
essence.31*
Aquinas identified three kinds of correspondence by analogy:

attributive, metaphorical, and proportional. Attributive and
metaphorical analogies give knowledge of God's dynamic perfect

ions. Proportional (and also attributive) give knowledge about
God's nature as it is in itself. Proportional analogies predicate
a perfection "properly and intrinsically of each analogate." *
317

God's love in Christ's human presence and actions, through which
God reveals his presence in Christ, would seem to be such an

analogy. But the reality of the unity of form and content in the
hypostatic union makes this a unique situation,

in that the

fullness of personal being is now united with concrete human
being in the person of the Word. Christ is not simply any human

being expressing God's love, but is God loving us in Christ.
Christ as concrete analogy is unique. The doctrine of the Incar
nation affirms that created nature in a human being, as "image

and likeness" of God, permits God to unite himself to it in the

person of the Word.

Is also permits Christ to live out the

immanent life of the Trinity economically, in a way that is truly

expressive and se1f-disclosive of both the divine and human
natures. Nothing else in creation can be as perfect an analogy
because nothing else is united to God hypostatical 1y.

It is as

3l‘lbid., p. 465.

3l7B. Mondin. "Analogy, Theological Use of." New Cathol ic
Encyclopedia. Vol. 1. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 465-468,
at p. 466.
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univocal analogy as is possible given the distinction between
Creator and creature, and the necessity that God in himself be

ever greater and dissimilar than any analogical similarity.

The transcendentals, unity, beauty, goodness, and truth,
include a mode of participation and "are the concern of both
natural theology and revealed theology." The only way we can know
the meaning of affirmative statements about God based on the

perfections of creatures or on Revelation is by analogy.31* But

the question remains as to what kind of knowledge of God we can
have through analogy, and particularly of God in Christ,

the

concrete analogy. St. Thomas held to the view that in addition to
knowledge of God possible by negative affirmations (via negativa), we could have a positive knowledge of God by analogies (via

positiva).

For example,

if we say that God is wise, or good,

the analogy describes something in God that is "partly the same"

as it is in created reality. ".

.

. St. Thomas insists that when

affirmative predicates are predicated of God,

they are predicated

of the divine nature or substance."11* On the other hand since

God as an object of our intellect in this life can be known only
imperfectly through created reality, our concepts and words share

n*Klubertanz, p. 465.
319

The following discussion is based primarily on Frederick
Copieston, S.J. A History of Philosophy. Vol.
2.
Mediaeval
Philosophy. Part I I. Albert the Great to Duns Scotus. Garden City,
N.Y.: Image Books, 1962, Chapter Thirty-five, "St. Thomas Aquinas
V: God's Nature."

HI Ibid., p. 70.
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in that imperfection. Our knowledge is real but imperfect, and so
our concepts and terms must be vague and uncertain in meaning.

They cannot be fuily univocal, but neither are they equivocal.31
But there is still the difficulty of the positive content of the

concept as applied to God.

Is the similarity purely logical

(veritas in cognoscendo) or is it ontological (veritas in essen-

do)? If we abstract the essence of "wise” or "intelligent" or

"loving" and apply it to God,

is that not a univocal application?

It was for this reason that Duns Scotus later insisted that we

can form univocal concepts applicable to both God and creatures,
though there is no univocity in the real order in respect of God

and creatures."*
322 Of course, this view of Scotus depends on a

particular definition of univocal which ignores the distinction
between finite and infinite perfection. This conclusion by Scotus
would pull the ontological rug out from under analogy and make it

into a purely logical concept. Therefore, the concepts and words

used of God would yield no real knowledge of God's reality in

Himse1f.
In fact, St. Thomas' epistemology would seem at first sight

to be at odds with his natural theology of analogy. 323 For Thomas
held that the active and passive intellect depended on phantasms

32tIbid., p. 70-71.
322 Ibid., p. 77-78.
323This discussion is based primarily on Copleston, Mediaeval
Philosophy. Part I I. Chapter Thirty-eight, "St. Thomas Aquinas
VIII: Knowledge."
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or sensory images for abstraction of universals, and ultimately

for all knowledge of created reality or of God, apart from

revelation or mysticism.

If this is the case, how could the

intellect have any real knowledge of immaterial substances,

particularly God? Can there be any metaphysical knowledge or any
knowledge which transcends the senses? St. Thomas answer is based

on the fact that intellect as such is the faculty of apprehending
being, and has as its primary object the apprehension of being.

The active power of the intellect is the key to his position. For
it enables the intellect to abstract what is universal

in all

particular reality, that is first of all "being" and secondarily

essence.

Implicit in this operation is cognition of the relation

of immaterial being to sensible being. Sensitive cognition is the
material cause of intellectual cognition which extends beyond
material being. Therefore the intellect can know immaterial

objects but only by analogy.32* With respect to whether the posi

tive content of the analogy must be either univocal

(Scotus) or

equivocal, St. Thomas answers neither. Copieston sums up his

views this way:
To demand that the content of analogical ideas should be
perfectly clear and expressible, so that they could be
understood perfectly in terms of human experience, would be
to misunderstand altogether the nature of analogy. St.
Thomas was no rationalist, though he allowed that we can
attain to aliqualis cognito Dei. The infinity of the object,
God, means that the finite human mind can attain no adequate
and perfect idea of God's nature; but it does not mean that

31k

Ibid., p.

113-14.
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it cannot attain an imperfect and inadequate notion of God's
nature .325
Revelation can extend our knowledge of God without any contradic

tion between theology and philosophy, as when we know by faith
that God is triune.326

Analogy and Knowledge of God in the Franciscan School

An indication that Aquinas'

insights,

though profound and

helpful, were not the final solution was the fact that the
Franciscan school, especially St. Bonaventure, maintained the

spirit of Augustine in the more mystical orientation of Bonaventure's doctrine. With respect to faith and reason, simply put St.

Bonaventure and St. Thomas differed over whether reason had its
own intrinsic light or needed the light of faith to attain any

true knowledge, at least with respect to transcendent realities.

Their differing views of Aristotle followed on this differ

ence.*
322 For St. Thomas, theology, while rooted in Revelation and
grace, and developing under God's providence, "is strictly a

rational construction." For St. Bonaventure theology involves a
dynamic synthesis of faith and reason; it is a perception or a

type of seeing of the depths of the revealed truth using the
infused gifts of the Holy Spirit.

It is more of a recognizing

God's order and the intelligibility of reality in the light of

325 Ibid., p.

116.

324 1 bid.

322Copleston, Medieval Phi losophy. Part I I . pp. 36-40. ". . .
it is not right to exaggerate their difference of outlook." Ibid.,
p. 38.
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faith,

than a rational construction by the human spirit.311 St.

Bonaventure's emphasis was on the will and love of God as the key

to true perception and

the integration of reason into faith.

Theology is more of an affective, moral, experiential or reli
gious mode of reflection or contemplation guided by the Holy

Spirit.

While Bonaventure used Aristotle, he did not have confi

dence in reason on its own as a means to come to deeper under

standing of the faith, or as a means to knowing truth about
transcendent reality.

He held to a reciprocal relationship

between theology and philosophy, but taught that theology ful

fills philosophy and assures that it will not fall into error.

Without theology philosophy cannot attain to the full truth about
reality. For example, a philosopher might by reason come to know

God is the exemplary cause of all being, but he could never know

without theology that the divine Word is the exemplary cause of
all things.*
330

But, Bonaventure's emphasis also had its dangers. Though
Bonaventure had a strong doctrine of exemplarism and analogy
based on a metaphysics, his emphasis on the mystical and contem

plative could be the basis for denying any true natural theology
and basing all real knowledge of God on Revelation. John Duns

Scotus is generally known for preparing the way for Ockham and

3i,Congar, pp.

119-20

q j ft

P. de Letter, "Theology, History of. New Catholic Encyclope
dia. Vol. 14. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 49-58, at p. 5253.
330Copleston, Mediaeval Phi losophy. Part J_, pp. 288-89.
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Nominalism - the critical theology of the fourteenth century.
While there is a definite sense in which this is true,

taken

alone it is a distortion.531

Yves Congar points out that Scotus was reacting to two
issues of the time. First, consistent with the Augustinian
tradition he was reacting to Albert-Thomistic philosophical
"naturalism." Secondly, he was trying to refute incipient Nomin
alism.333
331 *In reaction particularly to the second, he went even

further than St. Thomas in affirming the objectivity of human
knowledge. He insisted that the primary object of the intellect

was ail that is intelligible, or being as being.

In his view this

was necessary if metaphysics was to be possible for the human

mind.

But he also affirms that all human knowledge comes

through the senses and that the intellect simply has an intrinsic

capacity to know without any innate ideas or principles.33* In
addition to the intellect's ability to abstract universals Scotus

held that the intellect could apprehend the individual thing by a
confused primary intuition, contra St. Thomas. This he believed

was essential to maintain the objectivity of human knowledge.
Interestingly, he repudiates St. Thomas'

view "on the ground that

the Apostles believed that a certain visible, palpable,

individu

al human being was God." Thomas' view was adequate for scientific
331Copleston, Mediaeval Phi losophy. Part I I . pp. 204-209.
333Congar, p.

127.

333Copleston, Mediaeval Phi losophy. Part 11 . pp. 210-213.
33*Ibid. , pp. 219-221.
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knowledge of essences or universals but not for knowledge of the

individuality of a thing. Since, a singular thing is intelligible
in itself, an intellect in theory should be able to know a thing
in itself, but in this life because the intellect does not know a

thing in itself directly,

the intellect can have only a confused

primary intuition of the thing as existent.

If we say that the

intellect can have no intuition of the individual thing as

existent we destroy the objectivity of knowledge.335 He defended
St. Thomas'

idea that the intellect has its own natural light and

had no need of divine illumination to reach certitude from the
first principles of Revelation. His theories of the univocity of

being,

individuation, and formal distinction (distinctio formalis

a parte rei) all had the purpose of protecting the objectivity of
knowledge .33<

Scotus'

thing,

teaching that we can know the individuality of a

I believe,

is an important contribution to an epistemology

of revelation in Christ, and therefore to our ability to under

stand what we know when we know a person relationally and intu-33 * * *

33 5 Copleston. Mediaeval Philosophy, Part II, pp. 214-217; Scotus
distinguishes intuitive knowledge from abstractive knowledge. "The
difference between intuitive knowledge and abstractive knowledge is
not, then, that the former is knowledge of an existent object, the
latter of a non-existent object, but rather that the former is
knowledge of an object as existent and actually present, that is,
in intuition properly speaking, whereas the latter is knowledge of
the essence of an object considered in abstraction from existence,
whether the object actually exists or not." Ibid., p. 221. One can
also have imperfect intuitive knowledge of an existent object as
existing in the past.
nt Ibid., pp. 207-208, 224-31, 231-34, 239-40.

165
itively. St. Thomas' epistemology, as pointed out above,

is built

on knowledge of universals abstracted from sensory phantasms and

denies we can know a thing in its individuality. And it would

seem, we could not perceive the "whoness" of a person as opposed
to "whatness." The Triune God revealed in Christ,

the "object" of

our faith, could not be personally encountered and recognized in

this life through the transmission of his historical life-form in
Scripture and Tradition, and the power of the Holy Spirit. All we

have are the truths of faith, authenticated by miracles, espe

cially the Resurrection. Those truths validate the existence, and
reality of God and point to fulfillment in the beatific vision of

the object of our faith, but don't really present that object
through created forms for even imperfect encounter and recogni

tion now. Grace becomes a created form given to the soul.

The more contemporary view of grace as being the actual
personal presence of God, and the self-communication of God the

"object" of our faith, mediated by created forms and the Holy
Spirit, seems inconsistent with such a rationalistic conception

of Revelation.

It would seem that all participation in grace is a

finite participation in God's own life and knowing of Himself.337

337 This definitely seems to be Balthasar's view. The act of
divine faith is a participation in God's own knowledge and love of
himself, as revealed in Christ's "life-form." For more on the
contemporary theories of the nature of the union between the human
and divine which seek to explain the way in which God's presence is
mediated to the human soul, see: E.M. Burke, "Grace." New Catholic
Encyclopedia. Vol. 6. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 658-672,
at p. 669, col. 1; and, M.3. Redle, "Beatific Vision." New Catholic
Encyclopedia. Vol. 2. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 186-193,
at p. 191-192.
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Based on my limited exposure to Balthasar's writings it
seems to me that his thought about analogy is,

in part, a synthe

sis of the thought of Thomas, Bonaventure and Scotus. From Thomas
he takes the insistence on knowledge of God through the sensual

and according to analogy while rejecting a rationalistic inter

pretation of the way that knowledge is arrived at. From Bonavent
ure he takes the intuitive, mystical faith emphasis on the mode
of knowing God in Christ, but rejects any hint of illuminism and
insists on the objectivity of that knowledge through Christ's

"super-form" or life-form. With Scotus,

I believe he would affirm

the ability of the intellect to have a synthetic,

intuitive

knowing of the personal individual presence of God in Christ.
But, he would differ from Scotus in insisting that the knowledge
by analogy is of ontological truth and not simply logical truth.

The remaining question is how a person, divine or human, self

expresses or communicates the truth of their being to another.

And, how do we as that other, perceive and know the truth of the
other which they are communicating?
Christ the Concrete Analogy
It is important to note that St. Thomas even defines "per

son" in terms of "whatness," in terms of an individual rational

substance, or a subsistent being with a rational nature.

He

defines it primarily ontologically rather than functionally or

relationally.
Hl Summae

It is not that St. Thomas did not have a dynamic

Theologiae:
A Cone i se Translat ion,
e d.
T i mo thy
McDermott. Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1989, p. 68-71.
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notion of being. He did. He saw personal being as the most
perfect expression of what it meant to be, and as intrinsically

active and self-communicating. But historically,

there was a need

to distinguish between person and nature, with respect to the
persons of the Trinity, and in relation to the person of the Word

in Christ. St.Thomas never fully drew out the implications of his
thought about the relational nature of the persons in the Trini
ty. With respect to the human person, he returned to the defini

tion of Boethius noted above.33’ This is inadequate in terms of

describing what positive content is constitutive of the personal
uniqueness of an individual rational substance.

It defines what

constitutes ontic individuality but not personal reality.

It is

personal reality which God is se1f-disclosing and communicating

in Christ. Esse and essence or even substance and form do not

seem to be completely adequate to explain one’s unique personal
reality. This creates a real problem when transferred to the
three persons in God, or when used to try to explain how the Word

is the person of Christ and yet Christ is fully human. When
transferred to the Trinity, one ends up with three ontic individ

uals, unless in the transposition one qualifies the human concept
of personal individuality by stripping it of ontic individuality.

While this is necessary in moving analogically from creatures to

God, one is then left with a very confused idea of the nature of

33,See, W. Norris Clarke, "Person, Being and St. Thomas."
Communio 19 (Winter 1992)4: 601-18, at pp. 601-5; Clarke draws out
the implications of Thomas' thought.
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the divine persons. With respect to Christ,

if person is an

individual rational substance and Christ is fuiiy human how can

one avoid ending up with two persons in Christ? This definition

has led to the idea in contemporary thought that person is
synonymous with individual consciousness and freedom, or individ

uality, which in turn has brought true incarnation of the Word
into question,

Thomas'

if the full humanity of Christ is to be preserved.

solution was that the humanity of Christ subsisted

in the act of being of the Word. The persons of the Trinity were

described relationally. Scotus solved the problem by making a
distinction between human individualized nature and human person
ality. Scotus defines "personality" as one's independent,

in

alienable existence. "In the case of Christ, existential indepen
dence was given to Jesus, not by virtue of his human individuali

ty, but by the divine power of the Word." For him,

in Christ

there is no "assumed man" but only an "assumed nature," which "is
concretized,

individualized, in its human factuaiity .

personalized, made independent, given subsistence,

.

.

, and

in the divine

Person of the Word."3*0 Scotus' view continued the Franciscan
emphasis on the humanity of Christ.

It preserves Christ's full

humanity, determines what is essential to it and what is not, and

then shows how Incarnation of the person of the Word is possible.

More recent approaches, using Lonergan's idea that consciousness
is a quality of a person or subject, rather than of nature or

3UGeorge Tavard,
Images of the Christ: An Enqu i rv Into
Christology. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1982, p. 55.
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faculty such as intellect or will has provided a better solu
tion.*
3*1 But this too is an ontological solution, and does not

address the question of what constitutes a unique personal
reality or how the truth of the personal reality is communicated.
Personal reality is intrinsically unique by nature and cannot be
defined by terms and concepts which express universality rather

than uniqueness. One can experience another person's unique

reality only by encountering them in some way. Their personal
reality as experienced can be communicated and related to others
in terms of their unique life-form, as Jesus is described in the

Scriptures.3*3 The essence of one's personhood, whether ours or

Christ's, can never be known di rectly in this life and defined.
It can only be known and experienced by encounter. The essence of
personhood can be defined only in terms of the nature of rela

tionships, that is in terms of the functional meaning and signif
icance of persons to one another.3*3
Certainly, what we mean by recognizing God present in

Christ, can only be known and expressed in terms of who this

3*lRoch A. Kereszty, 0. Cist. Jesus Chr i st: Fundamentals
Christology. New York: Alba House, 1991, p. 308-312.

of

3*3A clear implication of this is that one is on some level
conscious of one's unique reality. If so, Jesus was conscious of
his personal reality as God or he could not have communicated it
through his words and actions.

For further discussion of the idea that relativity towards
another constitutes the human person, see: Joseph Ratzinger,
"Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology." Communio 17 (Fall
1990)3: ^37-45^; Hans Urs von Balthasar, "On the Concept of
Person." Communio 13 (Spring 1986)1: 18-26; and, W. Norris Clarke.
"Person, Being and St. Thomas," cited above.
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other is for us. The very idea of a personal God is relational,
rather than ontological in the sense that we somehow perceive and
abstract the essence of the other. God as idea or concept is the
recognition of an ultimate relational reality between creature
and Creator.

It is the personal reality of God in Christ, as

revealed by the quality of God's kenotic love and miraculous

deeds,

that God communicates to us. God's ontological and meta

physical nature can only be secondarily derived from the nature

of God's communicated personal reality, or from the purely
rational sources of philosophy. As pointed out in the section on
grace and nature,

that problematic can be solved best on the

level of the interpersonal or relational, rather than on the
level of difference in natures. God's personal reality cannot be

a universal abstraction of anything we know. Even Absolute Being
is a concept which universalizes what we know of Being;

it is not

an ontic entity, or God himself.

Balthasar's emphasis on knowing God as formal object in
Christ through the experience of God's love, exemplifies his view

that one must see the essence of personhood in a Trinitarian

light and in the nature of the relationship, rather than individ
uality as such. One is most fully a person, when one lives one's
life in Christ,

in a life of love (mission).Further,

I be

lieve his theological aesthetics provides the only adequate way

to understand how the personal reality of God in Christ is
expressed and communicated analogically, first to the Apostles
n*See, Balthasar, "On the Concept of Person," pp.23-26.

171
and now to us. Personal reality, God's in Christ, or any personal
reality, can only be expressed, communicated and known,

itively and synthetically,

intu

in and through a "life-form" which

reveals the meaning and significance of another for us. Analogy
as applied to God's personal reality in Christ the concrete

analogy,

is not the rational and intellectual extension of human

perfections to an infinite degree. Nor is it the philosophical
use of reason to examine analogically the attributes of God as

the fullness of perfections found in the created order. Rather,

it is an analogical personal encounter with God in Christ,

in

which an intuitive, synthetic judgment of God's personal reality

is made under the influence of the light of God's love shining on
the face of Christ, through Christ's words and actions. One is
free to choose to accept or reject that light,

to see or not to

see.

The unique way in which a person, uses the "stuff" of
created being (the transcendentals),

to express their personal

reality through words and deeds, actions or inactions,

who they are for us.

reveals

It is not a revelation of their ontological

essence, but a revelation of their personal reality. That reality
has a "life-form" which can be perceived only aesthetically and

personally, if one is to know the person's significance and
meaning for them, as distinguished from the simple truth and
goodness of their actions. Love alone reveals the true and unique
personal significance of the other for us, and that personal and
unique love can be perceived only as beauty. As Balthasar's has
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contended, only God's love can reveal his unique personal and
divine reality, which is the basis for our experience of his
authority and the motive for the act of divine faith.

To sum up then, analogy in the realm of faith knowing of
God, through God in Christ, is analogy by personal encounter. The
medium of the analogy is not a concept or idea, but Christ's

"super-form" or "life-form." It is a graced, aesthetic,

intuitive

and synthetic judgment of God's personal reality. Analogy in the
realm of natural theology or philosophy, is a purely rational

judgment and a purely natural knowing of God's metaphysical
reality based on the intrinsic principles of natural knowing
through universals.

It can shed no light on God's personal

reality which can be known only in encountering Christ's personal

reality.

Subjective and Objective Knowledge in the Act of Faith
Further,

I do not think that Balthasar's approach is "a

purely subjective explanation of the nature of faith."

In his

article on "Faith," T. Urdanoz says:

A purely subjective explanation of the nature of faith based
on psychological analysis and phenomenological description
of the act of believing is likely to lead, if the method is
exclusive, to antidogmatic positions such as are implied by
one or another of the following: (1) the purely affective
commitment proposed since the time of Martin Luther by many
Protestant writers who wished to dissociate themselves from
the concept of faith-assent of Catholic theology; (2) a
philosophical, rationalist concept of faith based on the
criticism of I. Kant; (3) the semirationalist theory of
faith proposed by L.E. Hermes and A. Gunther and condemned
by Vatican Council I; (4) the fideist concept of faith
proposed by L.E. Bautain, or A. Bonnetty's traditionalist
concept, both of which were also condemned by Vatican Coun
cil I; (5) the Modernist and immanentist concepts of faith;
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(6) the existentialist faith affirmed by S. Kierkegaard and
Karl Barth.
As Urdanoz says Catholic theology has stressed as primary,

the

objective content of Revelation (God as Formal Object and First
Truth, both in dicendo and in cognoscendo) and those truths

believed with divine faith on God's authority.1*4* The
3
subjective
dimension has been considered secondary and derivative.

I think

that Balthasar's approach says that form (Christ's life-form) and
content (God in Christ and in himself as formal object)

in the

act of divine faith cannot really be separated. The subjectiveobjective dichotomy is not that helpful in understanding the

nature of the act of faith.

If subjective means simply that the

objective is experienced and judged subjectively,

to understanding.

it adds little

If subjective refers to the choice to believe

God and God's Revelation in Christ, and to surrender and commit

oneself to God (tides qua), then I don't see how that is second

ary and derivative. That seems to be fundamental and essential.
It might be better to say that the act of faith has two constitu

tive elements, tides qua and tides quae, both of which are

3*5Urdanoz, p. 798.

3**The integral object of faith "includes all that God has
revealed. Everything to which the formal motive of faith extends
must be embraced by the integral object. The formal reason for
believing is the authority of God, and this exists equally with
respect to anything and everything that God has in fact revealed.
'By divine and catholic faith, ail those things must be believed
which are contained in the written word of God and in tradition,
and those which are proposed by the Church, either by way of solemn
pronouncement or through the exercise of her ordinary and universal
teaching power, to be believed as divinely revealed. (Denz 3011)'."
Urdanoz, p. 799.
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integral to a genuine act of divine faith.

It is true that

logically and formally the choice to surrender and commit oneself
to God follows the judgment that God has been encountered, but

one might ask whether the latter judgment is also a free choice

which implicitly contains the willingness to surrender to God,

and to believe what God is revealing as truth. This simply
illustrates the impossibility of assigning greater importance to
one of these two elements in an actual act of divine faith.

In addition there are,

I believe, two types of objectivity

involved in the act of faith. There is the subjective encounter
with the objective reality of God in Christ through Christ’s

"super-form" in the analogical manner described above.3*7 Then
there is the conceptual and rational way in which that objective
content is articulated and expressed. On the existential level
these two types of objectivity are inseparable. Doctrines and

creeds must be humanly congruent with the reality encountered and
known. But,

the foundation of the latter dimension of the act of

divine faith is the objectivity of the encounter with Christ.

That faith encounter, available in all ages, makes the identity
and continuity in faith through levels of doctrinal development

possible.

If the objective reality of the subjective encounter

with God in Christ is not the same from age to age,

then contin

uity in doctrine and creed is not possible. Put philosophically,

following Balthasar, Christ's personal ontological reality as God

U7

qua.

Balthasar's pistis and gnosis, which are part of the

fides
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was communicated through the personal reality of his "life-form."

That personal and ontological reality was self-expressed , re

ceived and transmitted in the historical-cultural forms of the

context in which he communicated himself.

I believe that this is

the only way to explain how true historical continuity and
identity of doctrine is possible, unless God communicates Christ

's reality in each generation non-historically by direct inspir

ation. This latter view would be consistent with a more immanentist and illuminist perspective with respect to human conscious
ness. But it is subject to all the dangers of a subject-bound

epistemology. This brings us to the hermeneutical question of the
transposition of the knowledge of personal reality of Christ in
different concepts and language, and the question of the depen

dency of truth and meaning on context. Given the restrictions of
this thesis,

1 cannot treat this at length, but I want to comment

on a few issues.

Christ in Context
Francis Schussler Fiorenza's views, as previously noted,

reflect the modern critique of "foundational ism."

the search for foundations is futile.

willing to agree to this view,

It holds that

I think Balthasar, would be

if it were limited to a search for

indisputable foundational tenets which would justify the knowl

edge we have by faith. As we have seen31*, Balthasar holds that

fundamental theology has been stunted for the past hundred years.

3U Supra, p. 60.
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Instead of asking the central question, "How does God's revela
tion confront man in history? How is it perceived?", fundamental

theology has sought verification by reason of Christ's claims.
This is the kind of foundationalism against which the modern

critique, epitomized by Fiorenza, has been mounted.
The idealist and rationalist approaches were but two of the
consequences of the "turn to the subject." Theology sought to

meet Idealism and Deism on its own ground by locating the source

of certitude about Revelation within the structure of the conlift
sciousness of the human subject. As Fiorenza points out
there
was a radical shift to a new starting point for theology in orde
to provide certitude for Revelation. The new starting point was

philosophical anthropology. Hermes, Gunther, Drey and others

sought to find certitude for Revelation in its correlation with
human consciousness.

But, Fiorenza sees the transcendental approach as also a
foundationalist approach. Fiorenza contends that the transcenden

tai approach "operates with a coherence and disclosure theory of
truth.

It seeks to show the correlation between present human

experience and belief statements."551 More specifically,

it seeks

a critical correlation in two basic steps, between a phenomeno

logical, transcendental or existential analysis of religious

experience, and Christian faith, or Revelation.551 He sees David
n,Fiorenza, pp. 260-62.
ISO.
Florenza, p. 270, and 276 ff

5511 bid. , p.

276.

177

Tracy's attempts to correlate the "Situation and Message" as
basically part of the same attempt.

The truth of the religious tradition consists in its ability
to disclose what coheres with the religious dimension of
human experience. This disclosure-coherence model of truth
underlies all these diverse conceptions of correlation
irrespective of whether the disclosure is seen as actualiza
tion, explici tation, or intensification and manifestation.
Such a model tends to view the Christian tradition primarily
as specification of what is universally experienced as
religious. The historical particularity of the tradition as
well as the force of its conflict with experience tends to
be minimized in such a model.352
In contrast to this Balthasar,

I believe, sees the Christian

tradition as a specification of what is uniquely experienced in
the personal encounter of Christ in the act of divine faith. That
experience of Christ challenges and calls for conversion and

surrender to a new way of seeing and living reality, which finds

its apogee in the cross of Christ.

It is the encounter of the

personal reality of God in Christ that is the foundation of the

act of divine faith, of creed, doctrine, and theology. The
reciprocal correlation to be made is between faith and revela

tion, which then illumines the nature of the human condition, or

anthropology. The process of hermeneutics becomes one of under

standing the language and concepts in which the personal and
ontological reality of Christ is transmitted from age to age, so

that his reality may challenge, convert and transform the pres
ent.

In this Balthasar shares the pre-critical view of the

patristic tradition which saw faith as a true knowledge of God,

3SZ

Ibid., p. 283.
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conferred by God's grace.111 The foundat ional i sm critiqued by
Balthasar and Fiorenza is the fruit of the critical period in

theology.
The immediate source of the search for an unshakable founda
tion for all human knowledge, which has been termed "Carte
sian anxiety," is itself but a reflection of the search for
certitudo in the period immediately following the CatholicProtestant split. The whole of the critical era has been
preoccupied with establishing the foundation for knowledge
and has sought to place it, one way or another, within the
human mind conceived as an isolated "subject." Being does
not cooperate in the act by which it is known; it is rather
a passive unknowable whose intelligibility is determined by
the access allowed to it through the activity of the conditioned subject.
I cannot take the space to analyze Fiorenza's hermeneutical

solution to foundationa1ism. But, his reconstructive hermeneutics
with its emphasis on context-dependent truth and meaning,

seems

to me to so reiativize ontological truth and being, and the
connection between the two, that he too ends up in a subject-

bound position. The only difference is that human experience,
tested by communal reflective judgment, becomes the norm substi

tuted for reason.

St. Thomas did emphasize that personal being in particular

is active and dynamic in its se1f-communication. This thought has
been developed by Balthasar to explain the manner in which God in
Christ communicates his personal reality and being to us.

I

believe no personal being, and in particular the personal being

353

I am using pre-critical, critical and post-critical in the
senses defined by Francis Martin in his article "Feminist Theology:
A Proposal," Communio 20 (Summer 1993)2: 334-376, at pp.336-39.
35»

Ibid., p. 344.
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of God in Christ, can be "a passive unknowable whose intelligi
bility is determined by the access allowed to it through the

activity of the conditioned subject." 555 We can only receive

another personal being and be informed and enriched by them.
believe that post-critical thought,

I

if it is to remain in conti

nuity with the Tradition, will have to find its foundation on the
active, dynamic and communicative nature of personal being, which
can only be received.

In a sense,

will be the new paradigm.

the old paradigm transposed,

It seems fitting to conclude with a

passage from St. Paul:

For no one can lay any foundation other than the one that
has been laid; that foundation is Jesus Christ. Now if
anyone builds on the foundation with gold, silver, precious
stones, wood, hay, straw--the work of each builder will
become visible, for the Day will disclose it, because it
will be revealed with fire, and the fire will test what sort
of work each has done. If what has been built on the founda
tion survives, the builder will receive a reward. If the
work is burned up, the builder will suffer a loss; the
builder will be saved, but only as through fire. (1 Cor.
3.11-15)

355

Ibid.
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